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# THE JEWS OF TO-DAY



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BY

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY  
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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY  
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## INTRODUCTION

"LIFE is interesting, if not happy," Sir John Seeley used to say. The same may be said of the Jews who have had the unfortunate knack of attracting the world's attention to themselves for the last two thousand years, with results often disastrous to themselves. Formerly the interest was theological. The Jews were the solitary exception to the Christian consensus. Yet, curiously enough, just as theology is losing its hold on the world's attention, the interest in the Jew has risen again to the same heights as before.

Indeed, the modern Jew is anomalous enough to attract the attention of a world curious, above all things, about anomalies. The most modern of men with the most ancient of faiths, sceptical yet loyal, materialist and idealist in one, cosmopolitan yet priding himself on his patriotism, conspicuous among both capitalists and socialists, exploiter and exploited, the Jew remains the Sphinx of the nations, asking the sempiternal Jewish question. Or, rather, he is always raising a whole Cadmean crop of questions, economic, demographic, religious, social, eugenical, even political. Are the Jews of to-day the direct descendants of the Israelites of old? Will Judaism survive the assaults of modern criticism and scepticism? Are Jews a people, a nation, a sect or a race? Is there a specific

Jewish culture differing from the civilisations of the nation among whom they live? Is there a Jewish music, a Jewish art? What is the cause of the comparative superiority of the Jewish intellect, if there be such superiority? These are but samples of questions that have been raised in our own times about Jews and still lack definite answers.

There is even a certain scientific interest about investigations into Jewish phenomena. Thus the question about the purity of the Jewish race, on which so much has been written of recent years, has a direct bearing on the opposition noticed by the late Sir Francis Galton, between the nature and the nurture of men. In other words, does birth or training determine human characteristics? The Jews throw light upon this subject whether they are a distinctive race or not. If they are, their common characteristics shown in such different parts of the world is evidence of the influence of breed or nature. If they are not, the same characteristics prove the influence of nurture, education or environment. Jewish characteristics have even been made the subject of discussion in the struggle now going on between the Mendelians and the Biometricians. The former assert, the latter deny, that Jewish features are hereditary in mixed marriages, according to the Mendelian Law.

So too, the sociologist can find facts for or against his generalisations from Jewish phenomena. Jews, for example, are predominantly town dwellers, and it is a problem for the sociologist to ascertain how far their common characteristics, *e.g.*, their shorter height, is due to this fact. Or again, the difference in nurture may show striking phenomena even in the same town area. Thus, Sir Isidore Spielmann and myself, on

measuring the heights of a number of London Jews, arrived at the interesting result that the heights of those dwelling in the West End or richer parts of London were, on an average, two inches greater than those dwelling in the East End where poverty prevails. As all our subjects were descendants of the same class of Jews the increase of height was obviously due to better nourishment.

The general form of these problems, anthropological, sociological or demographic, is by way of comparison both in the popular and the scientific interest. Jews are the more musical, or more materialistic, or richer, or meaner, than their Gentile neighbours, is the general way of making statements about Jewish characteristics. Yet in every case we are met with the curious fact that while some Jews are more musical than their non-Jewish neighbours, they have a larger number of deaf mutes who cannot be musical ; or again, while some of them are richer, a very large proportion of them are poorer than others. Such contrasts raise problems which have something more than a mere popular interest of curiosity.

The very methods by which such problems can be approached have not yet been determined. The nearest approach is afforded by the Galtonian curves of frequency, as developed by Prof. Karl Pearson. Roughly speaking, this method consists in determining how many Jews out of each million fall within each of the sixteen classes into which any given body of men may be divided with regard to the possession of any specific characteristic—musical ability, riches and poverty, intellect and insanity, and the like. Of course, the vast majority of men, when ranged in order of merit with regard to any of these qualities, cluster round the

centre or average classes. But if we assume that the curves of distribution thus obtained are normal or symmetrical, the differences between them at both extremes should be the same. Thus, if at the superior limit of the distribution of Jewish intellect, there are more geniuses among a million Jews than among the same number of Germans, there should be, at the other end of the Jewish curve of intellect, more idiots and insane persons among Jews than among Germans: this is found to be the case. Similarly they have both more rich and more poor, more persons musically gifted, but yet more deaf mutes, more philanthropists at one end of the curve of altruism and more greedy and stingy persons at the other end. Thus, by a mere deduction from rigid mathematical laws many of the anomalies that the Jewish people present are, to some extent, explained.

The difficulties of applying such a method are enormous, and indeed I believe that, up to the present, I have been the only person sufficiently daring to attempt such an explanation. Your average man is so predominant in point of numbers that he swamps all those much above or much below the average, and yet it is only the exceptional persons, as a rule, that we can count. Hence in making deductions about the relative position of two races, judged by their respective curves of distribution, or rather by the ends of such curves, it would seem as if we were making the tail or even the tip of the tail, wag the dog. Take, for example, an instance which I recently had occasion to work out. In the fifth edition of *Wer Ist's*, the German equivalent of our *Who's Who*, I have found 1064 Jewish names out of the 16,000 therein mentioned, or, in other words, 6.5 per cent., whereas the Jews in the German-speaking

countries are not much more than 1 per cent. Yet it would be precarious in the extreme to deduce any conclusions as to the relative superiority of intellect of the average German-speaking Jew as compared with his Gentile neighbour. Jews are predominantly of the mercantile classes, and it is from these classes almost exclusively that the professional element, which fills out such books of celebrities, is mainly recruited.

Thus figures when applied to Jewish phenomena are often deceptive, or at least have to be interpreted with great care. Yet without figures what have we? Merely impressions or, often, only prejudices, which are specially strong in the case of Jews. Hence, when examining, some thirty years ago, into the charges which anti-Semites brought against the Jews, I found it necessary to get as many numerical facts as possible about the Jews in their various aspects, economic, demographic, and the like, and thus started a series of investigations which have grown into a whole literature, of which this book of Dr. Ruppin's is a striking example. He treats his subject, at least in the second edition, now represented in this English version, from the standpoint of a single problem, which, however, touches upon most of the other problems which the Jewish question raises. When the walls of the Ghetto fell some fifty years ago the admission of the Jews into modern society on comparatively equal terms raised the question how far their distinctive characteristics—intellectual, cultural, religious and the rest—would survive the contact with modern culture, from which repressive legislation had hitherto restrained them. Would they, could they be assimilated into modern European culture and still remain Jews in the characteristics they had retained throughout the



Christian ages ? That is the problem which Dr. Ruppin sets himself to solve, and the answer he gives is a decided negative.

Dr. Ruppin comes to this conclusion after the widest possible induction of the cultural and demographic facts relating to modern Jews. He starts with the assumption that there was a specific Jewish culture developed out of the old biblical culture of Jews into the *Ghetti* of the Middle Ages with their autonomous organisation and isolation from the rest of the world. This culture found its appropriate medium in the sacred language of Hebrew, in which most Jewish children were trained from their earliest youth, and was fostered by a sense of common descent and creed, and, in later centuries, of common persecution. This Ghetto life and culture continued down to the middle of the nineteenth century with most Western European Jews and is still predominant among the Jews of Eastern Europe. But it is being broken down mainly by Jews themselves who, in West Europe and America, have deserted the "Chedarim," or special Jewish schools in which Hebrew is taught. They frequent the schools and colleges of the nations among which they dwell and, in many ways, adopted the interest of their neighbours in preference to, or side by side with, those of their own people. Dr. Ruppin also points out the rapid increase of intermarriage between Jews and Gentiles, especially in Germany and Austria, which almost necessarily breaks down the transmission of the special Jewish culture to the children. In the same countries baptism has, of recent years, considerably increased as a means of getting social recognition and professional advancement. Dr. Ruppin appears to think that the congestion of Jews in large towns is also a factor tending

to assimilation. But it is difficult to agree with him on this point. Surely the bringing together of many Jews is rather a cause of the retention of the Jewish spirit than otherwise. So too, the recent decline in the birth-rate among Jews has little bearing upon the problem of assimilation except, in so far as by limiting the numbers of Jews in the future, it may render the proportion of the assimilated comparatively larger.

However, there can be no doubt that, on the whole, Jews, especially in Western Europe and America, have become more like their neighbours in social practices and in the adoption of the surrounding culture in its widest sense. And if this were to result in the disappearance or diminution of the specific Jewish spirit this would be a misfortune not alone for the Jews themselves but for the world in general. The great danger of modern times is the tendency towards what may be termed Chinesism, a fatal and monotonous similarity and mediocrity invading all sections of national life. One of the outward signs of this is the deadly monotony of dress and furniture, which is becoming more and more international. The growth of inter-communication is giving a common set of ideas and ideals to the whole world and making it more and more difficult for any special culture like the Irish, or the Japanese, or the Jewish, to hold its own. Every such specific culture that disappears would make the final form of humanity, which seems so rapidly approaching, less rich and manifold. There would be nothing gained for the world and much would be lost for it if all Jews were to-morrow to become indistinguishable from their neighbours.

But does it altogether follow that the advance of modern culture among Jews must necessarily destroy

their specific characteristics and ideals? Modern civilisation, in some of its chief aspects, is based upon the Hebraic ideals, and the rapid manner in which Jews have acquired modern culture is itself a proof that there is no incongruity between the Jewish folk-soul and European civilisation. In England, France, Germany and America the Jew, in the immediate past, has shown himself quite capable of being strongly and patriotically English, French, German and American, but still retaining his devotion to his faith, his interest in the fate and misfortunes of his fellow Jews throughout the world. Such Jews have had a duplex culture, and their nature has, in consequence, become richer and more iridescent. So far as this is so, both Jews and the world have gained by their adoption of modern culture.

But in one respect Jews have certainly suffered incalculable harm by their assimilation of modern thought. The centre of Jewish life was religion; to uphold the ancestral faith was their *raison d'être*. Yet modern thought has largely undermined the older revelational views of religion, of which Judaism was the typical example. It is one of the ironies of history that just when Jews have been released from their mediaeval bondage and have been admitted to political and, to some extent, social equality with the European nations, the faith that has kept them alive, and at the same time isolated them from their neighbours, has been disrupted by the assaults of modern rationalism. Anti-Semites assert that much of modern scepticism has been due to Jewish influence on the press and general literature. The process has been rather the other way, and the late Anatole Leroy-Benaïeu was undoubtedly right in asserting that it was modern

culture that had made Jews sceptical rather than that Jews had interpenetrated modern culture with scepticism. There is a rationalistic strain in Jewish thought and theology, as is illustrated by the speculations of Abraham ibn Ezra, Maimonides and Spinoza ; and this rationalism has, undoubtedly, helped the rapid assimilation of modern thought by Jewish thinkers. But the disrupting effect came, in the first place, from the Encyclopedists and Kant.

Yet there are those who consider that the fundamentals of Judaism are identical with the most prominent aspects of modern thinking. Its two main dogmas, the Divine Unity and the Messianic Hope, only express, in historic form, the fundamental scientific conception of the Unity of Energy and the essentially modern notion of Progress. Whatever changes the religious consciousness may undergo in the near future, these conceptions will survive, and Judaism has at least as great a chance of passing uninjured through the critical transition of religious thought as any of the historic faiths.

It will thus be seen that Dr. Ruppin's work raises a world-problem of the highest interest. The answer he gives to the question he himself has raised is the Zionist solution. This, as is well known, regards the revival of Israel as a political entity as the only means of combating the disappearance of the Jewish spirit. By creating a Jewish nation on the soil of the ancient fatherland in Palestine Zionists hope to revive and intensify the special Jewish culture which has lasted on through the ages till its existence is now threatened by the assimilation of modern culture. It is recognised that it will be impossible to transfer the whole of the fourteen million Jews of the world to the narrow

confines of the Holy Land ; but if there were established a spiritual as well as a political centre in Zion its example and influence would radiate through all Jewish communities throughout the world and thus keep alive the Jewish folk-soul. The romance of the notion must appeal to every heart, Jewish or Gentile, conscious of the aspirations and ideals that have clustered round the Holy Land ever since the fall of the Jewish State.

Without going into the general question, we may doubt how far the Zionist solution meets the particular problem raised by Dr. Rupp in his interesting work. Jews outside Palestine—and the majority of them, it is recognised on all hands, must remain outside for all time—will be just as much subject to the assaults of the assimilative forces after as before the foundation of a new Jewish State. The difficulties of the Jewish position, now due to their being an inter-nation, will be rather increased than diminished, if they once more form a nation. There will be troubles of Ultramarinism corresponding to the difficulties of Ultramon-tanism in the Catholic State.

The source of all the troubles that beset the Jews, in their relation to the outer world, is to be found in the continuance of their mediaeval status in one great modern Empire, which still retains a constitution based on mediaeval conceptions. Russia is still a Church-State, in which only those who belong to the National Church have full rights as citizens. This obsolete conception must break down in Russia as it has done elsewhere, with the development of industrial democracy within the Czar's dominions. When that day arrives the Russian Jews will take their fitting place in their native country and will no longer be

thrust elsewhere into that sudden contact with modern thought which leads to the assimilation so much dreaded by Dr. Ruppin. Jews throughout the ages have faced this problem of assimilation with success, as was notably shown in the great Spanish-Arabic period, when Jews acquired all that their Arab conquerors could teach them of Greek science and philosophy without losing aught of their Jewish feeling and culture. The same occurred in Holland, in France, in England, and, to a large extent, in Germany. The danger of a conflict of cultures, which Dr. Ruppin so much deprecates, is the danger of religion in general, which would assail Jews even on the sacred soil of Palestine with as much intensity as elsewhere.

Dr. Ruppin has another and more personal reason for advocating their return to the Holy Land as a prophylactic against assimilation. He regards a return to the soil, in a literal sense, as a necessary means of salvation for the modern man, debased and degenerated by urban conditions. In its general aspects this is a problem too large to be discussed in this place, though it may be remarked that the increase of urban taxation and the development of electrical power will probably send back even the industrial population to the land before another generation is past. Jews, however, have a special need of an agricultural element owing to their having been so long cooped up in towns, leading to a one-sided development towards intellectualism. Jewish leaders have recognised this need both within and outside Palestine, the most prominent examples of the latter being the Baron de Hirsch colonies in the Argentine and the 40,000 Jewish farmers of the United States. In Palestine itself Zionist feeling may well aid the first settlers in overcoming the natural repug-

nance of town-bred men to the toilsome work in the fields. Recently an agricultural station has been established mainly by American Jews in Haifa, Palestine, under the direction of Mr. Aaronsohn, the discoverer of "wild wheat." The world-wide tendency to make agriculture a branch of applied science is thus made effective on the very spot where, it would seem, agriculture first took its rise.

I have now discussed most of the points raised in the following pages sufficiently to put the reader in a position to appreciate their wide significance both for Jews and others. It remains only to say a few words of the man to whom we owe these suggestive pages. Dr. Arthur Ruppín was born on March 1st, 1876, and after studying law and economics entered the Prussian State service. He has written upon the Theory of Value, expounded by Thünen (1902), and on Darwinism and Sociology (1903), besides the present work, which appeared in its first edition (1904), and in a second form in 1911. He was the founder and first editor of the *Zeitschrift fuer juedische Statistik und Demographie*, of which eight volumes have already appeared. He helped to found as well a Bureau of Jewish statistics, which has issued a dozen valuable monographs; so that he writes on matters Jewish with the fullest knowledge of all the information that can be obtained in quantitative form. Dr. Ruppín has proved the ardour of his convictions as a Zionist by taking up his residence in Palestine for a number of years, and he is thus in a specially favourable position to speak of the solution he proposes of the problem he has raised.

JOSEPH JACOBS.

PART I. ASSIMILATION.

*SECTION I.*

ASSIMILATION IN THE DIASPORA A CONSTANT  
MENACE TO JUDAISM.





## CHAPTER I.

### REVIEW OF JEWISH ASSIMILATION— HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL.

#### *A. The process of disruption in the present day.*

The structure of Judaism, once so solid, is crumbling away before our very eyes. Conversion and inter-marriage are thinning the ranks of Jews in every direction, and the loss is the heavier to bear, in that the great decrease in the Jewish birth-rate makes it more and more difficult to fill up the gaps in the natural way. Until lately this breaking-up process was confined to Central and Western Europe; a few years ago it was thought it could only gain ground there, and that the six million Jews on the other side of the Vistula would be untouched by it. Since then, however, a revolution has taken place in Russia, and with it comes the glaring revelation of the ardour with which the Russian Jew throws in his lot with that of the land of his birth, and how readily the intellectual Jew, in particular, sacrifices his Judaism to plunge headlong into the vortex of Russian life. Thus here, too, we see disruption seizing on the great mass of East European Jews and threatening to undermine the last bulwark of Judaism.

Many circumstances conspire to forward the movement. The progressive development of trade among

Christians has deprived the Jews of any claim to a special calling even in those branches of commerce which used to be almost exclusively in their hands. Similarly, as soon as Jews attend the same schools as Christians—instead of exclusively Jewish ones, as formerly—they tend to lose their specific culture. And on the other hand, the growing disregard for any kind of traditional religion, the supplanting of Yiddish (Jargon) by Russian, German, and English, and the immense emigration from Eastern Europe to America—all these have conspired to loosen the ties which formerly bound every individual Jew to his community. So the gulf between Jew and Christian is bridged, and it is difficult for Jews to resist going right over to Christianity by the path of conversion and inter-marriage, thereby securing for themselves, or at least for their children, all the advantages which in every country accompany conformity to the prevailing religion.

*B. The social life of the Jews before their emancipation.*

In the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, no one could have conceived such a development. The Jews were then shut in their Ghettos, confined to a few mean and despicable trades, and far removed from Christian culture. It seemed unthinkable that they should step out of their narrow circle, and work side by side with Christians for a common culture. The intellectual life of the Jews was then limited to the study of the Bible and Talmud. These studies, principally encouraged in the Talmudic schools in Poland, were not primarily directed to finding out the *spirit* of these books. They made of the text of the Bible a palaestra

for interpretations which, though clever, were hair-splitting and fantastic; nor did the Talmud, upon which they piled commentary upon commentary, and supercommentary upon supercommentary, fare much better. By the side of these flourished the "Kabbala," which in its most important book, the *Zohar* professed to have revealed the key to all wisdom, and to be able thereby to dispense with all other knowledge. The innumerable ritual ceremonies were slavishly followed and made the pivot of daily life. Nothing gives us a clearer insight into the mental attitude of the Jews of that period, than that event which moved the whole of seventeenth century Jewry to its very depths—the appearance of the Messiah, Sabbatai Zevi, and the subsequent cult of Sabbataism in the eighteenth century led by Nehemiah Chija Chajon and other less scrupulous adventurers. On the same level was the quarrel between Emden and Eybenschütz in Hamburg (1750-1756)—a quarrel which raised the passions of Jews all over Europe to boiling point—raising the question whether or not the life-saving amulets sold to midwives by Rabbi Eybenschütz contained the name of Sabbatai Zevi in their formula. Such was the intellectual standard of Jewry in the eighteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

### C. *The emancipation of the Jews.*

• If we are to believe the statements made in several Jewish histories, the revolution in the social and cultural status of the Jews must be ascribed solely to the fact that Moses Mendelssohn happened to be born in

<sup>1</sup> An account of this quarrel appears in the Acts of the Hamburg State Archives under the title "Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde," bk. xii. p. 89 (Hamburg, 1903).

1729, that he came to Berlin in 1743, that he there became the friend of Lessing, translated the Bible into German, and wrote a number of important philosophical works.<sup>1</sup> It need hardly be said that such a view reveals a puerile attitude to history. The real cause of the so-called emancipation of the Jews is not to be found in the achievements of any single Jew, but in the sudden change of outlook, social and economic, which characterised the whole of the eighteenth century.

The development of commerce and industry, which then finally shook off the fetters of the mediaeval corporations by taking on an individualist and capitalist character, brought Christians and Jews into contact with one another. Not only were Jews and Christians associated in great business enterprises, but the Jewish profession of money-lending suddenly lost its unpleasant savour. Whereas the Jew had formerly only been able to sustain the credit of the consumer, and was thus condemned to the calling of a usurer, he now found himself in a position, by assisting the credit of the *producer*, to become a valuable aid to business men,

<sup>1</sup> It may be said at once that Mendelssohn's contributions to Jewish literature are surrounded by a halo which would surprise none more than their modest author himself, were he here now to witness it. Mendelssohn, to whose mind and character all homage is due, was nevertheless no great philosopher; he walked in the well-worn paths of Wolff's philosophy, and cannot be mentioned in the same breath with Kant, much less compared to him. His attitude to Judaism is anything but logical. His great achievement for Jewish emancipation was the translation of the Pentateuch, which, by bringing German Jews into touch with the pure German language, gave them access to German literature and culture. But can this—250 years after Luther—justify making a hero of him? Bernfeld was right (*Jews and Judaism in the Nineteenth Century*, Berlin, 1898) in denouncing the exaggeration of Moses Mendelssohn's share in the emancipation of the Jews.

and a promoter of industries which required his capital.

The change in their economic condition had a rapid effect on the social status of the Jews. The French philosophers of the second half of the eighteenth century, had proclaimed the equality of men, and when these ideas became embodied in laws, the yoke of the Jews was correspondingly lightened. They gained at once greater freedom for participation in commercial life, and a rise of status; and in proportion as trade and industry took on greater importance in the European States, and the citizen class gradually supplanted the aristocratic, so the Jews advanced in the social scale. Breach after breach was thus made in that wall which separated Christian from Jew; through personal intercourse with Christians the way was opened into the great Christian world of thought. Jews began to read German and French books, etc., and their newly acquired culture influenced them so strongly—in Germany and Western Europe, at least—that in less than fifty years they completely abandoned Yiddish (the so-called Jargon) in favour of the pure language of the country, and approached as nearly as possible to the Christians in dress and customs. From this to complete renunciation of Judaism was but a step. At first, indeed, before the final abandonment of Judaism, many attempts were made to reconcile it with the Christian world of thought. But this world of thought was that of the French and German freethinkers (Voltaire, Holbach, Lamettrie, Diderot, Wolff, Lessing, Reimarus), which, with its championship of atheism and extreme materialism (in France), its glorification of reason, its demand for a rationalistic basis for

everything, its ardour for science, and its antagonism to metaphysics and any positive religion, stood in direct opposition to the contemporary spirit of Judaism. Many a Jew must have been torn between conflicting impulses in hours of doubt.

But from this impasse the Jewish religion rarely emerged triumphant; according to the education and character of each individual Jew, some gave it up entirely in favour of the new knowledge, while others, through a more or less contradictory compromise, sought to bring it into outward harmony with prevailing thought. Mendelssohn belonged to the latter section. He adhered to the ceremonial law, and though he admitted in his open letter to Lavater that "he found many accretions and abuses in Judaism which obscured much of its lustre," though he declared emphatically<sup>1</sup> "I recognise no other eternal truths than those which cannot only be conceived by human reason, but can be demonstrated and verified by human experience"; nevertheless he comes finally to a glorification of the Jewish Law: "What is ordained by Divine Law cannot be set aside by the no less Divine Reason,"<sup>2</sup> and he ends by the following appeal to his co-religionists: "We are allowed to meditate on the Law, to fathom its spirit; here and there to assign a reason where no reason is given by the Lawgiver for enactments made for a specific time and place, and which different times and circumstances necessitate changing—if it should please the greatest Lawgiver to make His will known to us with the same irrefutable truth and infallible directness, with no room for the shadow of a doubt, as He revealed the

<sup>1</sup> *Jerusalem*, Complete Works, p. 256 (Vienna, 1838).

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.* 285.

Law itself to us. When this is not the case, when we can point to no such authority for setting aside the Law, then our petty reasoning is not sufficient to release us from the rigid obedience the Law demands, and the fear of God sets a boundary between speculation and practice which no conscientious man may override." <sup>1</sup>

It is not surprising that Bruno Bauer should ridicule <sup>2</sup> this parody of the sovereignty of Reason; still less surprising to find that such an illogical position could nowhere find acceptance. Everyone knows that Mendelssohn's own children threw their father's doctrines to the winds, cut themselves free of all the ordinances of the Jewish religion, and finally became converts to Christianity. In a letter from the famous etcher Chodowiecki to the Countess von Solms-Laubach, <sup>3</sup> dated December 12th, 1783, we read that the Jews of Berlin are no longer concerned with any kind of ritual, they buy and sell on Saturdays, eat all the forbidden foods, keep no fast days, etc.; only the lower classes (that is, those still untouched by German culture) are still orthodox.

The theories of enlightenment, originally directed against Christianity, proved to be much less destructive of Christianity than of Judaism. The Christian, while theoretically convinced of the untruth of the Christian dogmas, could still remain a Christian; Christianity imposed no special mark of peculiarity upon him, he was to a certain extent Christian without knowing it; his Christianity did not disturb him. It was otherwise with the Jew, the adherent of the religion of a

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.* 287.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Judenfrage*, p. 83 (Braunschweig, 1843).

<sup>3</sup> Reprinted in *Ost und West*, December, 1903, p. 832.



minority. Every way he turned he was constantly reminded of the exceptional position his religion placed him in ; unlike the Christian he could not rid himself of it by disregarding its dogmas and rites, to set himself absolutely free he had to perform an external act. This act was conversion, and the cultured Jews of Berlin were not slow in availing themselves of it to its full extent.

*D. The disintegration of Judaism by the adoption of modern education.*

Berlin was the centre of Jewish enlightenment, and presented the most vivid spectacle of the loosening of the bonds of Judaism ; yet similar phenomena were everywhere apparent, as the recognised social status of the Jews improved, and they were able to take advantage of Christian culture—that is to say, all over Central and Western Europe. Hitherto a well-defined nation, characterised by a specific language, religion, education and customs, they now, by denuding themselves of all peculiarities, became completely denationalised. As in chemistry a compound is dissolved into its elements under the influence of fermentation, and these elements unite again in a new compound, so modern culture, working on the old homogeneous Ghetto-Judaism as a ferment, brought about denationalisation, which, beginning with the splitting up of Judaism into several different grades of culture, culminates in the union of the highest culture with Christianity. The Jews did make some effort to stem the stream ; in Mendelssohn's time the orthodox section were at great pains to check the circulation of his translation of the Pentateuch, to declare his writings heretical, and to warn the Berlin community

of this dangerous spirit. When this failed, and clear-sighted Jews realised that the cause of orthodox Judaism was irreparably lost in Germany, they tried to save what still remained, though with questionable success, by reforming the service, making it more up-to-date (in 1818 the first Reform Synagogue was opened in Hamburg, with an organ, a sermon in German, and a revised Prayerbook), and by modifying the ritual. If Reform Judaism has proved a refuge for many Jews who are deterred from baptism, for many more it has proved but a halfway house from Judaism to Christianity.

If we survey the whole of Jewry as it has emerged from the last century-and-a-half of disintegration, we can distinguish four classes :

1. First we have the great mass of Jews, hitherto, or until very recently, untouched by modern culture, and therefore on the same plane of thought as those we have described as characteristic of the period of 1750. To these belong the great majority of Jews in Russia and Galicia, the native Jews of Morocco, Asia, and European Turkey. They have their own colloquial language called Yiddish or Jargon, or Spaniolisch (a corrupt Spanish) in Turkey and North Africa, and their literature is entirely written in this language and in Hebrew. They keep themselves as a nation apart, wear a peculiar costume (the Ashkenazim, in particular, cultivating side-locks when not forbidden by law), live for the most part under the old Jewish Law which is expounded by their Rabbis ; and disparaging profane learning, rely for their culture on ancient Jewish literature, knowledge of which they acquire from their earliest childhood in the Cheders (religious elementary schools). They are for the most part small traders

(pedlars), artisans, and agents, and are miserably poor. Their birth-rate is very high, families of ten children or more being nothing unusual. Numerically this class is still the biggest in Jewry; about six millions, that is, one half of the nation, belonging to it.

2. The second class has been influenced by modern culture, and speaks the language of the country, and sometimes Jargon as well. It has relinquished its strange apparel (and also the side-locks), and dresses in Christian manner. The Jewish ritual is adhered to—modified in some cases, like that of the Sabbath Laws, when their observance demands too great a sacrifice: there is much less intolerance of all things non-Jewish, imitation of Christian manners and interest in non-Jewish literature being no longer denounced or despised. The children attend Jewish elementary schools by preference, and there receive elementary secular education along with religious teaching. The families are large, though not so large as those of the first class. The members of this second class have an income just sufficient for their wants; some are moderately well-to-do. They include the Russian and Galician Jews who have emigrated to England and America, the Jews of Algiers and the Christian Balkan States, the lower classes of the Jewish population of Holland, and the Jews of the small towns of Austria (always excepting Galicia), Hungary, Eastern Germany, and Alsace Lorraine. Their total may be roughly estimated at three millions.

3. The third class almost entirely ignores Jewish ritual, particularly the observance of the Sabbath; speaks exclusively the language of the country, is educated in the public schools, and no longer concerns itself with Jewish literature. Its adherence to Judaism

consists only in its members marrying within the faith, the circumcision of the sons, and occasional attendance at Synagogue (usually limited to two or three festival days). This class, mostly business men who live in comfortable circumstances and have small families, includes the so-called Jewish bourgeoisie in Germany, England, the Colonies, Italy, France, Holland, America, and the large towns of Austria-Hungary (again excluding Galicia). They number about two millions.

4. The fourth class has completely broken away from Judaism, and remains Jewish only because—either out of conscientiousness or a sense of honour, or out of family and social considerations—it hesitates to take the decisive step of marriage with Christians. Inter-marriage and child-baptism are frequent—two children in a family is the rule. To this class belong the rich Jews of the large towns, and Jews of University education all the world over. They total about one million.

We have roughly indicated four classes, and have for easier reference, tabulated their chief characteristics in an appended table. They must on no account be taken for definite, rigidly marked groups, but are simply landmarks in an ever-flowing stream, which, constantly replenished from the great reservoirs of Jewish orthodoxy in Eastern Europe, finds a final outlet in Christianity.

In proportion as the Jews become penetrated with modern culture, so they become denationalised, and orthodox Judaism (the first section) supplies the liberal class (the second section), this the free-thinking (the third section), and this again the Jews in name only (the fourth section), until we are finally led up, through

conversion and intermarriage, to the Christianised type itself.

It is very rare indeed that a Jew belonging by upbringing and education to the first or second sections becomes baptised. A certain time must elapse before he can throw off the influence of his orthodox-Jewish *milieu*, and the altered conditions and impressions of his later life do not, as a rule, outweigh the influence of the orthodox Judaism of his youth. On the other hand, we may quite well take the four sections as representing four succeeding generations, though in point of fact the distance between orthodoxy and conversion is frequently covered in three and sometimes two generations. We are four or five generations removed from the times of Moses Mendelssohn. Of all the Jews who lived at that time in Berlin, hardly one has a Jewish descendant to-day; they have all gone over to Christianity. On the other hand, the rich Jews of present-day Berlin—those whom we class among the fourth section, and whose children are for the most part baptised in their cradles, or likely to become so later—are descendants of rigidly orthodox Jews, who two or three generations back, left their small native towns in the East Prussian provinces or just over the frontier, to emigrate to Berlin. To anyone who has studied the conditions of Jews in the large European towns, this process is as familiar as it is clear.

## THE FOUR SECTIONS OF JEWRY.

	Number.	Typical Representatives.	Economic Condition.	Religious Outlook.	Education.	Birth-rate per 1,000 souls.	Percentage of Mixed Marriages.	Conversions annually per 10,000 souls.
1st Section.	Six millions.	The great mass of Jews in Russia and Galicia.	Workmen, artisans and shopkeepers without means—and of uncertain livelihood.	Orthodox.	Cheder.	30-40	0-2	0-2
2nd Section.	Three millions.	Settlers in England and America, Roumanian Jews.	Artisans and merchants with modest but settled income.	Liberal.	Jewish elementary schools.	25-30	2-10	2-5
3rd Section.	Two millions.	The mass of German Jews.	Well-to-do Bourgeoisie.	Free-thinking.	Christian elementary and secondary schools.	20-25	10-30	5-15
4th Section.	One million.	Rich Jews and Jews of University Education in all the big towns.	Wealthy Bourgeoisie.	Agnostic.	Public School and University.	15-20	30-50	15-40

E. *Analogous assimilative movements of the Jews in the epochs of Greek and Arabic culture.*

The breaking-up of Judaism, of which we of the present day are witnesses, is by no means without precedent in its history. On the contrary, we see the very same thing happening on both the previous occasions when Judaism came under the influence of foreign culture—in the Greek period two centuries before and one century after Christ ; and in the Arabic period, from the eighth to the twelfth century A.D.

While the Jewish State was still in existence, the great party of Sadducees—similar to the Reformers of the nineteenth century—repudiated the “tradition” (*i.e.* the endless number of ritual ceremonies) on account of their Greek sympathies. Grecian gymnastics were practised in Jerusalem, and Jewish youths were so ashamed of their nationality that they actually submitted to a painful operation in order to remove all traces of circumcision, so that they should not be recognised as Jews in the Gymnasia. The Greek language was substituted for Hebrew and Aramaic, and Greek for Hebrew names. Philo, the leader of the Hellenising party, wrote his books in Greek ; with the aim of defending Judaism against the attacks of paganism, he divested it of individuality and represented it as merely an offshoot of Greek philosophy. He thereby prepared the way for the triumphant progress of Christianity. The one million Jews who lived in Egypt—the centre of Hellenic culture in the first century,—became so utterly merged into Paganism and Christianity that in the following century we hardly hear of the existence of Jews in Egypt at all. It was only in distant Babylon, whither a great portion of

Palestine Jews had migrated, and where they maintained, through their separatist organisation as exiles, a certain measure of autonomy, that the Jews displayed their "will to live," and, through the compilation of the Talmud, raised the Law to its sovereign authority.

Another wave passed over Jewry under the influence of Arabic culture. In the eighth century there arose the great party of Karaites—probably an off-shoot of the Jewish-Arabian colony in Syria—who repudiated the whole Talmud, of which the Jews were so proud, and recognised no authority but that of the Bible. We must not estimate the strength of the Karaites by their miserable descendants of to-day. At the time of their foundation they constituted a danger which threatened the continued existence of Judaism, and were at least the equals in strength of the Talmud Jews. Karaism failed because it set up a new ritual of its own, practically a new Talmud, and thus nullified its very *raison d'être*—antagonism to the superabundance of ritual, and to the exclusiveness of Rabbinic Judaism.

The influence of a Mohammedan environment was no less strong on the Jews of North Africa and Spain than on those of Syria. Jewish literature, hitherto concerned with the revision and interpretation of the Talmud, took on an absolutely different character. The famous Saadiah ben Joseph (892-942), the real founder of Jewish philosophy, is far removed from those who studied only the letter of the Law; his works form a philosophy of religion; he translated the Bible into Arabic, and set himself the task of reconciling tradition with the demands of reason and of altered social conditions, in a manner which is strikingly similar to the work of Moses Mendelssohn,



nine centuries later. In the tenth century we find Jews in North Africa and Spain criticising the Talmud, the Bible, the doctrine of revealed religion, till we even get Unbelief exalted into a principle—the last, certainly, under the influence of the Arabic philosophy of the Mutazilites, then in vogue. Something of this new spirit penetrated even into Babylon, where we have a Gaon of the College of Sura, Samuel ben Chofni Hakohen (960-1034) declaring “That anything opposed to reason need not be accepted.”

The great men of this period—a Salomon ibn Gebirol, a Maimonides—are not Jewish in teaching, but draw their wisdom from the newly discovered writings of the Greek philosophers. Samuel David Luzzatto in the nineteenth century had his reasons for calling the doctrine of Maimonides un-Jewish, and the contemporaries of Maimonides in France and Germany, who still held fast by the tradition, had reason also to be horrified at this enlightened Spanish Jew who was so loudly acclaimed. “They dreaded the destructive force of this foreign wisdom, and opposed it for hundreds of years with increasing bitterness.”<sup>1</sup> But they struggled in vain. Even if the Talmudists of other countries were successful in enforcing their decree that “no Jew under thirty should read Maimonides,” in Spain it was all over with the old Jewish tradition, which, indeed, has never been able to recover lost ground.

As soon as the Jews had laid hold of this culture—this Arabic-Spanish philosophy which was founded on the Hellenistic—the way was clear to complete assimilation. Already under the rule of Islam, conversion and

<sup>1</sup> M. Braun, *History of the Jews and their Literature* (Breslau, 1899).

intermarriage were of no rare occurrence, and when, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Christianity triumphed in Spain, the Jews went over to it in multitudes. The fact that in the year 1492, when confronted with a choice between baptism and exile, so many Jews chose exile, cannot be put down to strength of any religious belief : under similar pressure, the most enlightened Western Jews of to-day, who have no sort of connection with Jewish religion as such, would probably act in exactly the same way. Just such ruthless measures were needed to stiffen the backs of the vacillators ; and it is hardly too much to say that the Jews in Spain would in a very short time have been lost to Judaism if they had not been forced back into it through persecution. These periods of assimilation in Hellenistic and Moorish times are not isolated phenomena ; they are but the visible culmination of a movement which has always undermined Jewry in the Diaspora. Even in the times when the Jews lived in their Ghettos under most terrible oppression, and were cut off as a community from all contact with Christian culture, we see to our astonishment, individual Jews (either baptised or very nearly so) in the courts of princes and bishops in high positions, or else like Spinoza, leading progressive thought. The yellow badge which the Jews of the Middle Ages were forced to wear, and which every Jewish history speaks of as the greatest disgrace, was not introduced merely as a badge of dishonour ; it was designed rather to make it impossible for Jews to mix unrecognised with Christians, and to deport themselves as Christians. It shows us that even in the time of their greatest degradation many Jews sought to fuse themselves with the Christian majority. We may read Jewish history in

the Diaspora as one long battle between, on the one hand, the ideals of isolation and race purity, implanted into the Jewish people by Ezra and Nehemiah, and ever since the corner-stone of their religion; and on the other, the tendency to assimilate; and we shall find it a useful clue to the right understanding of that history. So long as the Jews live together, as in Babylon, in a large compact body with a higher state of culture than the surrounding non-Jewish majority, assimilation is nothing more than a tiny stream which draws few into its current; but this stream becomes a torrent, carrying everything before it as soon as the culture of the non-Jewish majority is raised, and the Jews are scattered in small groups among that majority without having to struggle for their daily bread.

How great the losses suffered by Judaism through assimilation have been, may be appreciated by the fact that the Jews number to-day only twelve million souls, while in the first century A.D. they numbered five million. Even allowing for the thousands and tens of thousands who succumbed to persecution, Judaism to-day should be stronger than it is by millions and tens of millions, were it not for the continuous secession to Christianity.<sup>1</sup>

F. *The assimilation of minor nationalities—a common social phenomenon.*

The similarity between the assimilative movements of Greek and Moorish times and that of our own day

<sup>1</sup> "It is generally admitted that but for the secession of thousands of its sons in every generation to Christianity, Judaism would number 4 or 5, perhaps even 10 times the total of its adherents," Leroy-Beaulieu, *Jews and Anti-Semitism*.

is obvious. By comparing the three epochs we shall arrive at an understanding of their common causes and effects, and shall be able to deduce a general principle in Jewish assimilation. This principle lays down that the rate of assimilation is higher—

(a) The smaller the percentage of Jews in comparison with the non-Jewish population of their immediate environment.

(b) The livelier the economic intercourse between Jew and non-Jew.

(c) The higher the standard of non-Jewish culture.

(d) The greater the wealth of the Jews.

This is incontestably established by historical facts; and the causes are not far to seek. They are the same causes which everywhere bring about the same result: namely, that minor nationalities—unless they come like the Manchus in China, as conquerors, and retain their power as ruling caste by military prowess and organisation—tend always to gravitate towards the national majority.

Man is a social animal; to satisfy his needs he must come into touch with his fellow-man, and thus set up any number of new relations with them. In the first place, there are economic relations: they are the most important and far-reaching, since everyone is subject to them in order to secure, by means of exchange, those necessities of life which he cannot produce. In a peaceful community, where the Law of Might holds no sway, the better a man gets on with his fellows the more likely he is to achieve his aim, the satisfaction of his immediate wants. To this end he requires not only a common language, but capacity to observe and enter into the life of others. Classes whose calling precludes them from actually producing any of the

necessaries of life, who rely on exchange in order to earn their daily bread, and have to seek customers for their wares, these classes are most liable to be assimilated. They are for the most part merchants and business men. The peasant is, in comparison, far more independent; he is able, especially in the early stages of development, to provide for himself, to satisfy the needs of his household by the work of his hands. We see the Germans in the United States being assimilated very quickly, whereas in Brazil, Transylvania and Russia, the process is very slow; this must be put down not so much to the higher state of culture in the United States, as to the fact that whereas the Germans there are merchants and business men, in Brazil, Transylvania and Russia they are peasants and husbandmen. For similar reasons, the Jewish pedlar or artisan who emigrates from Eastern Europe to Germany or America is not only forced to give up Jargon and adopt the German or English language, he must also adapt himself to the manners and customs of his new country. In the early stages this is confined to imitation of outward forms of intercourse, deportment, dress, etc., whereas at a more advanced stage it becomes complete identification with the German or American outlook, habits and culture.

In the Middle Ages, so long as the Jews were economically in touch with the Christians as merchants and bankers, they spoke the language of their surroundings and dressed like Christians. It was only when they were excluded from the larger spheres of commerce, their activity confined to pawnbroking and peddling—the inevitable outcome of their isolation in the Ghettos and the simultaneous growth and spread of the power of the Catholic Church—that their intercourse with

Christians was reduced to a minimum, and that they ceased to come into contact with Christian culture and activity. It was the Ghettos that created the spirit of stagnation in Judaism, the spirit that persisted in carrying the language and costume of the fourteenth century into the eighteenth. With the re-entry of the Jews into the economic life of recent times, this stagnation has disappeared. Assimilation set in at once, and brought about those rapid changes which at one stroke, transformed the Jews of what we have called the first class into those of the second, or even the third.

Equal in importance to the economic are the social relations, which satisfy man's need of friendly communion, by the exchange of mutual experiences in the realms of affairs and of thought, and by the fostering of common ethical, artistic and scientific aspirations. Into these circles the individual finds his way, not only by sharing the common language, costume and manners, but by proving himself worthy in culture and knowledge to come among them. He will therefore have to exert himself to acquire that culture, and thus to attain to a standard precisely equal to that of his associates. This is how our Jews of the second section pass over into the third section, and—generally a generation later—into the fourth. The tendency is intensified by the *struggle for social status*, which lays hold of men as soon as they no longer have any need to struggle for mere existence. We see this most plainly in the prevalence of fashion in dress, which is simply due to the fact that the lower classes do not want to be outdone by the upper, and strive, as a beginning, to appear their equals in visible outward things such as dress. With the proletariat, which

still has to battle for daily bread, the fight for social status is not yet developed; it grows in intensity as the struggle for gain decreases after achieving its aim; and it is typical of a class which has risen to wealth and culture from the most abject poverty. The Jews of Western Europe are just such a class: their success in business and in letters tempts them to seek position and social status among the rich bourgeoisie and in the scholastic world, and yet as Jews they are looked askance upon, and their efforts are frustrated. Confronted with this situation, many make conversion a means of wiping out their last distinctive mark, hoping thereby to secure, and often actually securing, admission as equals to circles hitherto rigidly closed.

These are the causes which lead the Jews—a small minority in every country—to adopt the language, the costume, the habits, culture and finally the religion of their non-Jewish surroundings, a complication of phenomena which we call the process of assimilation.

*G. Reasons for the power of resistance to assimilation shown by the Jews hitherto.*

It is certainly remarkable that, in spite of the tendency to assimilation, there still remain, after eighteen centuries a goodly number of Jews; that Judaism has after all survived its most critical periods, the epochs of Greek and Arabic culture. In our opinion there are three causes which have enabled the Jews to hold fast to the doctrine of isolation and exclusiveness established by Ezra and Nehemiah, and so prevented them from being absorbed by other nations.

(a) Even before the destruction of their State, the Jews of Egypt, Syria and other parts of the Roman

Empire, were principally engaged in trade and commerce, and according to Sombart,<sup>1</sup> developed money-lending into a fine art. With the migration of the nations they found themselves among peoples in the most primitive stages of domestic economy. Upon these the Jews, with their habits of trafficking and storing up wealth, produced an effect as foreign and uncanny as the nomad Gypsies of to-day on the settled population—be it noted that the Gypsies, like the Jews, have also hitherto defied assimilation. The Jews had nothing to do with the industrial constitution of the Christian majority, which rested on agriculture and the manorial organisation; and the latter being based on a traditional grouping of societies founded on blood-relationship, the foreign Jew could never become a member. As the ruling organisations were built on the foundations of these ancient co-operative unions, it follows that neither do we find a single Jew exercising any such function.<sup>2</sup> Similarly the Jews were excluded from the guilds and corporations into which commerce and handicrafts were organised in the Middle Ages, whose object was elimination of all competition, with a view to increasing the prosperity of the guilds. Sombart has pointed out that the Jews were forced to be in constant conflict with these guilds and with the principle on which they were based, in order to gain a livelihood.

On the other hand, their monopoly of the business of money-lending prevented them to a certain extent from becoming dependent upon Christian custom, and indeed had rather the opposite effect. These

<sup>1</sup> *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (Leipzig, 1911).

<sup>2</sup> O. Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, p. 367 (Vienna, 1907).



economic and professional divergences prevented Jews and Christians from ever entering into intimate relations with one another. The only exceptions were in those parts of the Roman Empire, such as Southern Italy and Egypt, which were not affected by the migrations to the extent of losing all their former culture and the system of finance established under the old Roman régime. Here the Jews were never so rigidly excluded as in Central Europe; in consequence they succumbed to assimilation in masses.

(b) The second cause for the survival of Judaism is, that in both periods, just when their extinction seemed imminent, great numbers of Jews were forced out of those countries where the state of culture was high, and had to take refuge in lands in a lower state of civilisation, where assimilation offered no attraction. The first time they were driven from Palestine and Syria to Babylon; the second time, from Spain and France to Poland and Turkey. But for these happy chances there would in all likelihood be no such thing as Judaism to-day.

(c) The great natural prolificness of the Jewish race—a result of the careful nurture of the children—enabled the Jews to make good the losses caused by conversion. If only a remnant withstood assimilation, in a relatively short time a new Jewry was born from it.

#### *H. The collapse of the obstructions to assimilation and consequent breaking-up of Jewry.*

What can we prognosticate for Jewry in the present period of assimilation? Will a remnant still remain to carry on Judaism even if the masses fall away?

Or is the danger from assimilation already so great as to give us cause to contemplate seriously a total merging of the Jews into Christendom? Most emphatically it is. The economic system of capitalistic finance—the monopoly of the Jews of the Middle Ages—has now become the common property of the whole world. Any vestige that may still remain of the old guild and corporation system is foredoomed to extinction, and is disappearing before our eyes. With it disappears the distinctive economic status which formerly stigmatised Jews and prevented assimilation. And the other factors which contributed to the preservation of the Jews exist no longer either. Whereas formerly the Jews migrated under stress of persecution from countries of a high to those of a lower culture—the persecutions thus actually helping to preserve Judaism—nowadays oppression drives the Jews from countries on a lower plane of civilisation to those on a higher—from dark, unenlightened Eastern Europe to progressive Western Europe and America, and thereby the danger of assimilation is enormously increased. Lastly, the natural prolificness of the Jews has lately suffered a relapse, and in many countries their fertility is less than that of Christians. So the way is clear to assimilation. It goes without saying that there can be no question of the Jews disappearing from off the face of the globe in a few decades. A people numbering some twelve million souls cannot be wiped out so quickly as all that. It may be a hundred years and more before the last Jew is absorbed—the actual time is a minor detail.

*What we are concerned to know is, whether the causes that have hitherto preserved the Jews as a separate community, will hold good for the future and protect them*

*from total assimilation.* If the answer is in the negative, the fate of the Jews is sealed. Just as a tree whose roots are rotten will yet stand a long time though fatally diseased, so also the Jews can go on existing for some time to come; but as a community they will decline and not advance. It is false optimism to make light of this crisis, and say that because Judaism has endured for two thousand years in the face of the greatest dangers and hardships, that therefore it is proof against all happenings. The past can prove nothing for the present, because present-day conditions are totally different from what they have ever been before. And besides this, do we not know that in the past the Jewish population of whole countries did become absorbed? We have already spoken of the Jews in Egypt. In China too, where two centuries ago numbers of Jews were settled, there is no longer any trace of them. Where are the great Jewish communities which flourished in Greece and Sicily in the Middle Ages? Jewish historians unfortunately pay far too much attention to outstanding events and to persecutions; the undermining of Judaism by assimilation, a more difficult but far more important side of the question, still awaits a historian.

The danger with which modern assimilation threatens Judaism has only just begun to be appreciated, because hitherto its last results—conversion and intermarriage—were confined to certain countries. They were looked upon as signs of temporary weakness. But now that we see the same thing repeating itself in every country, it is clear that we have to do here with a universal phenomenon, the inevitable result of assimilation. *We see in the assimilative movement the greatest danger that has assailed Judaism since*

*the Dispersion.* It is the purpose of this book to discuss to what extent Jews are already assimilated, and what is to be expected in the way of future development—more especially from the Jewish national movement, the outcome of reaction against assimilation.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE JEWS.

#### A. *Survey of the number of Jews since the Dispersion.*

To estimate correctly the number of Jews in the various centuries we must begin by ignoring the mythical numbers given in the Pentateuch (Ex. xii. 37, Numbers i.-iii.). The first approximately reliable estimate is found in the Book of Ezra ii. 64, where the number of Jews who returned from the Babylonian exile under Zerubabel is given as 42,360. To these we must add those who stayed behind in Babylon, as well as those who were settled in Phoenicia and Egypt ; nor must we forget that quite a considerable number of Jews had not been led away captive into Babylon after the destruction of the first Temple, but had been left behind in Palestine. With all these additions, the Jews, about 500 B.C. could not have numbered much above 100,000. They had increased enormously by the time of the destruction of the second Temple (70 A.D.). Though Josephus<sup>1</sup> probably exaggerates grossly in putting the number of Jews besieged in Jerusalem at 1,100,000, and again in stating that in the time of Nero 2,700,000 Jews were gathered together in Jerusalem to celebrate the pass-over ; yet we have Tacitus<sup>2</sup> estimating the population of Jerusalem shortly before the destruction, at 600,000.

<sup>1</sup> *Wars of the Jews*, vi. 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Historiae*, v. 13.

At that time, however, the major portion of the Jews lived outside Palestine, for since the time of Alexander the Great, masses of them had gone to settle in the lands on the coasts of the Mediterranean. According to Philo's estimate,<sup>1</sup> which is accepted by Mommsen, the Jews contributed one million to a population of eight millions in Egypt. Of these, 200,000 lived in Alexandria alone, the total population of which was only 500,000. Of the seven million inhabitants of Syria in the time of Nero, more than one million, according to Beloch,<sup>2</sup> were Jews. Josephus tells us there was no people in the civilised world without settlements of Jews, and this statement is borne out by other writers, in particular Strabo and Seneca. Estimating the number of Jews in Palestine at the beginning of the Christian era at 700,000 (Harnack<sup>3</sup>) and those in other countries (excluding Egypt and Syria) at one and a half millions, we have a total of about 4½ million Jews living within the Roman Empire. As, according to Beloch, the total population of the Roman Empire at that time was 54 millions, the Jews constituted one-twelfth of the entire population, and it is this extraordinarily high percentage which explains the important rôle they played at that period.

With the Dispersion we lose all accurate records of their numbers. It is probable that up to the fourteenth century, owing to continual conversions to Christianity and Islam, their numbers did not increase, though they did not perceptibly decrease. But with the fourteenth century there begins a period of great losses to Judaism, due partly to voluntary conversions,

<sup>1</sup> *In Flaccum*, vi.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Bevölkerung der griech.-röm. Welt*, p. 248 (Leipzig, 1886).

<sup>3</sup> *The Mission and Spread of Christianity in the first three Centuries*.

partly to oppression and persecution, which in many cases ended in wholesale conversions or wholesale massacres. In either case the consequent deterioration and unsettled nature of the Jews' social position produced a much higher death-rate, particularly of children. Between the years 1290-1474 the Jewish population in the kingdom of Castile decreased from 850,000 to 150,000—a fact attributable for the most part to conversions to Christianity, which have left their mark to the present day in the numerous markedly Jewish types still found in Spain. Italy throughout the Middle Ages possessed large and flourishing Jewish communities; one would expect to find hundreds of thousands of Jews in Italy to-day, instead of which there are only 35,000, and we have no record of great persecutions or emigration. The only reason we can assign is gradual absorption. The period of the Thirty Years' War marks the time when Judaism had reached its lowest ebb; in the decade between 1648-1658 a quarter of a million Jews perished in Poland alone during the Cossack rising under Chmielnicki, while the Western nations of Europe, with the exception of Holland and Italy, admitted no Jews at all. The kingdoms of Poland, Austria-Hungary and the Balkans were the only countries in which large numbers of Jews were to be found. In the German Empire, according to Graetz,<sup>1</sup> there were not more than three or four considerable Jewish communities—Frankfurt-am-Main with 2,000, Worms with 1,400, Prague with 10,000, Vienna with 3,000 Jews. It is doubtful whether the total number of Jews in the world at that time amounted to one million.

How greatly the Jews suffered during that time of

<sup>1</sup> *History of the Jews.*

persecution is best appreciated by the enormous rapidity with which they increased during the two succeeding centuries, when the fury of persecution and enforced baptism had somewhat abated, and their safety was more assured. In the year 1772 the total Jewish population of Poland and Lithuania is calculated at 308,500 souls, while a Polish writer estimates them at 450,000 at the beginning of the nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup> In 1856 in Russian-Poland alone, there were 563,000<sup>2</sup> and in 1897 1,321,100 Jews.

In Galicia the census of 1785 gave 212,002 Jews, that of 1857, 448,973, that of 1900, 811,371. In Moravia and Austrian Silesia we have in 1775, 23,382, in 1830, 32,244, in 1850, 40,681, and in 1900, 56,243 Jews. European Russia (without Poland) possessed, in the year 1838, 1,023,543 Jews against 3,789,448 in 1897.

Prussia had in 1816, 123,921, in 1843, 206,529, in 1858, 242,416, and in 1905, 409,501 Jews.

These numbers show that in all these countries the Jewish population has trebled itself in about one hundred years, and they give some idea of the enormous number of Jews there would be in the world to-day but for the assimilation and persecution of over sixteen centuries. The Jewish population in the Diaspora may be divided into a descending and ascending curve. The descent took place during the sixteen centuries following the loss of their territory, during which time they decreased in numbers from five millions to one million; the ascent began in the seventeenth century; in the eighteenth their numbers had increased to three

<sup>1</sup> T. Czacki *Rozprawa o Żydach*. Wilna, 1807; quoted from Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Jews and Anti-semitism*.

<sup>2</sup> Wengierow, "Die Juden im Königreich Polen" in *Jüdische Statistik*, vol. i. p. 295 (Berlin, 1903).



millions, while at the present day they number over twelve millions. There is not the slightest doubt that the numerical strength of the Jews to-day is far greater than it has ever been at any other period of their history. But, on the other hand, the dangers which threaten their existence are also greater than they have ever been. The climax we have reached in numbers—which places the Jews numerically higher than the Greeks, the Roumanians and Bulgarians, and only slightly behind the Poles—is due to three causes : first, that the Jews of the eighteenth and the greater part of the nineteenth century have shunned baptism and intermarriage; secondly, their death-rate has been a low one; thirdly, contrary to modern civilised practice, they indulge in very large families. The decline of this spirit must inevitably lead to another descent.

#### *B. Lost "Branches" of Judaism.*

For the most part, those Jews who have cut themselves off from Judaism by assimilation and baptism have mixed with their non-Jewish environment and become absorbed into it. Still there are cases where whole groups abandoned Judaism together, yet preserved the consciousness of their former attachment to Judaism for a long period of time, and married only among themselves. The best-known examples of this are the Jews of Spain known as Marranos. Forced into baptism in the fifteenth century, they maintained for more than two hundred years, a separate existence, which endured till the eighteenth century. The last remnant of them has survived in the Balearic Islands, where about 6,000 of them are known under the name of Chuetas or Anussim. In religion they are Christian, but they are conscious of their Jewish

origin and marry mostly among themselves. Much the same thing may be said of the Maimins or Dönmes of Salonica, a sect called into being by Sabbatai Zevi, and numbering some 4,000 souls, who are Mahomedan by religion, and the Gdid al Islam in Khorassan, some 2,000. And with these we must mention the 200 Samaritans—the remnant of the once great sect of Samaritans at Nablous (Shechem).

Whereas the above-mentioned groups are all Jews not by faith but by origin, there are on the other hand Jewish proselytes, that is, Jews by faith but *not* by race. Jacobs<sup>1</sup> reckons the following as such:

- 50,000 Falaschas in Abyssinia.<sup>2</sup>
- 20,000 Karaites in the Crimea and in Turkey.<sup>3</sup>
- 10,000 Daggatuns in the Sahara.
- 6,500 Beni Israel in Bombay.
- 1,000 Black Jews in Cochin.

As regards the Karaites, it is open to question whether, in spite of an influx of Tartar blood, they

<sup>1</sup> "On the Racial Characteristic of Modern Jews," in the *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*.

<sup>2</sup> The numbers of the Falaschas are variously given. Faitlowitch, who visited them in 1904, estimates them at 50,000 (*Notes d'un voyage chez les Falaschas*, Paris, 1905); Haim Hahoum, sent by the Alliance Israelite Universelle in 1908 to Abyssinia, at only 7,000.

<sup>3</sup> The Karaites in Russia in 1897 numbered 12,894. Their centre was the Crimea with 6,166 Karaites. Outside Russia there are still Karaites in Turkey and in small scattered communities in Galicia, for instance in the town of Kalicz. We might mention here as a curious fact the hundred or so individuals, who, Magyar by race, and belonging to the Christian sect of Sabbatarians, embraced Judaism in the year 1868, and now live in the village of Bözöd Ujfalu bei Schässburg in Transylvania. Again, there is in Russia a sect called Sabbotniki, the members of which live according to Jewish law, some of whom have emigrated to Palestine, where they live in the Jewish colonies under the name of "Gerim."

did not originally come from Jewish stock. Many look upon them, indeed, as descendants of the Chazars who all embraced Judaism ; while there is ground for believing that they are descended from the Syrian Jews who belonged to the Karaite sect. All the other Jewish proselytes, as has been ascertained from their anthropological characteristics, are certainly not of Jewish descent. The Falaschas are probably nearer in origin to the Abyssinians, the black Jews of Cochin and the Beni Israel of Bombay to the Indians, the Daggatuns to the Arabs.

In the following survey of the numbers of the Jews in each separate country, none of these side branches have been taken into account. Only those have been counted as Jews who belong both by religion and by descent to the Jewish race—that is to say, those who can trace themselves back with more or less purity of blood to the Jews of the time of the downfall of the Jewish State, when that State was their national centre.

*C. The existing numbers of Jews, and the spread of Jewry.*

It is only in the last few years that we have had anything like accurate calculations of the numerical strength of the Jews all over the world, namely, since the Russian census of 1897 gave the number of Jews living in European and Asiatic Russia at 5,215,805. Till that time, estimates of the strength of Russian Jewry had varied to an extraordinary degree. Most statisticians and geographers estimated from two to three million Jews to be in Russia, so that until lately the total number of Jews was given variously at six to eight millions, whereas in reality it reaches to-day practically twelve millions.

In the synopsis which follows we have put together from the best available sources the correct figures for Jews in every country. Only in very few cases have we been compelled to give our own estimate. Accuracy is not possible, in the first place, because many countries—for lack of a census—can only give us approximations,<sup>1</sup> in the second place, because the latest census was taken in different years in the various countries. Moreover, the Jews have migrated so much in recent years that many changes would already have to be made in the latest censuses. We should not lay too much stress on this, however, because we may take it that the countries from which the Jews emigrate in the greatest numbers—Russia, Galicia, and Roumania—soon make good their loss, thanks to the great fertility of the Jews, so that the number of Jews there to-day is practically what it was at the time of the last census. The countries into which there is most immigration (England, South Africa, Canada and the United States of America) furnish us with quite recent statistics, which we use in the synopsis.

According to our table, out of a world-total of 11,558,610 Jews, 8,854,037, *i.e.* 76.6 per cent., live in Europe, and of these 5,110,548, *i.e.* 44.2 per cent., in

<sup>1</sup> In Europe, England, France, and Turkey, besides some smaller states, make no record of religion in their census. In America, Africa, and Asia censuses of very few states are available. It is only in Australia that they are complete. For the Oriental countries an inquiry instituted by the Alliance Israelite Universelle in 1904—the results of which were published in the *Bulletin of the All. Is. Univ.* II. Series, No. 29 (Paris, 1905)—has been invaluable to us. For America, Asia, and Africa—whenever official or special calculations were not forthcoming—we have followed the figures of *The Statesman's Year Book* (1908), *The English Jewish Year Book* (1909), and *The American Jewish Year Book*, 5669 (Philadelphia, 1908).

Russia alone ; 1,898,000, *i.e.* 16.4 per cent., live in America. This marks an extremely important change of locality for the Jewish people, when we consider that fifty years ago there were only about 50,000, and twenty-five years ago only 230,000 (*i.e.* 2.5 per cent. of the total number) in America. Asia has 427,523 (*i.e.* 3.7 per cent.) ; Africa, 361,857 (*i.e.* 3.1 per cent.) ; and Australia, 17,106 (*i.e.* 0.2 per cent.) of the total number.

AMOUNT AND DENSITY OF THE JEWISH POPULATION OF THE WHOLE WORLD.

Country.	Year.	Actual Figures.	To every 10,000 of General Population.	Source of Information.
<b>I. EUROPE.</b>				
<i>Russia</i> (Pales of Settlement outside Poland) 15 Government Provinces, - -	1897	3,578,227	112	Census 1897
2. Poland, - -	1897	1,321,100	1405	" 1897
3. Baltic Provinces (Courland, Livonia, St. Petersburg), - -	1897	101,875	249	" 1897
4. Rest of European Russia, -	1897	109,346	19	" 1897
		<u>5,110,548</u>	497	" 1897
<i>Austria</i> —				
Galicja, - -	1900	811,371	1109	" 1900
Lower Austria (including Vienna), - -	1900	157,278	507	" 1900
Bukovina, - -	1900	96,150	1317	" 1900
Bohemia, - -	1900	92,745	147	" 1900
Moravia, - -	1900	44,255	182	" 1900
Silesia in Austria, -	1900	11,988	176	" 1900
Rest of Austria, -	1900	11,112	20	" 1900
		<u>1,224,899</u>	468	" 1900

# NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE JEWS 39

## AMOUNT AND DENSITY OF THE JEWISH POPULATION OF THE WHOLE WORLD—*Continued.*

Country.	Year.	Actual Figures.	To every 10,000 of General Population.	Source of Information.
Hungary, - -	1900	851,378	442	Census 1900
Germany—				
Prussia, - -	1905	409,501	110	" 1905
Bavaria, - -	1905	55,341	85	" 1905
Alsace-Lorraine,	1905	31,708	175	" 1905
Baden, - -	1905	25,893	129	" 1905
Hesse, - -	1905	24,696	204	" 1905
Hamburg, - -	1905	19,602	224	" 1905
Saxony, - -	1905	14,697	32	" 1905
Wurtemberg, -	1905	12,053	52	" 1905
Rest of Germany,	1905	14,371	35	" 1905
		607,862	100	" 1905
Roumania, - -	1899	266,652	448	" 1899
Great Britain (Ire- land excepted), -	1905	250,000	65	S. Rosenbaum, <i>Journal for Sta- tistics of the Jews</i> , 1906, p. 123.
European Turkey, -	1904	188,896	320	Calculated by <i>All. Isr. Uni.</i>
The Netherlands, -	1899	103,988	204	Census 1899
France, - - -	1905	100,000	25	Our own cal- culation
Bulgaria (including East Roumelia), -	1905	37,653	93	Census 1905
Italy, - - -	1901	35,617	11	" 1901
Belgium, - - -	1905	25,000	22	Our own cal- culation
Switzerland, - -	1900	12,551	38	Census 1900
Bosnia and Herze- govina, - - -	1895	8,213	52	" 1895
Greece, - - -	1907	6,127	24	" 1907
Servia, - - -	1900	5,729	23	" 1900
Sweden, - - -	1900	3,912	7	" 1900
Ireland, - - -	1901	3,898	9	" 1901

AMOUNT AND DENSITY OF THE JEWISH POPULATION  
OF THE WHOLE WORLD—*Continued.*

Country.	Year.	Actual Figures.	To every 10,000 of General Population.	Source of Information.
Denmark, - -	1901	3,476	14	Census 1901
Spain, - - -	1905	2,500	1	} <i>Eng. Jew. Year Book 1909</i>
Gibraltar, - -	1908	1,300	?	
Luxemburg, - -	1905	1,210	49	Census 1905
Portugal, - -	1908	1,200	2	<i>Engl. Jewish Year Book 1909</i>
Crete, - - -	1900	728	24	Census 1900
Norway, - - -	1900	642	3	" 1900
Malta, - - -	1901	58	3	" 1901
Total (approx.), -		8,854,037		
II. AMERICA.				
United States, <sup>1</sup> -	1907	1,777,185	210	<i>American Jew- ish Year Book 5669</i>
Canada, - - -	1908	60,000	112	<i>English Jewish Year Book 1909</i>
Argentina, - -	1907	40,000	70	<i>Report of the Jew. Col. Assoc. 1907</i>
Mexico, - - -	1895	8,972	7	Census 1895
Cuba, - - -	1895	4,000	20	} <i>American Jew- ish Year</i>
Brazil, - - -	1895	3,000	2	
Jamaica, - - -	1908	1,300	16	<i>Book 5669</i>
Surinam, - - -	1902	1,158	150	<i>Statesman's</i>
Curacao, - - -	1902	863	161	<i>Year Book</i>
Peru, - - -	1876	498	2	1908
Venezuela, - -	1908	411	2	<i>American Jew- ish Year</i>
Rest of Central and Southern America,	1908	700	?	<i>Book 5669</i>
Total (approx.), -		1,898,087		

<sup>1</sup> Of the Jews of the United States about one million live in the State of New York, about 100,000 in the States of Illinois, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, the remainder in the other States; of these about 200,000 in the Northern States, 150,000 in the Southern States, 50,000 in the Western States.

# NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE JEWS 41

## AMOUNT AND DENSITY OF THE JEWISH POPULATION OF THE WHOLE WORLD—*Continued.*

Country.	Year.	Actual Figures.	To every 10,000 of General Population.	Source of Information.
<b>III. ASIA.</b>				
<i>Turkey in Asia</i> — <sup>1</sup>				
Palestine, - -	1908	85,000	1400	Our own calcu- lation
Asia Minor and				
Syria, - -	1908	75,000	55	" "
Mesopotamia, -	1908	40,000	?	" "
Arabia (including Aden), - -	1908	40,000	?	" "
		240,000		
<i>Russia in Asia</i> —				
Caucasus, - -	1897	56,783	11	Census 1897
Siberia, - -	1897	34,792	60	" 1897
Central Asia, -	1897	13,682	18	" 1897
		105,257	46	" 1897
Persia, - - -	1908	35,000	37	<i>Statesman's Year Book</i> 1908
Turkestan and Af- ghanistan, - -	1908	18,435	?	<i>Jew. Year Book</i> 1909
India, - - -	1901	18,226	1	Census 1901
<i>Dutch East India</i> —				
Java and other colonies, - -	1905	8,605	2	Census 1905
China and Japan, -	1908	2,000	0.04	<i>Jew. Year Book</i> 1909
Total (approx.), -		427,523		

<sup>1</sup> For Turkey in Asia (not including Arabia) the Alliance calculates a total of 220,484 Jews, which concurs approximately with Vital Cuinet's estimate of the number of Jews in Turkey in Asia (not including Arabia) as 201,998 Jews in his Book *La Turquie d'Asia* (Paris, 1892, 1906).



AMOUNT AND DENSITY OF THE JEWISH POPULATION  
OF THE WHOLE WORLD—*Continued.*

Country.	Year.	Actual Figures.	To every 10,000 of General Population.	Source of Information.
IV. AFRICA.				
Morocco, - -	1908	150,000	300	<i>Jew. Year Book</i> 1909
Algiers, - -	1901	57,044	120	Census 1901
Tunis, - -	1908	62,500	310	Jaques Chalom 1909 ( <i>Welt</i> of 19. 11. 09)
Transvaal, - -	1904	15,481	115	Census 1904
Cape Colony, -	1904	19,537	80	„ 1904
Egypt, - -	1907	38,635	34	„ 1907
Tripoli, - -	1905	18,660	186	<i>Alliance Isr.</i> <i>Univ.</i>
Total (approx.), -		361,857		
V. AUSTRALIA.				
Australia, - -		15,239	40	Census 1901
New Zealand, -		1,867	21	„ 1906
		17,106		

In the whole World, 11,558,610

*D. The local distribution of the Jews.*

We see from the foregoing synopsis that the proportion of Jews to the general population is very small, and in few countries exceeds 10 per cent. These countries are the fifteen Government Departments of the Russian Pale of Settlement, Poland, Galicia, Bukovina, Roumania and Palestine. Of these, Palestine has only recently become a land for immigrants, whereas the other countries belonged formerly to the kingdom of Poland, or bordered on Poland, and owe

their large Jewish population to the masses of Jews who concentrated themselves in the Polish kingdom between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The density of the Jewish population never exceeds 20 per cent. in any single Russian or Russo-Polish Governmental Department. It reaches :

18.22	per cent.	in the Government of	Warsaw.
17.49	„	„	Grodno.
16.06	„	„	Minsk.
15.85	„	„	Petrokow.
15.77	„	„	Lomscha.
15.69	„	„	Sedlec.

In thirteen other governments of the Russian and Polish Pales of Settlement the proportion of Jews to the general population is 10-15 per cent., in five governments it falls as low as 4-10 per cent., in the Government of Poltawa to 3.99 per cent. Outside the Pale of Settlement the Jews constitute hardly anywhere more than 1 per cent. In Galicia the Jewish population in the municipal districts of Cracow and Lemberg is 28.11 per cent. of the general population, five districts have from 15-20 per cent., and in all other districts the percentage of Jews is less than 15 per cent. In Roumania three departments have more than 10 per cent. of Jews, namely the department of Jassy, 24.3 per cent., Botosani, 17.1 per cent., Dorohoi, 11.4 per cent. Besides the above-mentioned countries the Jews of Hungary and Morocco constitute quite a considerable fraction of the population ; in all other countries the percentage of Jews varies from 1 to 2 per cent. of the entire population.

The dispersion of the Jews, as we see from the foregoing figures, is perhaps more thoroughly consummated

to-day than ever before. In former periods of the Diaspora the Jews had at least one country (Babylon till the eleventh, Spain and the South of France till the fifteenth, Poland till the eighteenth centuries) in which the great majority of Jews lived, and which served as a national and cultural centre for the Jews who were scattered in smaller communities in other lands. A hundred and fifty years ago the Jews were almost exclusively concentrated in the kingdom of Poland; those Jews who lived outside Poland, in Turkey, Italy, Holland, England, and Germany, only composed a small fraction of Jewry. To-day the province of the smaller kingdom of Poland with its neighbouring districts still harbours half the Jews, but the other half has left this centre and spread in all directions, and this process of dispersion is making great headway in the present day. Assimilation thus gains impetus, because the smaller the percentage of Jews amongst Christians, the more susceptible they are to the assimilative influences of their surroundings.

*SECTION II.*

THE CAUSES OF RAPID ASSIMILATION  
IN THE PRESENT DAY.

enables him to demand only a low rate of interest, whereas in the Middle Ages the risks attending money-lending had compelled him to demand a very high rate.

It was not only as a provider of credit that the Jew came to be looked upon by the Christian as "honest"; as man of business and pioneer of industrial development he was everywhere welcomed. Under the guild system it had been considered dishonourable for any individual to make great profits, because that would have been prejudicial to the other members of the guild. The Jew, who stood outside the guild, and sought only his own advantage, sinned against the spirit of guilds and corporations. His whole conduct of business was immoral according to their conceptions.<sup>1</sup> With the passing away of the guilds, the "dishonesty" of the Jew passed away too; what he did the Christian did also; private trade, the race for money and profit, has become the foundation of modern economic life. So the activities of the Jews came to be considered "honest" because the general population adopted Jewish methods.

#### B. *Successes of the Jews in capitalistic enterprise.*

As merchants and *entrepreneurs*, the Jews were soon brilliantly successful, showing all that great business capacity which for 2,000 years had seemed to mark them out as predestined for commercial callings. It is a mistake to account for the fact that the majority of Jews are occupied in trade, by saying that the Christians of the Middle Ages shut them out from all other callings. It was not in Europe that the Jews first became traders; since the Babylonian exile they

<sup>1</sup> An echo of this is heard in the cry raised against the modern "store." The small shops which are hard hit by the competition of the great emporia denounce these latter as immoral.

had devoted themselves in ever-increasing numbers to trade in Syria, Egypt, Babylon, etc., while in Palestine itself, till the destruction of their nationality, they lived on the products of the land. In the Diaspora the Jews have never occupied themselves with agriculture to any extent.<sup>1</sup> The Middle Ages did not turn them into traders, but merely intensified and increased an aptitude that was already there. It may be taken as a general rule that legislation does not produce new conditions in domestic economy, it only legalises existing conditions, and thus secures them against changes. Laws would never have succeeded in confining the Jews to work as traders and pedlars if the Jews had not already come to Europe in these capacities. On the other hand, the Christians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when they took up commerce, and when all the great trades sprang up, did exclude Jews from their organisations, and thereby drove them from respectable and respected trades into the despised ones of peddling, pawnbroking, and usury.

It is commonly agreed that the Jews do not owe their commercial eminence to chance, but to an extraordinary inborn business capacity. "The Jewish race is—on one side of its character—the incarnation of the capitalistic business spirit," says Sombart,<sup>2</sup> whose verdict will stand for that of others.<sup>3</sup> This means, in

<sup>1</sup> The opposite is the view taken by Schipper (*Angänge des Kapitalismus bei den abendländischen Juden im früheren Mittelalter*).

<sup>2</sup> *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, vol. ii. p. 349 (Leipzig, 1902). Sombart has recently depicted in detail the eminent part played by Jews in the development of capitalism, in his book *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (Leipzig, 1911).

<sup>3</sup> Corroborations of this verdict can be found in Russell and Lewis, *The Jew in London*, p. 63; B. Webb, *The Jew of East London*, chap. ii.; Woltmann, *Politische Anthropologie*, p. 308, etc.

fact, that Jews, to a far greater extent than Christians, produce men who not only have energy and daring, but possess alert minds, with a special gift for swift comprehension and combination. It is this gift which makes the Jews the greatest chess players, excellent skilled workmen, technical inventors and first-class business men.

It is only because this business capacity, from its great importance in industrial life is so strikingly in evidence that we are apt to form the erroneous conclusion that the talents of the Jews are exclusively commercial.<sup>1</sup>

It is not unlikely that the Middle Ages helped to foster this natural inclination of the Jews ; the continual persecutions and restrictions acted as a sort of natural selection by which the less cunning and resourceful Jews were removed, and only the very cleverest—those who could extricate themselves from the greatest difficulties—were able to survive. Similarly the smartness of the American is most simply explained by this theory of natural selection ; that is to say, it was only the most energetic, adaptable and courageous elements of Europe who risked the voyage over the ocean, and left these gifts as an inheritance to their descendants. The

<sup>1</sup> When we speak of the commercial superiority of the Jews, it is only in comparison with the European peoples among whom they live. Compared with some other peoples, particularly Indians, Greeks, Armenians and Chinese, this superiority is no longer apparent. In the East there is even a proverb to the effect that in business one Armenian is equal to three Greeks, and one Greek to three Jews. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that all these rivals of the Jews belong, like them, to the oldest civilisations, to nations who had reached a high state of culture at the time when the peoples of Central and Northern Europe were totally uncivilised. An ancient culture seems thus calculated to develop a predisposition to trade and commerce.

commercial ascendancy of the Jews must not be taken to mean that every Jew is *ipso facto* a good business man, and that no Christian is his equal. There are and always were great business men among Christians. But the proportion is much greater among Jews than among Christians. The extraordinary part played by Jews in the building up of modern international trade and finance is proof of this. Jews have had no small share in inaugurating the present-day system of joint-stock enterprises, and of banks, with their facilities for exchange, for the concentration of capital, for improvement in communications, for unbounded competition and wild speculation. In Germany the new kind of shop—the store—is entirely the creation of Jews, and the latest industrial combinations, trusts, syndicates, etc., are, if not creations of Jews, at least used by them to the greatest advantage.

In the struggle for life, besides intellectual gifts, the industry, versatility, and powers of adaptation of the Jew stand him in good stead. The Jew does not despair if one of his enterprises fails; he begins again straight away with another. If he should be altogether unsuccessful in one calling, he is ready at once to take up another.<sup>1</sup> In this he is totally unlike the German Christian, for example, who is slow to change his vocation, but similar to the North American, who also changes his profession without the slightest hesitation. The adaptability of the Jew is shown also in another direction; he changes his manner of living according to circumstances, without being in the least upset by

<sup>1</sup> That is, provided the calling is not held in contempt. For instance in Galicia, a Jew who had his fire-wood chopped by a Ruthenian told me in answer to my question why a Jew was not employed for this work, that no Jew would undertake it for double the wage.



the change. Thus he can exist on less than the European Christian, and yet not be satisfied with the best that money can buy. This is due to the fact that the Jew, unlike, let us say, the German peasant, has no fixed standard of life: he is therefore always in a state of uncertain equilibrium, always pushing forward, never satisfied; whereas the Christian is usually content when he has arrived at the standard of his class.

### *C. Wealth of the Jews in developed countries.*

Wherever there are no Armenians, Greeks or Indians to compete with him, and the geographical, industrial and political conditions are favourable to the free play of his commercial instinct, the Jew rises to wealth and position. This is clearly exemplified by the immigration of Jews into the United States. Although they are one of those peoples who bring least money with them as immigrants, their condition there is, as Joseph Jacobs says, highly satisfactory.<sup>1</sup> Nothing is more extraordinary than the rapidity with which the new inhabitants find a means of livelihood. Those even who, on arrival, seek assistance from charitable institutions, soon get along without help. In a World Almanac for the year 1900, a list of 4,000 millionaires included 114 Jewish names. This is the more remarkable since, in the last decades, Jewish immigrants have been relatively much poorer than non-Jewish. In Surinam (Dutch Guiana) the Jews, who emigrated thither from Brazil in 1644 and were able to develop themselves in absolute political freedom, attained to the highest standing and prosperity: "They became through industry, sobriety and thrift, masters of the country, though they only numbered 1,400. They control all trade, all the gold-

<sup>1</sup> *Jewish Encyclopedia*, ~~Vol. 11~~ ("Immigration").

fields, all the most influential situations. The colonial troops (Schutterij) from their commandant down to their youngest lieutenant are officered only by Jews." <sup>1</sup>

In Germany the prosperity and higher social status of the Jew in comparison with the rest of the population is shown in many ways: primarily by the fact that to a far greater extent than the Christian he belongs to the "independent" class—that is, to the highest of the three categories: independent, official, and wage-earning. This independent class constitutes three-fifths of the total number engaged in business, while for

## RELIGION AND INCOME TAX IN BERLIN 1905-6.

Religion of the Income Tax payer liable to more than 21 Mks. Income Tax (i.e. with income exceeding 1500 Mks. a year).	Number of Tax Payers.	Per cent. of total number.	State receipts from Income Tax (in Mks.).	Per cent. of the total.	Income Tax average per head.
Evangelist, - -	156,590	75.96	20,812,113	60.88	132.91
Catholics, - -	14,756	7.16	1,641,917	4.80	111.27
Other Christian sects and Dissenters, - -	1,068	0.52	288,474	0.85	270.11
Jews, - - -	29,426	14.28	10,517,535	30.77	357.42
Other Religions, -	17	0.01	879	0.01	51.71
Garrison, - -	4,271	2.07	922,013	2.69	215.88
Total, - - -	206,128	100.00	34,182,931	100.00	165.84

the Christian it is barely one-fourth.<sup>2</sup> In Berlin, the greater wealth of the Jews is manifest in the accompanying table, from which it will be seen that the Jews, who in 1905 constituted only 4.84 per cent. of the total

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Joest in *Globus*. Vol. 60, p. 304 (1891).

<sup>2</sup> I am here repeating some remarks made in my publication *Die sozialen Verhältnisse der Juden in Preussen und Deutschland*.

population of Berlin, gave 14.27 per cent. of householders liable to an income tax of 21 marks (that is, having over 1,500 marks (£75) yearly income) ; and the sum realised by taxation of these householders came to almost a third of the total, namely 30.77 per cent.

The Jews of Berlin numbered on 1st December, 1905, 98,893 souls, and of these, two-thirds were non-earning children and women. Therefore the fact that 29,426 Jews were liable to the 21 Mk. income-tax means that only a small fraction of wage-earning Jews had less than 1,500 Mk. income, whereas among Christians this class constitutes the majority.

In the Arch-Duchy of Baden in the year 1907 we get the following :

	Protestants.	Catholics.	Jews.
	Mks.	Mks.	Mks.
Capital, - - -	1,007,242,320	632,064,030	180,399,900
Real estate and Trade			
Earnings,- - -	1,153,062,100	1,354,649,080	177,686,920
Income, - - -	172,760,510	141,597,035	31,815,480

Against this the average per head of the population was :

	Protestants.	Catholics.	Jews.
	Mks.	Mks.	Mks.
Property (Capital, Real Estate and Earnings),	2,806	1,646	13,829
Income, - - -	244	117	1,229

In Frankfurt-am-Main (famous for the wealth of its Jews) we get on a tax levied on those with more than 3,000 Mk. income, Jews, 63.15 %, Protestants, 25.45 %, Catholics, 16.93 %.

In Copenhagen the greater prosperity of the Jews is patent from the fact that to every two of the independent class there is only one of the working class (against ten of the general population); and again from their better conditions of housing and domestic service.

	Among Jews.	Among General Population.
Houses with 1-2 rooms, - -	11.9 per cent.	48.5 per cent.
" " 3-4 " - -	21.7 "	35.8 "
" " 5-7 " - -	47.2 "	12.9 "
" " 8 and more, - -	19.2 "	2.8 "

	Jews.	General Population.
Families without servants, - -	34.8 per cent.	87.2 per cent.
" with 1 servant, - -	37.6 "	10.4 "
" " 2 servants, - -	21.0 "	2.0 "
" " 3 " - -	4.7 "	0.3 "
" " more than 3, - -	1.9 "	0.1 "

In Italy the notable number of Jews engaged in the higher and more independent callings (officials, lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers), and the high percentage living on their incomes (9.26 per cent. of Jews as against 2.86 per cent. Christians), are attributed to the greater material prosperity of the Jews.

#### *D. Poverty of the Jews in industrially backward countries.*

We have shown that the Jews acquire great wealth wherever the modern system of capitalised trade and manufacture has been introduced; this is far from being the case in countries of backward economic development. The lack of manufacture and of trade on a large scale in Galicia, and their backward state in

Russia, Roumania, and Turkey have made it impossible for the Jews of these countries to make the best use of their talents ; so they eke out a miserable existence with petty handicraft and peddling, and—the supply of shop-keepers and artisans already far exceeding the demand—compete with one another murderously.

In Russia this competition is aggravated by the Jews being confined to the Pale of Settlement and thus prevented from sharing in the life of the Greater Russian Empire. The hardship which this entails on the Jews can be numerically estimated by comparing the number of Jews engaged in their specific callings within and without the Pale area. Take, for instance, four similarly constituted governments—Witebsk and Mohilew within the Pale area, and Pskow and Smolensk outside it. To every 1,000 of the general population we have :

Engaged in	Witebsk and Mohilew.	Pskow and Smolensk.
Hawking, - - - - -	52.9	19.5
Tailoring, - - - - -	24.3	11.3
Carrying Trade, - - - -	6.8	1.7
Teaching and Education, - -	6.0	2.3

As we are here dealing with callings directed to local markets, and the Jews make two-thirds of the total numbers engaged in these callings, we see that the specifically Jewish branches of trade have two and three times the numbers engaged in them within the Pale of Settlement, as compared with those outside it. We can imagine the overcrowding in these callings.<sup>1</sup> Besides this, there are within the Pale, any number of

<sup>1</sup> Brutzkus, *Im russischen Ansiedelungsgebiet und ausserhalb desselben.*

Jews with no fixed business—broker one day, clerk the next, teacher the next. Halpern tells of a Russian Jew whose chief means of livelihood consisted in uncorking sealed butts of brandy with a corkscrew on market days.<sup>1</sup> With luck the man earned 15 copecks a market day. In a special study of conditions in Odessa<sup>2</sup> we read that in the year 1900, of 150,000 Jewish inhabitants no less than 48,500 were supported by such feeble communal charity as there was: 63 per cent. of the dead in Odessa had pauper burials, and a further 20 per cent. were buried at the lowest possible rate. It is not without reason that Leroy-Beaulieu says: "I can certify that nothing in Europe is so poor, no beings earn their crust of rye bread with such bitterness, as nine-tenths of the Russian Jews."

In Galicia we see the same thing. Only a fraction of the Jews have any sort of assured existence, the rest live from hand to mouth and often do not know in the morning where to procure a meal for themselves and their families. Max Nordau has coined the word "Luftmenschen" (men of air) for such types. In statistics these "Luftmenschen" come under the heading of "Casuals" or "Independents of no vocation," and it is noteworthy that the Jews of Galicia, who constitute only 11.09 per cent. of the population, give 31,754, *i.e.* 51.51 per cent., of these "Independents of no vocation," and 61,829, *i.e.* 39.80 per cent., of "Casuals." A Jewish artisan or shopman who earns from 8-10 gulden a week is considered almost well off, and is looked upon by the masses, who generally have to support numerous families on 6, 5, and even 4 and 3 guldens a week, as a man to be envied. I visited over

<sup>1</sup> *Die jüdischen Arbeiter in London*, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> J. Brodowski, *Das jüdische Elend in Odessa*.

100 families of the artisan class in small Galician towns in the year 1903, and found that the majority earned a weekly wage of from 5-7 gulden, of which at least 1 or  $1\frac{1}{2}$  gulden went to rent and Hebrew instruction for the children. On the remaining 4-5 gulden the family of 5-8 persons had to feed and clothe themselves !

Perhaps conditions in Roumania are even worse than in Galicia, and the Jews suffer the more acutely because until the eighties, their lot there was a very good one. But since then the influx of Jewish immigrants from Galicia and Russia has set up such terrible competition among the Jews themselves, that this, combined with the anti-Semitic legislation, has literally robbed the majority of Jewish small shop-keepers and artisans of any sort of means of livelihood.

#### *E. Principal vocations followed by Jews.*

Accurate statistical information as to the vocations followed by the Jews are to hand from Italy, Germany, New South Wales, Austria and Russia, and are set down in the following table. We see from it that the majority are engaged in trade and commerce ; in Italy, Germany and New South Wales about one-half, and in Austria and Russia about two-fifths of all Jewry is engaged in it, against 5 to 10 per cent. of Christians.

On the other hand, Christians are engaged in agriculture to the extent of 75 per cent. in Germany, 50 per cent. in Austria and Italy, and even 66 per cent. in Russia, while the Jews are a negligible quantity. Austria is a slight exception to this, 11.42 per cent. of Jews—quite a considerable percentage—being occupied there in agriculture. Still it would be wrong to imagine these Jews as peasants ; they are for the most part lessees and lessors of property, administrators, sellers

Vocation.		TO EVERY 10,000 CHRISTIANS.				
		Italy <sup>1</sup> (1901).	Germany (1907).	New S. Wales (1901).	Austria <sup>2</sup> (1900).	Russia <sup>3</sup> (1897).
Agriculture,	Christians.	5326	3166	—	5444	7157
	Jews.	31	128	174	1142	381
Manufac- tures,	Christians.	2244	3587	—	2668	1144
	Jews.	867	2151	2494	2867	3463
Commerce,	Christians.	832	1068	—	607	543
	Jews.	5034	4972	4985	3826	4315
Public Service,	Christians.	648	551	—	460	413
	Jews.	1871	647	884	723	630
Casual labour,	Christians.	83	555	—	224	443
	Jews.	78	210	614	543	661
Domestic Service,	Christians.	136	—	—	—	—
	Jews.	31	—	—	—	—
Of indepen- dent means,	Christians.	492	1073	—	440	226
	Jews.	1798	1892	713	377	400
Of no vocation.	Christians.	239	—	—	157	74
	Jews.	290	—	136	522	150

of agricultural produce. The noticeably large share taken by the Jews in manufacture in Austria and Russia is explained by the great number of Jewish operators in these countries, whereas in other countries the Jews belong by preference to wholesale manufacturers. In the division "Public Service" Italy claims a large number of Jews. This is because in

<sup>1</sup> The figures for Italy represent males of over fifteen years.

<sup>2</sup> The figures for Austria and Russia include both workers and those dependent on them.

<sup>3</sup> The figures for Christians in Russia refer to Greater Russia only.



Italy all civil and military positions are open to them, and the Jews there are not, as in Germany and Austria, limited to unofficial, voluntary professions (such as those of doctor, lawyer, teacher, etc.).

In the divisions of Casual Labour and " Domestic Service " there is a marked difference between the two groups Germany and Italy—Austria and Russia. In the former countries the Jews take a smaller share than the Christians. The reason for this has already been given ; all branches of industry open to Jews in Austria and Russia are overcrowded, making a large surplus of Jews who have to seek their fortune as chance dictates, one day in one, one day in another occupation.

The " men of independent means," of whom private gentlemen and pensioners make up the largest contingent, are most numerous in Italy and Germany, illustrating the greater prosperity of Jews in these countries.

In general it may be said that the five countries represent stages in the gradual ascent of the Jews from peddling and hawking to wholesale trade and manufacture. Russia and Austria show them on the lowest rungs of petty trading and handicraft. They are here, in an overwhelming majority, small artisans, shopkeepers, innkeepers, usurers, pawnbrokers, pedlars—earning a scanty existence, which the slightest mischance suffices to destroy. New South Wales shows an advance in the direction of wholesale trade and more liberal professions, while in Germany, and still more in Italy, we see the Jews exchanging their former petty occupations for the great industries and all liberal callings. In Rome, Berlin and London the type of Jew (apart from the " greener " immigrant)

is no longer, as he was 150 years ago, the shabby hawker and pawnbroker, but the successful man of business, the factory manager, the wholesale merchant, the banker. Of all Jews engaged in business there are employed, in the highest departments of commerce—in particular, in banking and finance—5.63 per cent. in Italy, 3.90 per cent. in Germany, as against only 0.36 per cent. in Russia.

In Roumania, which could not be included in the table because it had no complete statistics, the Jews are the backbone of the young Roumanian industry, and provide a very considerable number of artisans. An official enquiry instituted in the year 1901-02 ascertained that there were :

	As Employers.	As Officials and Workmen.
Roumanians -	53.9 per cent.	77.0 per cent.
Aliens of foreign nationality -	26.6 „	17.7 „
Aliens without foreign nationality -	19.5 „	5.3 „

On 1st April, 1908, it was ascertained in Roumania that of the 127,841 persons engaged in handicraft, 25,184 = 19.70 per cent., belonged to the Jewish creed,<sup>1</sup> while the Jews numbered :

10,831 among	41,260 master-workmen, <i>i.e.</i>	26.26
551 „	6,189 foremen,	„ 8.90
10,699 „	64,023 artisans,	„ 16.72
13,103 „	16,369 apprentices,	„ 18.96

In certain districts the majority of artisans are Jews ; for instance, 68.70 per cent. in the district of Botoschani,

<sup>1</sup> Jewish women figure largely in all handicrafts. Out of a total of 15,070 women engaged in handicraft, 39.41 per cent. were Jewish.

63.05 per cent. in the district of Jassy, 65.57 in the district of Dorohoi, etc. Similarly in certain branches of handicraft there is a majority of Jewish workmen, for instance, among plumbers, modistes, watchmakers, goldsmiths, brushmakers, gold-lace makers, box-makers. To go by figures, the greatest number of Jews are employed in tailoring (9,259), shoemaking, plumbing, carpentering and baking. Their excess of numbers and the consequent terrible competition, combined with the preference shown to the Christian workman as against the Jew, tend to make the position of the Jewish workman in Roumania as bad and even worse than that of his brother in Galicia.

The Russian and Galician immigrants to England and the United States have created new industries in their new homes, such as dressmaking, laundry, and the manufacture of footwear, caps, cigars, boxes and domestic furniture. Most immigrants are employed in these industries, the centres of which in England are London, Manchester, Leeds; in America, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago. The condition of these Jewish working men is not very brilliant, but at any rate it is a great advance on that in Galicia and Russia. The conditions of housing and labour may be very bad according to English standards, but they are not to be compared to the overcrowding, the dirt and the misery of Eastern Europe. Besides, there is always the chance of escape from the sweating system, and of finding some better paid employment; and most of them do succeed sooner or later in becoming their own masters. This is their most ardent desire, almost as Halpern says, a mania with them.<sup>1</sup> "The Jewish working-man, almost without exception, cherishes the hope of one day

<sup>1</sup> *Die Jüdischen Arbeiter in London*, p. 49 (Stuttgart, 1903).

becoming a small master, dealer or shopkeeper—in short, of living rather on profits than on wages.”<sup>1</sup>

It is a peculiarity of the Jewish working man of Eastern Europe that he is not proud of his calling, as, for instance, German and English workmen are. Jewish handicraft is seldom in a healthy state; it is weak and stunted. This is partly attributable to the generally bad economic conditions in Eastern Europe; but it is certainly partly due to the fact that Jews cannot take a real pleasure in handicraft; their excess of mental energy makes them feel the need of change and emotion such as they find in trade, but not in labour.<sup>2</sup> The New York Ghetto poet, Morris Rosefeld, does not speak for himself alone in describing his agony of weariness and desolation in the workroom and factory: he voices the general feeling of the Jewish workman. Miserable dwellings, scarcity of food, renunciation of pleasures—these are to him as nothing compared to the influence of machine and factory. It is not from dread of any physical strain, but simply from dislike of uniformity and monotony, as can be seen from the fact that in work that requires skill and intelligence, Jews are to be found in great numbers in Western Europe. Thus almost the whole industry of diamond-cutting, which is centred in Amsterdam, is in Jewish hands; of the 10,000 engaged in it there, 80 per cent. are Jews, and

<sup>1</sup> Russell and Lewis, *The Jew in London*, p. 192.

<sup>2</sup> It is the same craving for excitement and chance that makes Jews addicted to gambling. Nowhere in England is there so much lottery play as among the poor Jewish immigrant population; and in Eastern Europe, betting, lottery, and card-playing is widespread. What the poor Jew does in a small way, the rich Jew does in a large way, in speculation, on the Exchange, in the Casino, and on the racecourse. It is characteristic that the Jewish immigrants in England go in for the branches of trade where most risk is involved, such as the perishable fish and fruit markets.

of these, the 1,300 female workers are practically all Jewesses.<sup>1</sup> That we are here dealing with superior workmen is apparent from the average wage of the men, which amounts to 50-80 Mks. per week, and the fact that they constitute one of the strongest trades-unions in the world. The Jews are engaged in large numbers in the gold and silversmith trade in all countries ; they are numerous also as opticians, higher mechanics, and master tailors. The Jew's dislike of factory work is increased by the slight chances of promotion it offers—the unlikelihood of his ever being able to realise his ambition of becoming his own master. The strict discipline of the factory, with its suppression of any independent initiative, is in the highest degree antipathetic to him. He actually prefers to work under the sweating system, in spite of the unhygienic conditions of its workrooms, and the excessive hours ; he prefers it because of the freedom of intercourse between the workers (including the employer), and because there is less supervision and discipline. The Jew only becomes an ordinary artisan when trade has ceased to pay at all, and the great number of Jewish workmen and their organisation into unions in Eastern Europe shows that the Jew can at any rate make a living as a workman and an operative. But wherever trading is possible, he trades. Nor can we wonder at this ; he is thereby only carrying out the universal law that everyone strives to do that for which he is best fitted.

F. *Non-wage-earning dependents of the West European Jew.*

In comparison to the East European Jew, the Western Jew has few non-wage-earning dependents

<sup>1</sup> N. W. Goldstein, *Die Juden in der Amsterdamer Diamanten-Industrie.*

(children and grown-up daughters). In Germany, by the census of 1882, 15.94 per cent., and by that of 1899, 21.97 per cent. of Jewish females were wage-earners ; whereas in Eastern Europe the principle that the man is the wage-earner, and the place of the woman is in the home, is generally acted upon ; it is only during the last few decades that conditions have altered sufficiently for the female worker to be no longer a rarity.

If we compare the number of non-wage-earners (0-15 and over 60 years) and wage-earners (15-60 years) of Jews and non-Jews, we see that in Russia and Roumania, Galicia and Bukovina, the Jews have *more*, in all other countries *fewer* non-wage-earners than the Christians. The same difference is noticeable between the Eastern and Western European Jews. The West European Jews are seen to be less burdened with dependents even than West European Christians, and this, in spite of the fact that the number of persons over 60 years is larger with the Western Jews than anywhere else. This is because many persons over 60 years still go on earning, and their number in any case is only a fraction of the number of children. Leroy-Beaulieu says : " It is as if, clever reckoners that they are, they had solved by instinct the difficult problem of population in the manner the most convenient for themselves, and the best for national economy."

The burden of " dependents with no vocations " on the Jews of Western Europe would be still less, and the comparison with the Christians still more favourable, were it not that Jewish children on an average attend schools to a higher age than Christian children. The latter leave school for the most part at the legally prescribed age of fourteen years, while Jewish

children often remain till their eighteenth and nineteenth year.

*G. Possibilities of advance in the industrial position of the Jews of Eastern Europe.*

The foregoing discussion shows that the Jews have attained to a high standard of prosperity in all countries which are commercially well developed—such a high standard indeed, that it is a rarity to find a native born Jew in England, Germany, France or Italy who is poor. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the badge of poverty is on the whole population. We must, of course, take into consideration that this poverty is all the more striking by contrast with the wealth of the Western Jews. If we compare it to the economic position of the Christians of Eastern Europe, the result is not always unfavourable to the Jews. In Galicia, for instance, judging from the proceeds of taxation, in twenty-seven large towns in 1904 the Jews stand financially higher than do the Christians, the number of taxpayers and particularly of super-taxpayers (those earning Kr. 100 a year and over), being relatively more numerous among Jews than Christians.<sup>1</sup> And if we were to compare the economic condition of the Jews in Eastern Europe to-day with that of twenty or fifty years ago, we should find in all probability that, bad as it is, it is still an advance on former conditions.

Signs are not wanting that at no very distant date we may expect a further advance, and a very great one. Wholesale trade and industry are slowly but gradually insinuating themselves into Eastern Europe, and all the opposition of the Government and the non-Jewish

<sup>1</sup> Thon, *Die Juden in Oesterreich*, p. 133 (Berlin, 1908).

population will not be able to hinder the Jews from exercising their natural gifts in the industrialisation of Eastern Europe. Thus Roumania, in spite of the most stringent and repressive laws against the foreigner, *i.e.* the Jew, could not prevent Jews creating great industries in Roumania and thus bettering their condition. The laws of economic development prove stronger in the end than paper legislation.

We have seen that the poverty of the Jews in Eastern Europe is caused not only by the lack of wholesale trade, but also by the overcrowding in the various Jewish vocations, and the consequent murderous competition. This overcrowding has been lessened of late by increased emigration into the interior and to foreign countries. In Russia the Jews force their way out of the Pales of Settlement within which anti-Jewish legislation seeks to enclose them. In 1897 there were 211,221 Jews outside the Pale of Settlement, and their number has since appreciably increased in spite of all rights of residence being withheld. Once out of the Pale the Jews find wide fields for their energy and achieve such prosperity as was unattainable before. In Galicia the Jews leave the villages and small towns where the increasing State-protection of peasants, the spread of the co-operative spirit, and the competition of Christian dealers make it harder than ever for them to get a living, and turn their steps to the large towns.

But much more important than these migrations is the emigration to foreign countries. This takes hundreds of thousands of Jews from Eastern Europe, and not only opens up a brighter future to the immigrants themselves, but also to the Jews who stay behind, who are thus relieved of some of the pressure of competition. In particular, the insecurity



of the artisan as to whether there will be work for him on the morrow, an insecurity which hangs like a shadow over the broad mass of Eastern European Jews, becomes less and less, and the number of "Luftmenschen" is on the decline.

On the whole, therefore, we may hope that at no very distant date better days will dawn for the Jews of Eastern Europe. The prohibition against residing outside the Pale, which the Russian Government is now modifying, must sooner or later become a dead letter; industry advances, communication is improving; Jewish emigration assumes larger proportions year by year. Thus the Jews of Eastern Europe will in all likelihood advance industrially within the next ten years to the point their Western brethren have already reached. This industrial advance—founded on progressive capitalism—will not only improve the economic condition of the Jews, enable their children to enjoy good schooling, and widen their intercourse with Christians; above and beyond all this, it will, as we have already seen in Western Europe, wipe out the economic antithesis between Jew and Gentile, and generally smooth the way for rapid assimilation.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE DECLINING BIRTH-RATE.

#### *A. The decline in the Jewish birth-rate and its causes.*

In face of the great increase in the Jewish population in the nineteenth century, which, according to Schudt, had been going on from the very beginning of the eighteenth century, it is rather surprising to see how slow is the natural increase in the present day.

#### CHILDREN BORN.

Town.	Year.	ACTUAL NUMBERS.		TO EVERY 10,000 PERSONS.	
		Jews.	Gentiles.	Jews.	Gentiles.
Prussia, -	1908	7,112	1,262,214	17.37	34.22
Berlin, -	1906	1,744	49,689	17.64	25.60
Breslau, -	1906	306	14,427	15.03	32.02
Bavaria, -	1908	892	224,684	16.12	34.73
Netherlands, -	1906	2,491	168,461	23.95	33.69
Amsterdam, -	1903	1,341	13,881	22.70	30.72
Europ. Russia (not including Finland and Poland),	1901	136,948	4,676,310	36.14	52.16
Austria, -	1900	39,990	927,949	32.65	37.23
Vienna, -	1900	2,973	49,391	20.23	32.32
Hungary, -	1900	28,787	723,931	33.81	39.34
Budapest, -	1900	4,701	18,798	28.29	34.99
Bulgaria, -	1900-02	1,333	147,890	39.60	39.86
Roumania, -	1897-1902	9,769	228,857	36.63	40.22
Bukarest, -	1904-05	1,047	7,047	29.51	24.19
Algiers, -	1903	2,471	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="margin-right: 10px;">                     Europeans. 17,617 Mohams. 126,042                 </div> <div style="font-size: 4em; margin-right: 10px;">}</div> </div>	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="margin-right: 10px;">43.25</div> <div style="font-size: 4em; margin-right: 10px;">{</div> </div>	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="margin-right: 10px;">Europeans. 31.55 Mohams. 30.56</div> <div style="font-size: 4em; margin-right: 10px;">{</div> </div>

The above table shows how (except in Algiers and Bukarest) the percentage of Jewish births is lower than that of other faiths. The table shows extraordinary differences in the birth-rate between Jews of different countries; that of Algiers, for instance, being  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times as high as that of Bavaria or Prussia. It cannot be climatic conditions which cause this, because we find the same divergency in neighbouring countries with similar climates. Thus in Austria, for instance, the birth-rate varies from 17.85 per cent. in Bohemia to 38.01 per cent. in Galicia :

CHILDREN BORN IN THE YEAR 1900 IN  
DIFFERENT PROVINCES OF AUSTRIA.

State.	ACTUAL NUMBERS.		TO EVERY 1,000 PERSONS OF THE GENERAL POPULATION.	
	Jews.	Gentiles.	Jews.	Gentiles.
Bohemia, -	1,655	217,134	17.85	34.88
Lower Austria, -	3,226	94,474	20.51	32.10
Bukovina, -	2,840	27,143	29.54	42.81
Galicia, -	30,842	293,326	38.01	45.09

It is clear, then, that we have to seek the cause of this divergency not in climatic but in social differences, and we have not far to seek, when we compare the prosperity and commercial development of South Austria with the utter industrial misery of Galicia, and bear in mind the publicly recognised fact that, according as a population increases in well-being and culture, so its birth-rate decreases: the difference in the material conditions brings about the differences in the birth-rate.

How great these are is perhaps most strikingly illustrated by the statistics of the town of Charlotten-

burg. In the year 1904-5 in the wealthy eastern quarter the birth-rate was 10.95; while in the poor workman's quarter of Martinikenfelde it was 39.48, almost four times as large. In the same proportion as the material conditions of the Jews have improved during the nineteenth century, so has their birth-rate decreased. The figures in the accompanying table are illuminating:

AVERAGE YEARLY NUMBER OF BIRTHS  
PER 1,000.

	1822-40.	1841-66.	1878-82.	1889-92.	1893-97.	1898-1902.	1903-07.
Christians, -	40.01	39.55	37.92	37.03	36.89	36.19	33.80
Jews, -	35.46	34.75	29.96	23.75	21.61	19.71	17.79

They show how in Prussia the Jewish birth-rate has fallen from 35.46 per cent. in 1822-40 to 17.79 in 1903-07. With the Christians the decrease is nominal only, and they bring into the world to-day almost double as many children as do the Jews. In Hungary we have much the same thing.

With this decrease in the birth-rate the Jewish family has assumed a totally different character. Whereas at the beginning of the nineteenth century families of 4-6 and more children abounded, to-day families of 2-4 children are the rule. For example, in the year 1828, 40 per cent. of the Jews of Darmstadt were under 14 years of age, in 1867 the percentage had fallen to 31.23, and in 1905 persons under 15 constituted only 25.86 per cent. of the Jewish population. In less than eighty years the average number of children to a Jewish family had been reduced by almost one-half. The average issue of a Jewish marriage in

Prussia in the years 1875-79 was 4.57 (against 4.68 among Christians), in 1903-07 only 2.47 (against 4.26 among Christians). The slight decrease with the Christians becomes an alarming one with the Jews: a change from a system of four and five children to one of two and three in a family in the space of less than thirty years.

It would not be sufficient explanation to account for the falling off of births by the increase of prosperity, were there not some intervening stages to connect the two together. In the first place we have the well-established fact that the more wealthy and cultured a population is, the later it postpones, and the more cautious is it in entering, the bond of marriage, sometimes evading it altogether. In the countries where the Jews are poor, marriage takes place much earlier and more

## MARRIAGES.

In	Year.	ACTUAL NUMBER.		PER 1,000 INHABITANTS OF SAME CREED.	
		Jews.	Gentiles.	Jews.	Gentiles.
Germany, - -	1907	4,512	499,452	7.42	8.32
Bavaria, - -	1907	422	50,658	7.62	7.83
Prussia, - -	1907	3,094	309,945	7.56	8.40
Berlin, - -	1906	763	22,482	7.72	11.58
Breslau, - -	1906	150	2,900	7.37	8.66
Hungary, - -	1900	6,853	162,628	8.04	8.84
Bohemia, - -	1903	688	49,494	7.42	7.95
Budapest, - -	1900	1,236	5,091	7.44	9.48
Amsterdam, - -	1904	378	3,638	6.40	8.05

*Note.*—Mixed marriages are counted half to the Jews, half to Gentiles.

regularly than amongst the Jews of more prosperous countries, partly because the poor Jews are practically all orthodox, and in orthodox circles marriage is a

specific religious duty. In Galicia, for instance, there is only an infinitesimal number of Jewish bachelors, while an old maid would be looked upon as a monstrosity. Unfortunately, reliable marriage statistics are lacking in the countries with poor Jewish populations, because the Jews of these countries do not marry by the laws of the land, but in accordance with the ordinances of the Talmud (in Galicia the majority do this), and such marriages are not registered in the official statistics. On the other hand, in countries with a well-to-do Jewish population, where Jews are married in accordance with the law of the land, statistics prove—as the foregoing table has shown—that Jews are behind Christians in marrying. The low rate of marriage among Jews is the more remarkable, seeing that since they have fewer children than the Christians, they ought to have a higher marriage rate. In Berlin, 1st December, 1900, of married inhabitants over the age of 20 years there were :

60.38 per cent. Christian males.  
 51.62 per cent. Jewish males.  
 53.83 per cent. Christian females.  
 52.51 per cent. Jewish females.

In Copenhagen in 1906 :

		MALES.		FEMALES.	
		Jewish.	Christian.	Jewish.	Christian.
20-25 years of age,	-	92.4	89.0	79.7	77.8
25-30   "   "	-	56.3	47.2	47.1	48.2
30-35   "   "	-	38.7	24.5	32.3	33.0
35-40   "   "	-	26.1	16.5	35.1	27.1
40-45   "   "	-	16.2	12.6	35.4	22.5

We see from this that Jews and Jewesses remain single to a greater extent than Christians ; again, the Jews, even when they do marry, do so later in life ; thus, of the married inhabitants of Berlin on December, 1st, 1900, under 30 (or, to be exact, born after 1870) there were :

15.56 per cent. Christian males.

6.89 per cent. Jewish males.

24.34 per cent. Christian females.

20.41 per cent. Jewish females.

It is as palpable as well as a statistically established fact that the issue of late marriages is smaller than that of early ones.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the frequent cases of celibacy and of late marriage must not be looked upon as the only causes of the small number of children. The chief cause is undoubtedly illicit sexual intercourse, which has attained extraordinary proportions during the nineteenth century, principally in the large towns, and here again among the well-to-do classes. The Jews of Western and Central Europe, living as they do in large towns and in greater luxury than the Christians, are affected more nearly by the spread of this practice, while with the Christians the consequences are to a certain extent nullified by the high percentage of the population living in the villages and small towns, where illicit sexual intercourse is unknown. As long as the birth-rate in the countryside continues to be high, the general birth-rate is not much affected by the falling off in the large towns. We see how far behind the birth-rate of the country

<sup>1</sup>Compare Rubin and Westergaard, p. 95; and Galton, *Genius and Heredity*, p. 340.

population is that of the towns by the following table from Roumania :

	In the Year.	Jews.	Gentiles.
In Bukarest, - - - -	1904-1905	29.51	24.19
In the Villages, - - - -	1897-1902	38.69	41.64

In addition to the above reasons there may also be physiological causes which would account for the barrenness or decreasing fertility of the wealthier Jews. Though we may doubt whether there is any truth in the contention that better nourishment leads to barrenness, there is scarcely any doubt that the prevalent nervousness of the educated classes is prejudicial to the propagation of the species ; especially the harmful effects of not exercising the natural functions—more often found with men of the upper classes who marry late, than with the early marrying lower classes—these are as potent factors as the ever-increasing physical incapacity of the society woman to bear children.

*B. The low death-rate of the Jews partially equalises the effect of the low birth-rate.*

The low birth-rate of Jews—in some countries lower even than that of the French (compare Prussia with 17.37 per cent. as against France with 22.1 per cent. in 1891-1900)—would result in a great falling off in the Jewish population, far greater even than we are at present experiencing, were the ill effects not to a certain extent modified by a low death-rate.

We see from the accompanying table that the Jews everywhere (if we except the Mohammedans of Algiers)



## DEATHS.

In	Year.	ACTUAL FIGURES.		PER 1,000 INHABITANTS.	
		Jews.	Gentiles.	Jews.	Gentiles.
Prussia, - -	1907	5,717	675,232	13.96	18.31
Bavaria, - -	1907	703	137,993	12.70	21.33
European Russia (not including Finland and Poland,)- -	1901	68,492	3,156,436	18.08	32.51
Hungary, - -	1900	14,459	500,775	16.98	27.21
Austria, - -	1900	22,506	636,174	18.37	25.52
Algiers, - -	1897-99 inclusive.	1,420	Christian 12,457	29.12	Christian. 39.16
			Mohammed. 71,837		Moham. 19.08
Frankfort on the Main, - -	1907	296	4,790	12.61	15.38
Budapest, - -	1900	2,322	12,480	13.97	23.23
Roumania, {	1896- 1902	5,557	159,337	20.84	28.00
Bukarest, - -	1904-05				
Berlin, - -	1905	1,310	33,141	13.45	17.08
Berlin, - -	1906	1,302	31,346	13.17	16.15
Breslau, - -	1905-06	325	10,200	15.97	22.64
Charlottenburg, -	1904-05	180	2,767	11.33	12.42
Amsterdam, - -	1904	692	7,611	11.72	16.85
Vienna, - -	1900	1,841	32,462	12.53	21.25
Lemberg, - -	1903	829	3,249	19.3	29.0

have a considerably lower death-rate than non-Jews—a phenomenon which caused a Roumanian statistician to remark: "The Jews apparently enjoy the privilege of a special immunity from early death." In considering the figures we must not forget that infants (under 1 year) always constitute a large proportion of the death-rate, and that the low birth-rate of the Jews would explain in part the lower death-rate. And, besides this, Jewish infants and children have everything in their favour. In Prussia in 1882 we

find that in every 1,000 legitimate births (including still-born children), there survived over the first year :

Protestants, -	- 753 boys.	789 girls.
Catholics, -	- 758 boys.	796 girls.
Jews, -	- 814 boys.	843 girls.

In Frankfurt-am-Main in 1907, of every 100 infants (under 1 year) there died : Protestants 11.86, Catholics 11.67, Jews 4.56 ; while, in Breslau in 1906, among non-Jews 21.72, among Jews 6.21.

The causes of the smaller infant mortality among Jews are not to be put down to any difference of race, but rather to the absence of drunkenness in the parents, and the better nourishment and care which the poor Jews bestow on their children. Self-sacrificing care for the children is one of the most remarkable traits of Jewish family life. It can even be proved statistically. It is well known that of all infant scourges stomach and bowel troubles are the most deadly, and these in their turn are for the most part directly traceable to insufficient nourishment. In Berlin in 1905, 8.48 per cent. of Christian babies under 1 year of age died in their first year of stomach and bowel disorders, as against 2.57 per cent. Jewish ; and in Budapest between the years 1886-1890 in every 100 children under 5 years of age 4.14 Catholic children died of rupture, against 1.44 Jewish children. So we see that Jews pay far more attention to the care of these and other childish ailments than Christians.

A further proof that the small infant mortality among Jews is directly traceable to economic and social causes is to be seen in the fate of illegitimate

Jewish children; here, where care and solicitude for the infant is usually lacking, mortality is as high and even higher than among non-Jewish children. In Prussia in the year 1882—the same year in which we have just demonstrated the superiority of the Jews in rearing legitimate children—we find that of every 1,000 illegitimate births, there survived over the first year :

Protestants, -	-	606 boys.	642 girls.
Catholics, -	-	588 boys.	617 girls.
Jews, -	-	578 boys.	607 girls.

We see from this that illegitimate Jewish babies have less chance of living than any others.

The same gulf between the chances of life of legitimate and illegitimate Jewish children is found in Budapest, 1901-1905, where of every thousand children born alive, there died :

Catholics, -	161.9	legitimate.	176.8	illegitimate.
Jews, -	92.0	„	143.4	„
Other creeds, 136.2	„		148.5	„

We can get an exact picture of the proportions of mortality by dividing up different groups according to ages : thus, infants (0-1 year), children (1-15 years), adults (over 15 years), and examining the proportion of deaths among each separately.

The statistics of the Grand Duchy of Hessen and of the town of Budapest enable us to compare the mortality of Jews and Christians at various ages, thereby giving us an accurate idea of conditions. The figures of Hessen in the accompanying table speak for themselves, and show how the Jews by superior care and

nourishment save many infant lives which non-Jews lose in infants under 5 years.

Age in Years.	Number of Jews according to Census 1905.		Total number of Jewish Deaths (not including still-births in 1903-06).		AVERAGE NUMBER OF DEATHS TO EVERY 1,000 LIVES.			
					Jews 1903-06.		General Population 1905-06.	
	m.	f.	m.	f.	m.	f.	m.	f.
under 1	206	209	75	61	75.5		148.1	
1 to " 5	784	838	14	19	4.5	5.7	15.3	14.9
5 " " 10	1,044	1,013	5	10	1.2	2.5	3.0	2.7
10 " " 15	1,125	1,169	3	8	0.7	1.7	1.8	2.6
15 " " 20	1,007	1,032	11	9	2.7	2.2	3.6	3.6
20 " " 30	2,229	2,220	28	26	3.1	2.9	5.1	5.6
30 " " 40	1,752	1,892	26	49	3.7	6.5	6.6	7.2
40 " " 50	1,402	1,533	37	40	6.6	6.5	11.8	9.4
50 " " 60	1,104	1,338	89	87	20.2	16.3	23.1	17.3
60 " " 70	869	956	162	127	46.6	33.2	46.5	41.8
70 " " 80	361	389	130	145	90.0	93.2	97.9	96.8
80 and over	110	117	88	100	200.0	213.7	231.7	223.1
Total,	11,991	12,706	668	681	13.9	13.4	17.4	16.4

The weeding out which goes on among Christian infants from 0-5 years of age improves the chances of living of the succeeding age-divisions until the age of 20, while with the Jews there is a certain falling off at this age, and many die who, thanks to good nourishment and care, had survived the difficult first years. Between the ages of 20-50 years the mortality of Jewish men is almost one-half, of Jewish women one-third, less than that of Christian men and women. After the fiftieth year the chances are about equal for Jew and Christian, though there remains a slight balance in favour of the Jew. The following table for Budapest <sup>1</sup> shows how the Jews (with the exception

<sup>1</sup> Compare Elias Auerbach, *Die Sterblichkeit der Juden in Budapest, 1901-1905.*

only of male Jews from 10-15 years, and of Jewesses between the ages of 50-60 and over 80) have at all ages a lower death-rate than the Catholics.

## MORTALITY IN BUDAPEST.

Number of Deaths.	TO EVERY 1,000 IN EACH DIVISION OF AGE.			
	Catholics.		Jews.	
	Male.	Female.	Male.	Female.
0-5 years, - - - -	89.9	76.7	38.5	36.4
5-10 " - - - -	7.8	6.3	3.9	4.6
10-15 " - - - -	2.6	2.9	3.0	2.0
15-20 " - - - -	4.2	4.5	3.0	2.6
20-30 " - - - -	8.4	8.3	5.2	4.4
30-40 " - - - -	14.1	10.6	7.1	5.6
40-50 " - - - -	27.7	14.1	12.9	10.2
50-60 " - - - -	36.8	19.6	24.7	20.3
60-70 " - - - -	62.9	41.4	41.9	34.9
70-80 " - - - -	114.9	91.6	104.7	67.3
Over 80 years, - - -	212.1	115.9	196.9	182.8

The Jews have the greatest advantage in the division 0-5 years. And it is worthy of remark, also, that with the Catholics, men die in far greater numbers than women between the ages of 40-60 years—probably because of their employment in unhealthy or dangerous occupations, whereas with Jews of those ages there is no great difference in the mortality of men and women.

Nevertheless, the small infant mortality among Jews does not always mean a lower death-rate; it sometimes produces the opposite effect, for, even if numbers of weak children are preserved to life by careful tending, they usually die off before reaching old or middle age. This explains why, as the table shows, the death-rate of Prussian Jews over 15 has slowly risen (from 10.13 per cent. to 11.30 per cent.), whereas

within the same space of time the death-rate among Christians has fallen from 11.82 per cent. to 9.69 per

Deaths in Prussia per 1,000.	1878-82.			1888-92.		
	Under 15.	Over 15.	Total.	Under 15.	Over 15.	Total.
Christians,-	13.41	11.82	25.23	12.17	11.09	23.26
Jews, -	7.40	10.13	17.53	5.06	10.65	15.71

Deaths in Prussia per 1,000.	1898-1902.			1903-07.		
	Under 15.	Over 15.	Total.	Under 15.	Over. 15.	Total.
Christians,-	10.43	10.11	20.54	9.09	9.69	18.78
Jews, -	3.26	11.03	14.29	2.63	11.30	13.93

cent. Between the years 1903-1907 the Jewish death-rate for adults over 15 years is higher than that of Christians (11.30 per cent. against 9.69 per cent.).

### C. *Decrease in numbers a result of lower birth-rate.*

In consequence of their low birth-rate the Jews in many countries are behind the Christians in natural increase.

The table<sup>1</sup> overleaf shows us that this is felt most in Prussia and Bavaria; in Russia they are slightly behind (Russian Christians being extraordinarily fruitful), but in Austria, Hungary and Algiers the Jews multiply to a greater extent than the Christians.

<sup>1</sup> In certain towns, instead of natural increase we find natural *decrease*; in Breslau, for instance, in 1906 there were 339 still-born Jewish children against 306 born alive, making a decrease of 1.62 per cent. to the Jewish population.

NATURAL INCREASE OF THE JEWISH POPULATION  
PER THOUSAND INHABITANTS, COMPARED  
WITH OTHER CREEDS.

Country.	Year.	BIRTHS.		DEATHS.		NATURAL INCREASE.	
		Jews.	Non-Jews.	Jews.	Non-Jews.	Jews.	Non-Jews.
Prussia, -	1907	17.37	33.96	13.96	18.31	3.41	15.65
Bavaria, -	1906	18.47	35.91	12.36	21.39	6.11	14.52
Roumania, -	1896-1902	36.63	40.22	20.84	28.00	15.79	12.22
Eur. Russia (not including Finland and Poland),	1901	36.14	52.16	18.08	32.51	18.06	19.65
Austria, -	1900	32.65	37.23	18.37	25.52	14.28	11.71
Hungary, -	1900	33.81	39.34	16.98	27.21	16.83	12.13
Algiers, {	1903	43.25	Europ. 31.55 Moham. 30.56	20.58	Europ. 23.14 Moham. 19.66	22.67	Europ. 8.41 Moham. 10.90

If we analyse conditions in Prussia we find that the excess of births over deaths amounts on an average annually per thousand :

		1820-66.	1888-92.	1893-97.	1898-1902.	1903-07.
Christians	including illegitimate children and children of mixed marriages according to religion of the mother, - - -	—	13.77	15.05	15.65	15.02
Jews		16.80	8.04	6.88	5.42	3.86

The excess of births has thus increased with the Christians until within the last five years, whereas with the Jews it has rapidly decreased.

The small increase of Jews in Germany and the allied States is evidenced in the census returns, which shows how the Jews are a dwindling fraction of the population. Thus, in every 10,000 of the total population the Jews numbered :

In	1870.	1880.	1890.	1900.	1905.
Germany, - -	125	124	115	104	100
Prussia, - -	132	133	124	114	110
Bavaria, - -	104	101	96	89	85

This decrease in numbers would be still greater if the Jews of Germany were not reinforced by immigrants from Eastern Europe.

The deduction from all this is that, inasmuch as the Jews until a few decades ago were remarkably prolific, they have lost this quality wherever they have acquired culture and prosperity—when they have thrown themselves into the cultural and industrial life of the land. The four different sections which we classified in our introduction, as marking the various grades of disintegration among the Jews, may be taken as so many stages in matrimonial fertility, from large families down to families of four, three and two children. With the first class—the poor orthodox Jews of Eastern Europe—families of from five to ten children are the rule, while with the rich Jews of the capitals the two-in-family rule holds good. It follows that wherever the Jews have to recruit principally from this class their numbers must always decrease in proportion to the general population. This is the fact to-day in all the countries of Western Europe



the registered births and deaths during the years 1891-1900 (315,073 births, 166,966 deaths), we have here a deficit of 108,949 souls, which must be attributed to emigration. This emigration is directed almost exclusively to the United States ; America has become such a familiar idea to the Galician Jew, and the voyage thither such an every-day matter, that he talks of it almost as of an ordinary business journey. Several small Galician towns have been reduced to half their number of Jewish inhabitants by emigration, and there is hardly a Jew in Galicia who has not some relative in America.

Emigration on a large scale from Roumania started in 1899, the incentive being the passing of legal restrictions which still further reduced the political and industrial rights of the Jews. An official report of the Roumanian minister of the Interior (*Moniteur Officiel* du 13 août, 1906) gives the number of Jews who left Roumania during the seven years 1899-1905 as 55,000. Of these about 40,000 went to the United States, the remainder to England and other countries.

Jewish emigration to the United States usually takes the following form : the young working members of a family go out first, who, when they succeed in making a living, send for the rest of the family to come out after them. For example, in the year 1907-1908, among 103,387 Jewish emigrants, no less than 63,492 had received their boat tickets from relatives who were already living in America. This labouring emigrant class varies in age from 14 to 45 years ; in 1907-08 69.05 per cent. of the total of Jewish emigrants belonged to this class, while 25.16 per cent. were children under 14 years, and only 5.79 per cent. over 45 years.

By far the greatest number of Jews settle in the State of New York in preference to any other. In 1907-08 there emigrated to

New York, - - - - -	62,697 Jews.
Pennsylvania, - - - - -	10,193 „
Massachusetts, - - - - -	6,581 „
Illinois, - - - - -	5,928 „
New Jersey, - - - - -	3,696 „
Ohio, - - - - -	2,228 „
Maryland, - - - - -	1,682 „
Connecticut, - - - - -	1,599 „
Missouri, - - - - -	1,570 „
Texas, - - - - -	1,206 „

and all the other States together received only 6,107 Jewish immigrants.

The professions they belonged to were :

Independent professions (musicians, actors, teachers), - - -	713
Skilled trades, - - - - -	36,193
Varied callings, - - - - -	19,759
Of no calling (including children),	46,722

Of the trained industries, men's tailors predominated with 14,882 ; after these came :

Cabinet-makers, - - - - -	2,907
Bootmakers, - - - - -	1,981
Ladies' tailors (male and female), -	2,310
Clerks and bookkeepers, - - -	1,968
Painters and glaziers, - - - -	1,257
Seamstresses, - - - - -	1,268

Of the "varied callings," servants formed the largest contingent, 7,463 persons ; after these, day labourers,

6,824 persons ; pedlars and brokers, 2,416 ; and 1,896 agricultural labourers.

The result of the heavy immigration is seen in the extraordinary increase in the Jewish population of the United States. This is estimated :<sup>1</sup>

In the Year 1818	by Mordechai M. Noah -	at	3,000
1824	„ Salomon Etting		6,000
1826	Isaac C. Harby - -		6,000
1840	<i>The American Almanac</i> -		15,000
1848	M. A. Berk - - -		50,000
1880	Wm. B. Hackenburg -		230,000
1888	Isaac Markens - -		400,000
1897	David Sulzberger - -		937,800
1902	<i>The American Jewish Year Book</i> - - -		1,136,240
1907			1,777,185

Of this population no fewer than 1,000,000 live in New York, which has thus the largest Jewish population of any town in the world. After New York the towns which contain the largest numbers of Jews in the United States are Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and Baltimore.

### B. Emigration to England.

After the United States, England receives the greatest flow of Jewish emigrants. We have no reliable figures, as the English immigration statistics are registered not by religion but by national extraction ; even so they convey a false impression, because many of the immigrants only stop in England in transit for America. Thus when the official English immigration report<sup>2</sup> says that the immigrants from Russia,

<sup>1</sup> From the *American Jewish Year Book for 5667* (Philadelphia, 1908).

<sup>2</sup> Compare *Report to the Board of Trade on Emigration and Immigration during 1904*, London, 1905.

Poland and Roumania are practically all Jews, and puts their numbers at :

	1900.	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.
Russians and Poles,	25,633	20,914	28,511	30,046	46,095
Roumanians, -	3,216	1,162	1,282	565	513

these numbers are considerably higher than the actual number of Jewish immigrants who settle permanently in England. This can be seen from the following figures: the number of Jews in England in 1905 was fairly accurately estimated at 250,000, in 1880 at 40,000, and in 1891 at about 101,000. Taking into account the excess of births over deaths, the number of immigrants during the years 1891-1905 can only have been about 100,000, while the number of registered immigrant Russians and Poles from 1891-1904 is given as 259,406.<sup>1</sup> London has the greatest number of Jews, 150,000; then comes Manchester with 30,000, Leeds with 25,000, Glasgow and Liverpool each with about 7,000.

### C. General summary.

In the following table an attempt has been made to show the effect of emigration and immigration on the countries most affected. Here we see that from 1881 to 1908 the number of Jews who left their native countries amounted to 2,136,000; the principal immigrant country being the United States with 1,700,000 immigrants; the principal emigrant country Russia, with 1,545,000 emigrants. The United States, England, Canada, and South Africa together received 1,950,000 Jews, *i.e.* 91.4 per cent. of the total immigrants.

<sup>1</sup> Many Russian Jews bound for America stay a few weeks or months in London from poverty and from the conditions imposed by some of the steamship companies. See Halpern, *Die Jüdischen Arbeiter in London*.

During the years 1881-1908 Jews migrated :

To	FROM				
	Russia.	Austria-Hungary.	Roumania.	Other Countries.	Total.
United States, -	1,250,000	250,000	75,000	125,000	1,700,000
Canada, - -	30,000	5,000	—	5,000	40,000
Argentina, - -	20,000	—	—	10,000	30,000
America, - -	1,300,000	255,000	75,000	140,000	1,770,000
England, - -	150,000	10,000	20,000	10,000	190,000
Germany, - -	15,000	25,000	—	—	40,000
France, - - -	30,000	10,000	—	10,000	50,000
Belgium, - - -	5,000	—	—	5,000	10,000
West Europe, -	200,000	45,000	20,000	25,000	290,000
South Africa, - -	15,000	—	—	5,000	20,000
Egypt, - - -	10,000	—	—	10,000	20,000
Africa, - - -	25,000	—	—	15,000	40,000
Palestine, - - -	20,000	5,000	1,000	10,000	36,000
Total, - - -	1,545,000	305,000	96,000	190,000	2,136,000

Statistics of the immigration of Jews to Germany are not to hand. We know, however, that immigration from Eastern Europe must go on, from the following circumstances: in the year 1900 it was ascertained that there were 41,113 alien Jews in Germany, of which number 17,410 had been born in Austria, 12,752 in Russia and Finland. In Prussia the census of 1905 registered 38,844 foreign Jews; of these 16,665 were Austrian, 13,185 Russian, and 3,386 Hungarian. On 1st December, 1900, Berlin alone contained 11,651 foreign Jews among a total of only 35,142 foreigners. The kingdom of Saxony receives many Austrian Jews; thus in the year 1905 in Leipzig, of 7,676 Jews, 4,843 (= 63.09 per cent.) were foreign (3,010 Austrian, 1,401 Russian, 117 Hungarian, 315 other nationalities). In

Dresden, of 3,514 Jews, 1,715 (=48.80 per cent.) were foreign. In Munich in the year 1905, of 10,056 Jews, 2,388 (=23.74 per cent.) were foreign born (mostly Russian and Austrian); of the Christians only 4.3 per cent. were foreign born.

D. *The influence of emigration on assimilation.*

The migration *en masse* of the Jews of Eastern Europe to these highly developed English-speaking countries means something more than mere change of locality. Though the full significance has hardly yet been appreciated, there is no doubt that this migration is of the very greatest importance for the future of Judaism, especially as there is no sign of its abating. It means bringing into play all the latent strength and co-operation of millions of intelligent Jews in the ferment of life in the large towns, in great industries and manufactures, in the trade of the world—Jews who had hitherto eked out the most penurious existence in the villages and small towns of their native undeveloped countries. It means an advance from poverty and misery to prosperity and security. It means the raising of politically oppressed and degraded men to the dignity of free independent citizens of a free country. It means, finally, the substitution of the most highly developed and advanced surroundings in the world for those of a civilisation still blankly unenlightened.

In proportion as the Jewish immigrant advances in prosperity, the ties which bind the Jew of Eastern Europe so closely to his brethren tend to fall away. It is true that the Jewish quarter of New York is little else than a Russian or Galician Ghetto on American soil, and its inmates toil under the sweating system as tailors, cobblers and carpenters for their daily bread; but how long will this be so? The Jew will

not remain for ever in the sweated workrooms. At first, in order to get a footing in an absolutely foreign economic system, he cannot do without them : it has been rightly said that these workrooms turn out not so much *work as workers* ; that is to say, the Jew is here prepared for American economic life. But he is on the watch for other activities, his present ones are but a stepping-stone to better things. As soon as he is able to leave the East End, and find a foothold outside, thus climbing the first rung of the economic ladder, he submits himself absolutely to the influence of American culture, which in a few decades, or at most in one or two generations, lures him away from Judaism, or at any rate, so weakens its hold that a formal profession is all that remains of it. A Jew emigrates to the United States to-day a strictly orthodox Rabbi, speaking only Yiddish ; after the lapse of ten years, once outside the East End, he has become tolerant, has learnt to murder the English language, and attends a slightly modernised synagogue service. After twenty years he often attends reform synagogues with their Sunday Sabbaths, speaks English by preference, and gives his children a modern American education. Thus the children, or at best the grandchildren, grow up with little or no Jewish communal feeling, and the slightest inducement will take them over to Christianity. It is now only thirty years since these immigrations began, and the immigrants are still for the most part in the first generation ; the fate of the second and third generations will show what to-day can only be surmised.

Rapid as is the process of assimilation once outside the Ghetto walls, transforming a Jew of our often-quoted "first class" into one of the third or fourth

within the space of two or three decades, the process within the East End boundaries is much slower. The immigrant here rarely raises himself above the second class, and it is only his children and grandchildren who become assimilated.

#### E. *Inland migrations.*

Of less importance than these migrations from country to country are the inland migrations, *i.e.* changes of residence within the country itself; though similarly here the Jews naturally seek a district where the economic pressure is less heavy—with possibilities of greater prosperity—thus indirectly tending to assimilation. In Russia, the broad lands of which seem to invite such migrations, they are prevented by law, which denies all Jews (with the exception of merchants of the first guild, those holding university degrees, and master mechanics) the right of moving out of Poland or the fifteen other governmental divisions where alone they are allowed to live. Within this so-called Pale of Settlement there live 4,899,327 Jews, that is 93.93 per cent. of the whole of Russian Jewry, though this Pale of Settlement is only one twenty-third part of the whole Russian Territory.

We see how unequally divided the Jewish population of Russia is from the following figures:—

	Of total Population
In Poland, - - - - -	40.05 per cent.
In the 15 Governmental Departments of Pale of Settlement, . . . . .	11.12 „
In the 3 Governmental Departments, Kurland, Livland, St. Petersburg, - - - - -	2.49 „
In the remaining 32 Governmental Departments of European Russia, . . . . .	0.19 „



Inland migrations of the Jews from the overcrowded Pale of Settlement to other parts of Russia would be to their greatest possible advantage, but the Russian Government insists on their remaining within the prescribed areas.

The opposite policy prevails in Italy, where the Jews avail themselves freely of the right of change of domicile, and constitute the most mobile element of the population. Only 61.5 per cent. of the Jews (according to the census of 1901) were born in their present domicile. They migrate principally from Northern Italy to Rome and the Southern States.

In Galicia the Jews tend to move from West to East. Dr. Buzek, Docent at Lemberg University,<sup>1</sup> ascertained that in the year 1869 there were 147,356 Jews in East Galicia, 428,077 in West Galicia, whereas in 1900 there were 192,371 in West Galicia and 618,751 in East Galicia. In 1900 the Jews constituted 12.9 per cent. of the whole population of East Galicia; 6.9 per cent. of the whole, and 29.8 per cent. of the town population of West Galicia.

In Germany the Jews migrate from the countryside to the towns (cp. the similar tendency of the general German population), but, unlike the Galician movement, its trend is not from West to East, but from East to West. Between the years 1871 and 1905 the number of Jews in the East Provinces—East Prussia, West Prussia, Pomerania, and Posen—decreased from 116,075 (= 22.67 per cent. of the whole Jewish population in Germany) to 69,785 (= 11.48 per cent. of the whole Jewish population in Germany), a decrease of 46,290 souls; of these, 31,549 in the Province

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Korkis, "The Movement of the Jewish Population in Galicia," *Jewish Statistics*, vol. i. p. 311.

of Posen alone, the numbers there being reduced from 61,982 to 30,433. Against this, the number of Jews in the West Provinces (Saxony, Hanover, Westphalia, Hessen, Nassau, Rhineland) has increased from 110,765 (= 21.63 per cent. of the total Jewish population in Germany) in 1871 to 149,812 (= 24.65 per cent. of the total Jewish population of Germany) in 1905.

The Jewish population has increased more especially in Berlin and the Province of Brandenburg (to which the suburbs and environs of Berlin belong), namely from 47,489 to 139,320, *i.e.* 91,831 souls. Berlin attracts an ever-increasing number of Prussian Jews. The following table shows that whereas in 1816 only 2.72 per cent. of all Prussian Jews resided in Berlin, the percentage has steadily increased till in 1905 it reached 24.15 per cent. If we include with Berlin its 29 suburbs, we find that of a total population of 2,993,441 there were in 1905 about 130,000 Jews: *i.e.* 31.75 per cent. of all Prussian Jews live in Berlin.

Year.	IN BERLIN WERE		PERCENTAGE OF JEWS IN BERLIN TO TOTAL NUMBER OF PRUSSIAN JEWS.	
	Non-Jews.	Jews.	Non-Jews.	Jews.
1816, - - -	194,372	3,373	1.89 %	2.72 %
1843, - - -	341,457	8,351	2.24 %	4.04 %
1861, - - -	528,618	18,953	2.90 %	7.44 %
1867, - - -	585,054	24,189	2.47 %	7.72 %
1871, - - -	786,382	36,105	3.23 %	11.09 %
1880, - - -	1,068,414	53,916	3.97 %	14.82 %
1885, - - -	1,250,904	64,383	4.48 %	17.56 %
1890, - - -	1,499,508	79,286	5.07 %	21.31 %
1895, - - -	1,591,152	86,152	5.06 %	22.69 %
1900, - - -	1,796,642	92,206	5.27 %	23.50 %
1905, - - -	1,941,255	98,893	5.26 %	24.15 %

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONGESTION IN THE LARGE TOWNS.

#### A. *Causes of the rapid assimilation of Jews in large towns.*

Large towns are one of the great factors of assimilation—veritable hot-beds of the process, which goes on more actively and rapidly there than in other parts of the country. There are many reasons for this. First of all, the capitalised economic life of the day is there focussed; there are to be found the banks, the great markets, the centres of exchange. There hundreds of thousands of Christians are occupied in the same callings as Jews, whence the obliteration of that diversity of occupation which is still felt in the country between Jew and Christian. Further, the large towns are the homes of irreligion, or at least of religious indifference; Christianity, which exerts a powerful influence over the individual in villages and small towns, is here of little account, and the religious differences between Jew and Christian are hardly noticeable. On the other hand, large towns with their public schools, universities, and similar institutions, offer exceptional opportunities for acquiring higher education and culture, which, as we shall see, render the Jew especially receptive to assimilative influence and apt to renounce his Judaism.

In a small town the Jewish convert to Christianity must be prepared to create something of a scandal, and probably to be cut by the majority of those with whom he has hitherto associated ; whereas, in a large town, where people meet more easily, he can make new social connections without much difficulty, not only among other converted Jews, but with professing Jews and Christians. The Christians are ignorant for the most part of how recent is the conversion, and the Jews themselves are often so far assimilated, that they readily forgive the step, especially if it goes no further than allowing the children to be baptised. In addition to this, it should be noted that the formalities to be gone through in connection with the actual ceremony of conversion are much less rigorous in large towns. Further, a large town, where religious sects abound—agnostics, theists and dissenters of all sorts—puts no obstacle in the way of a dissenting Jew, who would be looked upon as a wicked unbeliever in a village or small town. The broad-mindedness of the town dweller is the greatest contrast to the limited horizon of the villager.

#### *B. Statistics of the centralisation of Jews in large towns.*

Seeing that large towns offer such special opportunities for the assimilation of the Jewish to the Gentile population, we must give particular attention to the departure of the Jews from villages and small towns, and to their centralisation in the large cities. It is true that Jews in the Diaspora have always been mainly townspeople ; in proportion to the Christians they have always been scantily represented in the open country, and this even in countries where they are at

perfect liberty to settle where they will. Thus there were :

In	Year.	JEWS.		OF TOTAL TOWN POPULATION.	
		In the Towns.	In the Country.	Jews.	Christians.
Denmark, - -	1901	3,310	166	94.98 %	39.06 %
Galicia, - -	1900	274,478	536,893	34.04 %	7.30 %
Prussia, - -	1905	351,550	57,951	85.85 %	44.89 %
Servia, - -	1900	5,726	3	99.95 %	13.88 %
Bulgaria, - -	1900	32,482	1,181	96.49 %	19.39 %
Norway, - -	1900	565	77	87.90 %	28.30 %

In Russia there are indeed stringent legal restrictions limiting the number of Jews in villages. Thus we find that there were in 1897 50.5 per cent. of the total number of Jews as compared with 11.8 per cent. of the total number of non-Jews who were town-dwellers. Perhaps the crowding of the Jews in the towns can be yet more clearly appreciated when we remember that the Jews constitute only 4.15 per cent. of the total population of Russia, but 15.6 per cent. of the town population.

Characteristic of the present migratory movement is the emigration of the Jews from towns to larger towns. The reason for this is the change in economic conditions. Just as the Jews used to seek the towns as being the centres of trade, they now troop to the large towns, because the development of international trade and commerce and the rapid advance of industry and manufacture are becoming more and more centred in the large towns, while trade between the small towns is fast losing its old importance. From the Grand Duchy of Hessen we have convincing statistics in proof

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of this movement. Of the whole number of Jews in Hessen there lived :

	IN ACTUAL FIGURES.			PERCENTAGE.		
	1828.	1871.	1905.	1828.	1871.	1905.
In Places with less than 2000 Inhab.	13,617	13,063	7,871	64.13	51.49	31.86
In Places with 2000-10,000 Inhabitants,	5,443	5,846	7,789	25.63	23.03	31.54
In Places with over 10,000 Inhabitants,	2,176	6,464	9,039	10.24	25.48	36.60

We may say that the more highly developed are the trade and commerce of a country, the greater the proportion of Jews in its large towns. Of the Jewish immigrants to England, 60 per cent. choose London, and 30 per cent. Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow and Liverpool as their domicile. In the United States, about 60 per cent. of the Jewish immigrants settle in New York. In Germany, according to the census of 1900, 42.72 per cent. of all the Jews, against only 15.90 per cent. of all the Christians, lived in large towns (*i.e.* towns of over 100,000 inhabitants). In Prussia (1905) there lived :

Inhabitants	IN ACTUAL FIGURES.		PERCENTAGE.	
	Christians.	Jews.	Christians.	Jews.
In cities with more than 200,000	4,748,565	188,926	12.87	46.13
" " 100,000-200,000	2,484,583	36,588	6.75	8.93
" " 50,000-100,000	1,683,923	18,269	4.56	4.46
" " 30,000-50,000	1,141,976	15,007	3.10	3.66
" " 20,000-30,000	1,432,338	16,960	3.88	4.14
" " 10,000-20,000	1,615,469	17,459	4.38	4.26
" " 5,000-10,000	1,516,623	23,618	4.11	5.76
" " less than 5,000	1,932,978	34,723	5.24	8.47
Total No. in towns,	16,556,455	351,550	44.89	85.85
" " villages,	20,327,368	57,951	55.11	14.15

The large towns of Prussia thus contained 55.06 per cent. of all Prussian Jews, but only 19.62 per cent. of the total of its Christians. In Bavaria in 1900, in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, Jews were 46.2 per cent. of their total number, Christians 21.9. These great numerical differences are easily explained when we bear in mind the trade census of 1895, when it was ascertained that 33.15 per cent. of those engaged in trade lived in large towns. The industrial pursuits determine the place of residence. Nor must we ignore that there are other motives for migration—the access to higher education for the children, the possibility of greater comfort and enjoyment, and the greater freedom of action offered by a large town. Anti-Semitism in the Eastern Provinces is also responsible for the departure of the Jews thence to Berlin.

In Roumania the respective percentage of the total number of Jews and Christians is 72.27 per cent. and 13.34 per cent. in the 32 capitals of the departments. In Italy in 1901, of a total of 35,617 Jews, 30,792, or 86.4 per cent., lived in the 69 chief towns: of these 20,698, or 58.11 per cent., in the six towns, Rome, Milan, Turin, Florence, Leghorn, and Venice.

In Bulgaria, where in 1900 no fewer than 96.49 per cent. of all the Jews lived in towns, 45.82 per cent. alone lived in the three towns, Sophia, Rustschuk, and Philippopol. In the Austro-Hungarian kingdom, in towns of more than 50,000 inhabitants, there lived in 1900 :

		Of all Jews.	Of all Christians.
Austria,	- -	23.33	10.60
Hungary,	- -	26.11	6.39

The relatively thickest Jewish population is found in the towns of the Russian Pale of Settlement and in

Galicia and Bukovina. In Russia the town of Berditschew with 41,617 Jews has the highest percentage of Jews, *i.e.* 78 per cent. of the whole population; in 15 other towns with over 10,000 Jews, and in 31 towns with over 5,000, the Jews constitute more than 50 per cent. of the whole population. In Galicia the town of Brody with 11,854 Jews has the highest percentage of Jews, *i.e.* 72.1 per cent. of the whole population; besides Brody, there are nine other large towns in which they constitute the majority of the population.<sup>1</sup> In Palestine, Jerusalem, Safed and Tiberias are largely Jewish towns. In Salonica also they are in a majority.

### *C. Preference for the Capitals.*

Capitals exert the greatest attraction for Jews, because they are pre-eminently the centres of trade and industry, and also of those other callings with which Jews love to identify themselves: journalism, art, literature, etc.

In actual figures, the following towns have the greatest number of Jews:

New York,	-	-	-	-	1,000,000
Warsaw,	-	-	-	-	250,000
Budapest,	-	-	-	-	169,000
Odessa,	-	-	-	-	150,000
London,	-	-	-	-	150,000
Vienna,	-	-	-	-	147,000

Chicago, Philadelphia, Berlin and Paris have about 100,000 each. In these ten towns there live about

<sup>1</sup> In Roumania the following towns have a Jewish majority: Herta with 66.2 per cent., Milhaileni with 65.6 per cent., Harlau with 59.6 per cent., Falticeni with 57 per cent., Dorohoi with 53.6 per cent., Botosani with 51.8 per cent. and Jassy with 50.8 per cent.



one-fifth, and in the first six about one-sixth of the entire Jewish population of the world.

### NUMBER OF JEWS IN THE CAPITALS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES.

In the Capital of	In Year	Jews.	Non-Jews.	Jews to every 100 Inhabitants of the Capital.	LIVING IN CAPITAL OF COUNTRY IN QUESTION.	
					Per 1,000 Jews.	Per 1,000 Non-Jews.
Austria, -	1900	146,926	1,528,031	8.77	123	61
Roumania, -	1899	43,274	282,071	13.30	161	50
Italy, -	1901	7,121	655,200	1.08	200	20
Poland, -	1901	254,712	457,276	35.77	193	57
Hungary, -	1900	166,198	537,250	23.63	195	29
Prussia, -	1905	98,893	1,941,255	4.85	241	53
U.S.A., -	1908	1,000,000	3,300,000	23.25	563	39
Netherlands, -	1899	59,065	451,788	11.56	568	90
England and Wales, -	1908	140,000	6,581,327	2.11	560	156
Denmark, -	1901	2,826	397,749	0.70	813	163
New South Wales (Sydney), -	1901	5,137	482,763	1.05	797	357
Bulgaria, -	1900	8,720	59,069	12.86	259	16
Victoria (Melbourne), -	1901	5,103	488,853	1.04	863	411

#### D. London and New York.

It is noticeable that in the towns which receive the greatest influx of immigrants, namely New York and London, the Jews congregate in one particular quarter. Thus in London in 1901, 85 per cent. of the Russian and Polish immigrants were living in the borough of Stepney, and in New York the great majority of immigrants are concentrated in the East End. This concentration may be put down partly to religious motives (proximity to synagogues and Kosher butchers), though the real reason is undoubtedly that the immi-

grant Jew—ignorant of the English language and of English and American life—instinctively seeks intercourse among his own people, and wishes to be as near them as possible. But, in proportion as he learns English and begins to get familiar with English and American life, he finds the East End with its sweated workrooms too narrow for him, and seeks employment outside. The East End serves as a sort of distiller, in which all those immigrants who are too old or unable to fit themselves into the new life, sink to the bottom. The others, and especially the second generation, flow out of the reservoir. The overcrowding of the East End is often cited as a proof that Jews like to congregate together; but this is not the case. The Jews crowd into the East End because in the first years their only chance of a livelihood is there; but their desire is not to remain everlastingly in the sweated industries. They aspire to be independent merchants and business men, and this aspiration will carry them out of the East End, even though that district should remain for many decades the refuge of the new immigrant.



*SECTION III.*

THE VARIOUS PHASES OF ASSIMILATION.



## CHAPTER VII.

### ADOPTION OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE COUNTRY.

#### *A. Changes of language in the history of the Jews.*

Language, handed down from generation to generation, is one of the most precious of spiritual possessions. It directs the thought of the child's mind into a fixed groove, the result of the mental effort of former generations, the written and printed masterpieces of which become, later on, the principal intellectual food of the child. All culture is bound up with language, and only accessible through it.

The Jews in the course of their history have had many changes of language. Hebrew ceased to be the general national language after the fifth century B.C., when it gave place to Aramaic (in its two forms Chaldaic in Palestine, Syriac in Babylon), and later to Greek. Hebrew only ceased to be a colloquial language at the end of the second century A.D., having been renewed in Palestine at the time of the Maccabees. ~~The~~ The cultured Jew of Alexandria in the first and second centuries A.D. was an exception if he spoke Hebrew fluently, besides Greek. As a written language it never died out, though the prevailing language of the Babylonian Talmud and of Jewish literature in Babylon until the tenth century was not Hebrew but Aramaic.

A great change came in the seventh and eighth centuries, when Islam triumphantly spread the culture of the Arabs from Arabia across North Africa to Spain. The Jews, taking up this movement with enthusiasm, gave up Aramaic in favour of Arabic. The poets and sages of the Jews at that time wrote most of their works in Arabic, though Hebrew—cultivated as a literary language in the schools of Sura and Pumbedita—was not forgotten, and was much used in that capacity. For about five centuries Arabic remained the principal colloquial language of the Jews till it gave way to the Latin languages—to Spanish in Spain under the dominion of Christian Castile, to French in France. The oldest known French elegy (written at the end of the thirteenth century) was written by a Jew on the burning of Jewish martyrs; and in Spain the Spanish language took such firm root among the Jews that after their exile in 1492 they took it with them to their new homes, and speak it in European Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine to this day. It is no longer pure Spanish, but is mixed with many Turkish and Hebrew words, and is called "Spaniolisch."<sup>1</sup>

As Spaniolisch is to Spanish, so is the "Yiddish" or "Jargon"<sup>2</sup> of Eastern Europe to German. The

<sup>1</sup> Spaniolisch is spoken not only within the present Turkish dominions but also in those countries which were formally under Turkish rule. In Bulgaria in 1900 Spaniolisch was the every-day language of 96.76 per cent. of the Jews; in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1895 of 69.75 per cent. of the Jews; in Servia in 1900 of 26.95 per cent. of the Jews.

<sup>2</sup> Latterly many protests have been raised by Jews against the designation "Jargon"—jargon signifying a mutilation, and conveying a false impression of an organically developed language. But "Jargon" has, we think, become the generally accepted name for "Yiddish," and as such carries with it no derogatory extraneous significance.

Jews in Germany, as we learn from old authorities and contemporary writings, spoke the same German as the Christians up to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Not till they were shut up in Ghettos—thus falling out of touch with Christian culture and being thrust back on themselves—did their language begin to differ from that of the Christians. It kept to the old forms (Mittelhochdeutsch) and had introduced into it many Hebrew words (especially for all incidents of religious or specially Jewish life), for Hebrew had never ceased being the literary language of the Jews. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the German Jews emigrated in vast numbers to the Kingdom of Poland, taking their colloquial “Yiddish” with them, and to this they have adhered to the present day: while in Germany itself—since the beginning of the emancipation, *i.e.* since the middle of the eighteenth century, it was given up in favour of pure German, and from the beginning of the nineteenth century, was no longer used at all.

### *B. Causes of the changes of language.*

How was it that within a hundred years “Jargon” disappeared altogether from Germany? It is explicable only in view of the equally rapid change in the economic conditions of the Jews. Till the year 1750 nothing but a number of pedlars and pawnbrokers, they began, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to be bankers and promoters of every new industry—the pioneers of the dawning capitalistic era! The numerous dealings they had with Christians made the acquiring of the German language—a luxury they had been able to dispense with in their previous petty callings—an absolute necessity. And along with the economic



motive came the introduction of compulsory schooling and the establishment of state education—both of great importance for the promotion of German.

As was the case with German in the eighteenth century, so with former changes of language among the Jews—we find economic causes the *prima mobilia*. The extension of their economic activities brought about the adoption of Aramaic when this was the prevailing language in Western Asia: similarly when, later, Greek became the universal language, and the seafaring Jewish merchants of Syria and Egypt were unfamiliar with it, they adopted Greek as their language. So in turn it became necessary to learn Arabic, Spanish, French and German when the Jews became the carriers of trade, bearing the goods of the Orient to Spain, France and Germany. In the present day we see how the Jewish emigrants from Eastern Europe to England and America are forced to give up Yiddish in favour of English as soon as they once get outside the Jewish quarters in New York and London and set up business for themselves; the same thing happens with the Russian Jew outside the Pale of Settlement, while even within the Pale, all those Jews who have dealings with Christians in a large way of trade and industry are bound to learn the language of the country.

### C. *The spread of Yiddish.*

Though Yiddish has suffered much from the emigration from Eastern Europe and the changes in European economic conditions, it still remains the language of the great majority of Jews. In Russia, Russian Poland, Galicia and Roumania it is the mother tongue of about six millions; in England and the Colonies and America

of a further million, and it is both written and printed (in Hebrew characters). Though a great number of these millions have at any rate some knowledge of the language of the country and of Hebrew, Yiddish remains the dominating language—the mother tongue. In all the Jewish quarters of Russian and Galician towns Yiddish is used on the hoardings and shops—Yiddish is the language of secular literature and of the newspapers.

In Russia we learn from the census of 1897 that of a total of 5,215,805 Jews, 5,054,300 (= 96.90 per cent.) spoke Yiddish as their mother tongue, and only 161,505 had any other mother tongue (Russian, Polish or German). Within the Pale of Settlement 97.96 per cent. speak Yiddish as their mother tongue. Beyond the Pale the percentage falls to 80.4 per cent., so that even here Yiddish is the prevailing language among the Israelites, though they are bound to have some knowledge of Russian also. In Galicia, Yiddish is not accounted a language in the official statistics, and, though there is not the slightest doubt that the majority of Galician Jews speak Yiddish as their mother tongue primarily, and Polish or Ruthenian only secondarily, the statistics give a false impression by registering the language of the Jews as German, Polish, Ruthenian, etc. Only thus are the following results explicable, obtained from the Austrian census of 1900 :

#### LANGUAGES SPOKEN BY JEWS IN GALICIA.

German,	-	-	-	-	17.1 per cent.
Polish,	-	-	-	-	76.6 „
Ruthenian,	-	-	-	-	5.0 „
Other Languages,	-	-	-	-	1.3 „

LANGUAGES SPOKEN BY JEWS IN THE WHOLE  
OF AUSTRIA.

German,	-	-	-	-	34.33 per cent.
Bohemian, Slovak,-	-	-	-	-	4.72 „
Polish,	-	-	-	-	50.81 „
Ruthenian,	-	-	-	-	3.35 „
Italian,	-	-	-	-	0.24 „
Roumanian,	-	-	-	-	0.02 „
Magyar,	-	-	-	-	0.01 „
Other Native Languages,	-	-	-	-	0.09 „
Foreign Languages,	-	-	-	-	6.53 „

In England and America, Yiddish, wherever it is used as the mother tongue, becomes influenced by English forms and idioms, and takes on numerous new words and phrases. The peculiarity of Yiddish is that it inflects the Hebrew verb in German fashion, and it does the same with English, thus coining some extraordinary words. Thus *Halach* (Hebrew for "to go") becomes *halchenen*; "to let" becomes *verleten*, and so forth. Further, the English words are spelt not according to their English spelling, but by the sound, so that very curious-looking words ensue.

*D. Extent of the adoption of European languages.*

Jews who have resided some generations in England and America speak perfect English as their natural language, just as the Jews in Germany, France and Italy speak faultless German, French and Italian, and can barely understand Yiddish, let alone speak it. Nevertheless, as in practically every country the Jews are constantly being recruited from their European brethren, Jews in all parts of the world show a pre-

ference for German--the parent language of Yiddish--and it may be generally accepted that every Jew, Australian, African or Asiatic, understands some German from the broken fragments which have come down to him. Therefore it was that the Zionist Congress--made up of delegates from all parts of the world--chose German for the official language of the Congress. Statistically this prevalence was proved in Hungary in 1900, when 25.45 per cent. Jews were found to be using it as their mother tongue, as against 10 per cent. of the Christians. In Bohemia and Moravia they show their preference for German by letting their children attend almost exclusively German schools and universities (as opposed to Czeckish), so that, for example, during the summer term of 1904 the percentage of Jews at the German University of Prague was 25.7 per cent., while that at the Bohemian University of Prague was only 1.2 per cent. In Bukovina in 1900, 91,907 Jews out of a total of 96,150 (= 95.6 per cent.) were speaking German or Yiddish as their mother tongue, and thus constituted the major portion of the German-speaking population of Bukovina, namely 57.6 per cent., so that without the Jews, Bukovina would lose its German character.

The German language--in its capacity of common medium of expression for all Jews--has lately encountered a rival in English. This is the result of the great influx of Jews into English-speaking countries. Fifty years ago hardly 100,000 Jews lived in English-speaking countries; now almost 2,200,000, or 19.2 per cent. of all Jewry, are established there. We must remember, however, that of these 2,200,000 Jews only about one-half have as yet adopted English as their every-day language, while the other half still

speaks Yiddish. The following table is intended to give a general idea of the languages spoken by the Jews.

Language of Country.	Number of Jews in Country.	Number of Jews who speak this language as Mother-tongue.
(Slavonic, <i>i.e.</i> Russian Polish, Czechick, Ruthenian, Bulgarian, Servian), - -	6,225,000	400,000
English, - - - -	2,200,000	1,100,000
German, - - - -	900,000	1,250,000
Hungarian, - - - -	850,000	600,000
Turkish and Arabic, -	650,000	250,000
French, - - - -	175,000	150,000
Dutch, - - - -	110,000	110,000
Italian, - - - -	40,000	40,000
Other Languages, - -	400,000	300,000
		Jargon 7,000,000
		Spaniol. 350,000
	11,550,000	11,550,000

Hence we see that of the 11,550,000 Jews in the world 7,350,000 (= 63.6 per cent.) speak their own dialects (Yiddish and Spaniolisch), the remaining 4,200,000 (= 36.4 per cent.) speaking pure European languages. We see also that German is the only language which is spoken by Jews outside its own province; in Italy and Holland the language of the country is equally that of the Jews, while all the other European languages are used to a much smaller extent than the number of Jews resident in the countries would lead one to expect. Especially striking is the discrepancy in the Slav countries, where only 400,000 of the 6,225,000 resident Jews, *i.e.* 7 per cent., habitually speak the language of the country.

*E. Change of language and its relation to assimilation.*

The overthrow of Yiddish—a work begun in the eighteenth century, and continued in the nineteenth—will be consummated in the twentieth century. This prophecy is based not only on the increasing development of capitalism, but on the progress of culture in Russian Europe and in the East. One of the most potent reasons for the resistance of the Eastern European Jew to acquiring the Slav languages, and of the Ottoman Jew to acquiring Turkish was undoubtedly the conviction that the culture and literature, to which he would thereby gain access was of a lower standard than his own Hebrew literature and culture. On the other hand, his anxiety to acquire the German and English language is directly attributable to the high standard of German and English culture. The transformation of Russia and Turkey into constitutional States and their consequent provision for national education, will do much to induce the Jews to acquire the Russian and Turkish languages. But with the overthrow of Yiddish the last barrier which separated the mass of East European Jews from modern culture is broken down. The adoption of the language of the country, which goes, of course, hand in hand with the adoption of all the manners and customs of that country, is the first stage to assimilation, and a very important one. It cuts away at a single stroke the chain by which Jewish tradition was handed down for centuries in unbroken continuity from father to child. Children and parents no longer understand one another. Yiddish—the sole language of the parents—is despised by the children who attend the national public schools not only in America and

England, but already to some extent in Eastern Europe, and this contempt for the language is transferred not only to those who use it but to everything which is conveyed to them by means of it. The difference of language means at the same time difference of outlook on all Jewish peculiarities and on the Jewish religion. One may say that the Jewish religion is on firm ground only where Yiddish is the mother tongue. With the abandonment of Yiddish the way is open for the triumphant march of capitalism, for the adoption of universal culture, for the depreciation of Jewish religion, and finally for intermarriage and conversion.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ADOPTION OF COSMOPOLITAN CULTURE.

#### A. *The Jew's craving for education.*

The process of assimilation, beginning with the adoption of the language of the country, passes into its second stage with the adoption of Christian (*i.e.* universal) education and culture. One reason for this is that Jews, who are already engaged in social and commercial intercourse with Christians, find the attainment of this culture a great asset as a means of advancement; but another reason is that Jews are always eager to seize any opportunity for further developing the intellect, and turn at once from the language to its literature. Appreciation of the value of learning and study is a tradition among Jews to an extent unequalled perhaps by any other people. It is noteworthy that already in the time of Mohammed they were called the "People of the Book." During the whole period of the Middle Ages the wealthy Jew sought a husband for his daughter not from among the rich, but from the most learned, the greatest Talmud scholar, and to secure such a one he was willing to make every possible material sacrifice. His ambition was to have a learned man for a son-in-law, as the ambition of his present-day descendants in Berlin, Paris or London is to have for son-in-law some Lord



or Count. In Poland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, at the time of the great annual fairs (Messe), there used to be a sort of market for sons-in-law, in which rich Jews sought out the young Talmud students who most distinguished themselves in public Talmudic debates and discourses—"The Jews used to outbid one another to secure the most promising young Rabbis for their daughters." Even among the very poorest class of Jews in Eastern Europe, opportunities for learning and study, at any rate for the sons, is considered so essential that in Galicia thousands of poor artisans and pedlars willingly pay one-tenth and even one-sixth of their week's earnings (up to one gulden out of about six guildens) to their son's "Melamed" (teacher of Hebrew and the rudiments of general knowledge). They would rather starve than that their children should go without education. This esteem for learning is very apparent in those countries where compulsory education is not

## ILLITERATES.

In	Year.	Of all Persons.	PER 100.			
			Jews.		Non-Jews.	
			M.	F.	M.	F.
Russia, -	1897	Of all Ages, -	50.6	71.1	70.6 <sup>1</sup>	91.2 <sup>1</sup>
Budapest, -	1900	Of all Ages, -	15.5	21.1	20.8 <sup>2</sup>	25.9 <sup>2</sup>
Italy, -	1901	Over 15 years,	3.0	7.5	42.6	57.0
Bulgaria, -	1902	Married in	4.1	21.3	34.1 <sup>3</sup>	81.2 <sup>3</sup>
		1902,				
Servia, -	1900	Of all Ages, -	42.99		83.02	
N.S. Wales,	1901	Over 15 years,	3.15		3.81	
Victoria, -	1901	From 5-15 ,,	6.81		10.00	

<sup>1</sup> The figures have reference only to Roman Catholics.

<sup>2</sup> The figures have reference only to Greek-Orthodox Christians.

<sup>3</sup> The figures have reference only to Orthodox Christians.

rigidly enforced, and where the attendance of the children at school depends very much on the inclination of the parents. Here statistics show that the number of illiterates among Jews is considerably less than among Christians. In view of these figures, we must not forget that the Jews are mainly townspeople and merchants, and thus need good schooling more urgently than the village peasant; and a school education is much more easily obtainable in towns than in country districts.

### B. *The decline of the Cheder.*

Just as philosophy in the Middle Ages was only "the handmaid of Theology," so Jewish learning until the end of the eighteenth century was confined to the precincts of religion, entailing a thorough knowledge of the great mass of Hebrew literature. Secular knowledge was not only despised, but proscribed. During the reign of Frederick the Great a young Jewish student (grandfather of the Banker Bleichröder) was expelled from Berlin for having been discovered in the act of reading a German book. The same spirit still prevails in the Jewish educational institutions of Eastern Europe. The Hebrew School, called "Cheder" (Hebrew for "Room") teaches its pupils only religious and Hebrew subjects. For the teacher (Melamed) and his pupils, the Talmud is the beginning and the end of knowledge. "Everything that man needs to know is to be found in the Talmud, and whatever is not there it is not necessary to know," this is their motto. The language of the country is not taught there, for fear of the consequences to orthodoxy. It is pathetic to hear of the almost insuperable obstacles put in the way of lads who seek to slake their thirst for knowledge by teaching them-

selves the language and literature of the country they live in. The Cheder guards the Jewish child from any contact with modern culture, and it is in its school-rooms that orthodox Judaism is born anew from generation to generation.

The pious Jew of Eastern Europe thinks, and perhaps knows from experience, that any secular addition to the Cheder instruction is a danger to orthodoxy. The schools in Galicia instituted by Baron Hirsch in 1891, which in 1907 employed 181 teachers, and were attended by about 10,000 pupils,<sup>1</sup> had a hard struggle against the mistrust of the Galician Jews. Although their curriculum includes a large amount of Hebrew, many Jews fear that their children may lose their nationality there, and prefer to bear the burden of the cost of the Cheder rather than send their sons to the Hirsch Schools, where not only are there no fees, but in many cases food and clothing are provided in addition. The *Alliance Israélite Universelle* encountered the same distrust when, in addition to building Agricultural and Handicraft Schools, it built Elementary Schools in Morocco, Bulgaria, European Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Tripoli, Egypt, Tunis and Persia—schools attended by 30,000 children (boys and girls), and entailing an annual expenditure of two million francs.

The Jewish father is less particular about his daughter's education; in his eyes there is no necessity for it, as it is only the sons who have to know the Torah: it is not even right for girls to know about it. "This principle"—as Graetz says—"has had disastrous results. While every congregation devoted itself

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Baron Hirsch Institution. According to this Report, between the years 1891 and 1907 about 9,640,000 Kn. were expended by the Institution for school organisation.

to the support of elementary and higher education for the male sex, the female sex was systematically kept in ignorance." In Russia the majority of Jewish girls are taught nothing; by the census of 1897, 49.4 per cent. of Jewish males, but only 28.9 Jewesses, could read. In Galicia, where education is compulsory, the parents willingly send their girls to the public (*i.e.* Christian) schools, while they withhold their boys from them as much as possible. The result is that in general knowledge the girls are much better informed than their Cheder-taught brothers. "It often comes to this," says Fleisher,<sup>1</sup> "that in many families there exists a regular dualism—the male members speak Yiddish, and the female speak Polish, and the two cannot understand one another. The result of these unhealthy conditions is seen in the numerous unhappy marriages and dissolutions of marriage among the Galician Jews, and also in the so-called kidnapping of young girls, who are often only too willing to leave the parental home and go over to Christianity." It is impossible to state more strongly the importance of the effect of education on Jewish conditions.

The Jewish Colonisation Association instituted an enquiry in the year 1898-99, the results of which were published under the title *Material collected on the Economic Condition of the Jews in Russia* (2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1904, Russian). In this it appeared that 507 places within the Pale of Settlement, with a Jewish population of 1,420,653, possessed altogether 7,358 Chedarim and Talmud Torah Schools, with 108,289 pupils. At this rate the whole Pale of Settlement would number about 370,000 Cheder pupils;

<sup>1</sup>Inquiry into the state of the Jewish population of Galicia. *Jewish Statistics*, vol. i. p. 230 (Berlin, 1903).

that is, one to every thirteen Jews. In the Government Province of Kieff alone, an official report for 1900 counted 165,000 Jewish children for whom education was obligatory. Of these there attended the

Jewish Elementary Schools, -	-	13,115 = 13.0%	} of children attending schools
Christian Private Schools, -	-	710 = 0.7%	
Christian Public Schools, -	-	8,280 = 8.2%	
Gymnasiums, -	-	4,010 = 3.9%	
Chedarim, -	-	about 75,000 = 74.2%	

so that about 60,000—probably mostly girls—were having no education at all. Here the influence of the Cheder is clearly seen.

In recent times the aversion to sending their sons to the public schools has tended to disappear. In 1880 only 13,618 Jewish boys attended the public schools of Galicia and Bukovina (with 22,864 Jewish girls) : in 1900 the number of boys had increased to 36,999 and girls to 50,322. In Galicia, too, Jews are beginning to attend secondary schools. In the Gymnasium there attended

Year.	Number of Jews.	Percentage.
1851	260	6.1
1876	963	13.5
1903-1904	4,318	19.5
Polytechnics, 1903-1904	981	28.8

In Bukovina the number of Jewish boys in secondary schools rose from 155 in the year 1864 to  
 512           ,,       1876 to  
 1645          ,,       1903-04.

In Russia also there is a distinct wave which is sending boys to the public secondary schools. This is proved statistically by the census of 1897, which showed that

the new generation of Jews (10-30 years of age) numbered six or seven times as many persons who had had secondary education as the old generation (those over 50 years of age). Altogether there were in 1897, 44,631 Jews (=0.89 per cent.) who had attended secondary schools.

*C. Increasing importance of secular schools.*

The process of the decline of the system of specifically Jewish education which we have been observing in Galicia and Russia during the last 10 to 20 years, had set in long before in Western and Central Europe, and has ended in the complete overthrow of the Cheder. Jewish children receive all their education in secular schools, and the efforts of the parents are all directed to secure if possible better education than the ordinary elementary schools provide. The following table shows that the number of Jewish children attending secondary schools (these including Gymnasiums, Polytechnics, and, in Austria, Commercial Schools) is far in excess of their proportion to the general population.

JEWISH PUPILS IN BOYS' HIGH SCHOOLS.

Country.	Year.	Number of Jewish Pupils.	Percentage of Jewish Pupils.	IN EVERY 10,000 CHRIST.	IN EVERY 10,000 JEWS.
				Christ. Pupils.	Jew. Pupils.
Prussia, - -	1906	15,762	6.53	61	385
Grand Duchy of Baden, - -	1905-1906	1,096	6.24	83	423
Bavaria, - -	1905-1906	1,607	4.27	56	290
Austria, - -	1903-1904	15,880	13.74	33	106
Hungary, - -	1904	14,790	21.59	29	174
Alsace-Lorraine, -	1906	840	7.86	55	264
Hamburg, - -	1906-1907	1,403	9.28	175	722
Berlin, - -	1905	4,257	17.73	102	430

Similarly with secondary girls' schools, where the percentage of Jewesses was as follows :

In Hungary (excluding			
Croatia and Slavoni), - 1906-07 31.28 per cent.			
In Prussia,	-	-	- 1906 8.54 „
In Bavaria,	-	-	- 1905-06 7.57 „

Taking boys and girls together, of the total number of school children the following received secondary education :

Country.	Year.	Christians.	Jews.
Prussia, - - - -	1906-1907	7.93 %	58.91 %
Bavaria, - - - -	1905-1906	5.49 %	39.62 %
Baden, - - - -	1905-1906	7.14 %	45.20 %
Hamburg, <sup>1</sup> - - - -	1906-1907	20.94 %	95.59 %
Berlin, - - - -	1906	14.07 %	67.53 %
Frankfurt-a.-M., - -	1906	26.47 %	86.61 %

As regards Prussia—for which we append a separate table—only 7.93 per cent. Christian children receive more than the elementary schooling, as against 58.91 per cent. Jewish children.

Here we see that Jewish children, though only represented in half their proportion in elementary schools, are four, eight and ten times out of proportion to their numbers in their percentage of scholars in the middle, secondary boys' and secondary girls' schools respectively. During the last two decades the percentage of Jewish school children in Prussia who

<sup>1</sup> Hamburg has Higher Jewish Foundation Schools with free education.

## SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN PRUSSIA, 1906.

Schools.	NUMBER OF CHILDREN.		Percentage of Jewish Children.	PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN EDUCATED.	
	Christian.	Jewish.		Christian.	Jewish.
Elementary Schools (boys and girls), -	6,206,178	24,288	0.39	92.07	41.09
Middle Schools, etc. (boys and girls), -	165,684	5,650	3.30	2.46	9.56
Secondary Girls' Schools, -	143,550	13,403	8.54	2.13	22.68
Secondary Boys' Schools (Polytechnics, etc.), -	225,482	15,762	6.53	3.34	26.67
Total, -	6,740,894	59,103	0.87	100.00	100.00

supplement the elementary school education has been steadily rising :

In the year 1886 it was 46.51 per cent.

„	1891	„	48.55	„
„	1896	„	51.07	„
„	1901	„	56.29	„
„	1906	„	58.91	„

This increase is due to the growing prosperity of the Jews, to their interest in trades which demand education, and to their domicile in large towns where schooling is easier to obtain. These factors must be added to the already mentioned natural love of knowledge inherent in the Jew, and should not be forgotten when comparing the education of Christian and Jewish children. An example is furnished by Berlin, where in 1906, 14.07 per cent. of Christian and 67.53 per cent. of Jewish school children received supplementary education to the elementary schools—a far greater disparity of numbers than elsewhere in Prussia.



In contrasting the Cheder with the secular school, we meant by secular those schools which teach primarily secular subjects (Arithmetic, Higher Mathematics, Nature Study and Science, Geography, History and Languages). Whether such schools accepted pupils of any creed, or were specifically Jewish schools with exclusively Jewish teachers and pupils was no concern of ours, though it is a matter of some importance. In specifically Jewish schools, along with modern education, considerable time is given to the teaching of Jewish religion and Hebrew, which instils into the pupils a certain respect for Jewish tradition that is altogether lost in Christian schools. To such schools (of a specifically Jewish character, but with a modern system of education) belong a number of Jewish public schools in Germany, England and America, the Baron de Hirsch schools in Galicia, and the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in the East. In Prussia in 1906 the 240 Jewish public schools were attended by 6,065 Jewish children, *i.e.* by one-fourth of the total number of Jewish school children in Prussia. The number of these has, however, steadily decreased during the last 20 years; in 1886 they numbered 13,249, *i.e.* 37.4 per cent. of Jewish school children. Similarly, the number of Jewish schools has decreased in Alsace-Lorraine from 61 in 1900 to 51 in 1907; the Jewish pupils going over in large numbers to the non-confessional schools. Secondary schools and girls' high schools of a specifically Jewish character are few and far between in Germany.<sup>1</sup> By far the greater number of Jewish children in Prussia and Germany (more than four-fifths) receive their education side by

<sup>1</sup> The best known are the "Philanthropin" in Frankfurt-a.-M., the Jacobson school in Seesen, and the Samson school in Wolfenbüttel.

side with Christian children, either in primary or secondary schools or in the "Gymnasiums." The only difference consists in the religious instruction which in Germany, France and England is limited to a few hours a week and includes Hebrew and Jewish history; instruction in these subjects is usually given by a special teacher authorised by the congregation.

#### D. *The Universities.*

Just as they throng to the higher schools, so do the Jews throng to the Universities, in Eastern as much as in Western Europe. Till the year 1760 the few Jews who went in for study (almost exclusively medicine) had to betake themselves to Dutch, Danish and Italian Universities, except for a few isolated cases in Halle, Göttingen and Frankfurt-a.-O.:<sup>1</sup> towards the end of the eighteenth century the Jewish student was already no rarity, and in the nineteenth century the number of Jewish students at German Universities had increased in the same degree as Jews had advanced in material prosperity and in the general standard of education. As their increasing wealth enabled them to defray the expenses of their sons' education at the Universities, so their improved social status and education enabled them to regard University education very differently from their attitude of 100 and 150 years ago—or as the Galician Jews look upon it to-day. In Galicia, owing to the lack of a Jewish middle class there is no bridge between the University-bred doctor or lawyer and the great mass of Jewish poor.

<sup>1</sup> The first Jewish student in Prussia was Tobia Kohen, who received a special permit from the Great Kurfurst about 1675 to study medicine at Frankfurt-a.-M.

The following table shows the number of Jews studying at Prussian Universities and their principal branches of study. (It should be mentioned here that Jewish theology is included in the Faculty of Philosophy.)

	OF THE TOTAL POPULATION THERE STUDIED IN PRUSSIAN UNIVERSITIES					PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION STUDYING				
	During the Terms.	Christian Theology.	Jurisprudence.	Medicine.	Philosophy.	Jurisprudence.	Medicine.	Philosophy.	The three non-theological Faculties.	In all Faculties.
Jews	1886-87-91	—	193	644	297	8.22	18.55	8.10	11.95	8.9
	1891-92-95-96	—	266	529	259	9.17	17.07	8.12	11.47	8.9
	1899-99-1900	—	383	453	364	8.67	14.60	7.16	9.52	8.1
	1905-05-06	—	539	319	443	9.35	16.14	4.88	7.73	6.9
Non-Jews	1886-87-91	3143	2155	2827	3371	91.78	81.45	91.90	88.05	91.0
	1891-92-95-96	2562	2638	2572	2926	90.83	82.93	91.88	88.53	91.0
	1899-99-1900	2199	4035	2646	4718	91.33	85.40	92.84	91.48	91.8
	1905-05-06	1847	5226	1658	8635	90.65	83.86	95.12	92.27	93.0

It shows that the average number of Jews during the summer and winter terms of 1905-06 was 6.97 per cent. of all the students. The medical faculty, with 16.14 per cent., claims the greatest number of Jewish students in proportion to the total number of students engaged in this faculty, then comes jurisprudence with 9.35 per cent., and lastly philosophy with 4.88 per cent. During the last two decades Jews have shown an increasing preference for jurisprudence; their numbers have increased in this faculty (while they have decreased in medicine)—an increase which, it must be remarked, is not confined to Jewish students alone. If we compare the proportion of any hundred Jewish students in each faculty in 1886-87-91 with the

proportion 1905-06, we shall see that the percentage in the faculty of jurisprudence has risen from 17.02 to 41.43, in the faculty of medicine has fallen from 56.79 to 24.52, and in the faculty of philosophy has risen from 26.19 to 34.05. The proportion of Jews to the whole number of students has fallen from 8.98 per cent. in 1886-91 to 6.97 per cent. in 1905-06. But this must be ascribed to the rapid growth of the Christian population, and it must not be thought that Jews are behind-hand in sending their sons to University. Thus in 1886-91 of 10,000 Jews 30.48 were students, whereas in 1905-06 their percentage was 31.77 per cent. Their proportion in 1886-91 was almost seven times as large as that of the Christian population when there were only 4.71 students to every 10,000 of the population.

The South German Universities have no statistics with regard to the religion of the students. The University of Strassburg alone furnished the following figures: For the summer term 1907, of 1,613 students, 90 or 5.6 per cent. were Jews. Of these 19 belong to the faculty of jurisprudence, 32 to that of medicine, 17 to that of philosophy, and 22 to the faculty of mathematics and natural science.

In Austria in the academic year 1903-04, 3,016 Jews were studying at Universities, making 15.54 per cent. of the whole number of students. In comparison to their numbers there are four times as many Jewish as Christian University students. Of the 3,210 Jewish students of the winter term 1903-04—

1,729 or 53.9 per cent.	were studying	Jurisprudence.
681 or 21.2	„ „ „	Medicine.
800 or 24.9	„ „ „	Philosophy.

At the same time of 15,751 students of other creeds—

7,686 or 48.8 per cent. were studying Jurisprudence.

1,828 or 11.6 „ „ „ „ Medicine.

6,237 or 39.6 „ „ „ „ Philosophy.

Hence we see the Austrian Jewish students applying themselves to Medicine in greater numbers than their Christian fellows, while they are behind them in the philosophical faculty.<sup>1</sup> Besides the Universities, the great technical schools of Austria numbered among their pupils in 1904, 1,231 Jews, *i.e.* 17.66 per cent. of their total number—6,978; the high school for agriculture 3 per cent. The conditions in Hungary may be seen from the following table:

STUDYING.	AT THE UNIVERSITIES.										IN TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOLS.	
	Jurisprudence.		Philosophy.		Medicine.		Chemistry.		All Subjects.			
	Actual Numbers.	Percentage of Students.	Actual Numbers.	Percentage of Students.	Actual Numbers.	Percentage of Students.	Actual Numbers.	Percentage of Students.	Actual Numbers.	Percentage of Students.	Actual Numbers.	Percentage of Students.
During the Year												
1886-1890	437	17.08	44	10.89	670	52.55	19	7.42	1170	26.04	502	37.89
1896-1900	1096	22.91	114	12.94	353	45.43	28	17.95	1591	24.11	510	40.60
1901-1905	1558	25.63	322	10.37	376	44.66	52	26.13	2308	26.53	646	44.80
1907	1670	26.73	266	15.95	718	47.80	114	34.03	2768	28.38	506	40.39

Here in 1907 there were 2,768 Jewish students, making 28.38 per cent. of all the students. These went in for philosophy and chemistry to a smaller, and for medicine to a greater, extent than their Christian fellows, and for jurisprudence in about equal numbers. Their attendance at the technical high schools is remarkable, 506 or 40.39 per cent. of the students being Jews. Taking

<sup>1</sup> The University of Czernowitz had relatively the greatest number of Jews; 277 out of a total of 668 students in 1903-1904.

the numbers at the universities and technical schools together, there are six times as many Jews as Christians (in proportion to their numbers) and one-half of the future doctors and engineers will be Jews.

Even in Russia the pressure of Jews to the Universities is very great, but since the law of December, 1886, the Russian Government has limited the percentage of Jews at the Universities. In recent years the restricted percentage for Petersburg and Moscow was 3 per cent., for Kasan, Charkow, Dorpat and Tomsk 5 per cent., for Warsaw, Kieff and Odessa 10 per cent. of the total number of students. That this percentage is not always rigidly enforced becomes evident when we see that in 1899 there were 1,757 Jewish students at all the Universities, making a percentage of 10.9 (as against 556 = 6.8 per cent. in 1880). But for the most part the law is enforced, and a great number of Jews are thereby excluded from Russian Universities. The result is that the Jewish youth are forced to go to foreign Universities. The number of Russian Jews who for this reason frequent Swiss, and to a lesser degree French and German, Universities, may be roughly estimated at 2,000 <sup>1</sup> to which must be added the statistically still unknown numbers of those who go to high schools, polytechnics, commercial schools and art schools. Many of these Russo-Jewish students, male and female, have a bitter struggle to secure their education. But in addition to their thirst for knowledge and native energy, they have a great incentive in the fact that the University diploma alone can free them from many oppressive laws, and in particular gives them the right to live outside the limits of the Pale of Settlement.

<sup>1</sup> Compare *Zeitschrift für Dem. u. Stat. der Juden*, 1905, vol. ix.

*E. Modern culture and assimilation.*

If we examine all the subjects which go to make up the education of the modern Jewish student, we find that in all progressive countries it consists of purely secular subjects with no bearing on the Jewish religion. And in these countries Jewish children receive more of this secular education than Christian children, since they frequent the high schools and Universities in greater numbers. In those countries where state education is not compulsory the majority of Jewish children do indeed receive a specifically Jewish education in the Cheder, but in recent years a distinct movement in favour of secular elementary school education is observable in Russia and Galicia where the Cheder once reigned supreme. We have devoted\* so much attention to the question of the education of Jewish children because we regard the spread of modern school education among the Jews as the chief cause of the ferment in the spiritual life of the Jews, and the principal factor in the process of denationalisation which is going on *within* Judaism to-day before our very eyes. The modern school education in its present form is fatal to Jewish tradition, and is rooting out the spiritual life which rested on that tradition. This process is the more complete the longer and the more strongly the Jewish children come under the influence of secular education; it is especially marked in those children who attend high schools and Universities.

It is not difficult to explain this psychologically. The Jewish child of Eastern Europe who goes straight from his orthodox home to the gymnasium, not only has to renounce "Jargon" for the language of the country, but he comes into contact with the accumula-

tion of twenty centuries of different culture. The culture of his parents being to all intents and purposes no further advanced than that of Judaism in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, he thus skips several centuries—the most fruitful and eventful centuries, indeed, in the history of science and discoveries. Just as a man of the fourteenth century would be unable to understand our modern culture, and conversely a man of the twentieth century would find the culture of the fourteenth strange to him, so the Jewish child, after having been through a modern school, becomes a stranger to his parents, and in his turn can no longer understand his parents and the Jewish tradition, nor desires to understand them. His wider knowledge and his mastery of the language of the country cause him to undervalue Jewish culture and language; the cleft is so wide that it can no longer be bridged. Modern education, as Jewish children receive it to-day, denationalises and dejudaisés them.

It was not chance, nor was it a tribute to learning that induced the Russian Government to allow the University Jew the right of domicile wherever he pleased in Russia—the right it so jealously denies to the mass of Jews; it was the recognition that a Jew who has received a modern education is, in the ordinary sense of the term, no longer a Jew. The more the Jews partake of state education, the stranger and more distant do they become to Judaism as a religion and as a national community. In Galicia their devotion to and understanding of Jewish tradition decreases according as the school which the boy attends is Cheder, Hirsch school, public school, gymnasium or university. It is as rare to find a Cheder pupil who discards the



uses of his religion, as it is to find a University Jew who holds fast to them (apart from the Jews who have been recovered by Zionism to the practice of the ceremonials). Zangwill has shown how great is the difference of outlook on Jewish religion and tradition between the Russian emigrant and his English public school son.<sup>1</sup> The estrangement of the modern Jewish child from Judaism is aggravated and accelerated by yet another cause. If this modern school education could be imparted not only to a fraction, but simultaneously to the whole of the young Jewish generation, the young generation would probably—wherever Jews were together in large numbers—develop a new character of its own and feel homogeneous; and this, if it did not prevent assimilation, would at least retard it.<sup>2</sup> But as, in point of fact, only a minority of Jewish children in Eastern Europe receives this education, such a communal feeling cannot exist. The Eastern European Jew who has received a modern education remains an individual apart among the Jewish community; he can no longer coalesce with them, and is driven into an isolation which too often leads to Christianity.

<sup>1</sup> In Zangwill's *Children of the Ghetto* (London, 1901) there are many good remarks on this subject: "Orthodox Jews," he observes, "are absolutely astonished when people of education remain true to Judaism." And the scene in which the dying son (who has been an inmate of an English school for a few years) can neither understand the language nor the thought of his Yiddish-speaking father who has been summoned to the bedside, is as true as it is moving.

<sup>2</sup> We assume this from the fact that in Galicia where the number of Jewish children and men who receive school and University education is relatively far larger than in Russia, the Jewish students are less estranged from Judaism than in Russia.

## CHAPTER IX.

### DECREASING IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION.

#### A. *The origin of the Jewish religion.*

The Jewish religion has sprung from many roots which extend back into different periods of time. The origin of the monotheistic idea, the belief in Jehovah as the One and Only God, is lost in the obscurity of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C. (Jehovah was then probably not worshipped exclusively, but as the mighty war-god of the Kenites, and His ascendancy over all other gods was not recognised until after seven centuries of constant religious struggle.) Much later and less fully developed is the origin of the belief in immortality, or rather the belief in the resurrection of the dead. According to Graetz<sup>1</sup> this idea was borrowed from the Iranian religions about the fifth or fourth century B.C., was disputed in the book of "Koheleth" at the time of the Maccabees, and only gradually became an article of faith. It is found again in the belief held by orthodox Jews to-day in the coming of the Messiah, with which is mingled the thought of retribution in another world for deeds committed in this.

Judaism as a religion owes its strength and its power of resistance through the ages less to its metaphysical ideas than to its cult, *i.e.* its ceremonies and ritual.

<sup>1</sup> *History of the Jews*, vol. ii. p. 204.

These can be traced back to the year 622 B.C., when at the time of the rebuilding of the Temple, the finding of a book of Moses (Deuteronomy) stirred the King Josiah to carry out sweeping reforms, making Jerusalem the religious centre, and the priesthood there all-powerful. But Josiah's reforms were followed by the destruction of the Jewish State (586) and the Babylonian Captivity, and would have disappeared without any trace if Ezra and Nehemiah, one hundred years later, had not led the people back to Palestine, and there revived and intensified observance of the laws. Ezra and Nehemiah set about to keep alive the faith in Jehovah in the heart of the nation—now so small—and to preserve it from the intrusion of heathen gods and their cults. The task was a difficult one, and the leaders of the people thought, and rightly, that they could only accomplish it by rigorous measures—namely, by the total exclusion of outside influence, by disallowing any mixture of blood, any adoption of foreign culture. Hence the prohibitions against marriage and eating with a non-Jew, hence the idea of the special "holiness" of the Jewish people, hence the reverence for the Torah above and beyond anything else in the world, hence the indifference to all foreign culture. A masterpiece indeed was this achievement of Ezra's; even H. S. Chamberlain cannot withhold his admiration: "The idea [of Ezra's] of isolating the nation by forbidding mixed marriages, and of rearing a noble race from the hopelessly mongrel Israelite is nothing if not brilliant: equally so the idea of representing the purity of the race as an historical legacy, as the special, characteristic feature of the Jew."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. It may be of interest to remark here that Chamberlain in this brilliant but very subjective

Many ritual ordinances—particularly the dietary laws, which cannot be defended on the grounds of hygiene—become comprehensible when considered from the standpoint that they were designed to limit the intercourse of the Jew to his own people, and to prevent his mixing with non-Jews. A Jew was immediately recognisable by the fringes of his dress (*Zitsith*) ; a Jewish home by the sign upon the doorpost (*Mesusa*), so that every Jew was protected from unwittingly eating with a non-Jew or entering a non-Jewish house. The temptation to do so was ever present, as the other inhabitants of Palestine were closely akin to the Jews in culture, language and race. From this point of view we shall consider the truth of the assertion so often made, that the Jews owe their continued existence to their religion. It is *not* true, if by religion we mean Jewish monotheism ; it *is* true if by the Jewish religion we mean the ritual incorporating it, instituted by Ezra's reforms. In this form it became less a religious "faith" than a religious organisation admirably adapted for endurance—for the physical and cultural preservation of the Jewish people.

book takes the contrary attitude to many of his followers and forerunners—to Eugen Dühring in particular—by attributing the alleged inferiority of the Jews not to race but to the religious doctrines instituted by Ezra and Nehemiah. "It is senseless to call an Israelite a Jew, though his descent is beyond question, if he has succeeded in throwing off the fetters of Ezra and Nehemiah, and if the Law of Moses has no place in his brain, and contempt of others no place in his heart. . . . A purely humanised Jew is no longer a Jew, because by renouncing the idea of Judaism, he *ipso facto* has left that nationality, which is composed and held together by a complex of conceptions—by a 'faith'" (see page 491). There are a few millions of such Jews. It shows how little Chamberlain knows Jewish conditions of the present day, when he proposes to set aside these Jews, and consider as Jews only the ultra-orthodox who in his "Judaised" Western Europe are only a small minority of the Jews themselves.

The fact that Ezra's ordinances held good for so many generations is due in the first place to the manner in which they were conveyed—as religious commandments, laws of God, obeyed, as with all primitive people, out of fear of arousing the anger of God. With every nation the social institutions which are bound up with religion endure the longest. We need only point to divisions of caste in India which, unjust as they seem to us, have endured, thanks to their religious authority, for thousands of years. The Armenians to-day, deprived of their political independence, make the Church the basis of their claim to national identity, and thus preserve an obstinate and not easily assailable existence. Again, Ezra's laws derived much of their strength from the fact that they were not merely theoretical teachings, but practical rules of life. Had the isolation of the Jewish nation been based only on the strength of the faith in Jehovah, it would not have survived the centuries, for theoretical ideas are apt to become weakened and changed in the course of time. On the other hand, traditional laws and customs of daily life have a strong hold and endure even when the idea which they express has long ago been forgotten or discredited; they then become superstitions, and are thought to possess secret powers. Theories are always subject to being refuted by proofs, ingrained customs are more difficult to uproot.

Thirdly, the Jews after the dispersion were economically in a unique position among the nations. They alone carried on the trades of merchants and money-lenders among agricultural peoples, and their attitude towards their non-Jewish surroundings was exceptional, and indeed often hostile. Hence they did not come into close intercourse with non-Jews, and there was no

temptation for them to discard their religious ordinances. Where, as was the case in Egypt and South Italy, the non-Jewish population was no longer engaged in agriculture, but lived under the same system of trade and exchange, and where, therefore, the social antithesis no longer existed, the Jews mixed freely with their neighbours and the strict observance of their rites was soon dropped.

The idea of Israel being a "chosen" people only took practical form in the time of Ezra. When we find Christians in the Middle Ages forbidden to eat with Jews or intermarry with them, this is only reciprocation of the Jewish practice. If the Jews had not separated themselves, the Christians would not have separated them, there would have been no Ghettos, and in spite of the difference of race—which, in the first ten Christian centuries, when the Jews lived along the coast of the Mediterranean, was less marked than during the next 1,000 years when they lived among the peoples of Northern Europe—the Jews would undoubtedly have been swallowed up by Christianity and Islam during the Middle Ages. The fact that the Samaritans, who live by Jewish law, have managed to survive since the time of Jesus to this day as a separate community in Palestine (in Nablous) is a proof of the effectiveness of the Jewish law in preserving a nation apart.

The later religious movements in Judaism—the schools of Hillel and Shammai in the time of Jesus, the learned Rabbis of the Talmud, and the great teachers of the Middle Ages—made no change in Ezra's and Nehemiah's reform, which made religious culture, enveloped in a network of ritual and ceremonies, the centre of Jewish life; they only continued it in a straight line and built a monument of literal interpretation and

extraordinary dialectic around it. The majority of the religious injunctions must assuredly have had a practical meaning for the author of Deuteronomy and for Ezra and Nehemiah, but they had lost all living interest and practical significance in the Talmudic and post-Talmudic ages, chiefly through absolutely changed conditions. Shorn of their rational foundation, they remained nothing but a complicated system of rules, their only justification being their supposed Divine origin; and as no other basis was accounted necessary, they were studied as Divine commands, and the very letters were interpreted as something holy.

From the point of view of general spiritual progress, Chamberlain is quite justified in saying that Ezra's reform, by substituting the imposed authority of the "Law" for the free and lofty conception of prophetic religion—the religion of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah—is a set-back to religious progress.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless a Jew who loves his people must be grateful to Ezra for having been the means of preserving the nation, for "Israel has been saved by her ritual."<sup>2</sup>

#### B. *Jewish orthodoxy in the present day.*

The Jewish religion to-day is thoroughly disorganised. It includes a hundred varieties between the "fromm" (pious) Jew, who would suffer any hardship rather than neglect the smallest religious precept, to the "enlightened Jew," whose adherence to Judaism only becomes apparent when he is buried in a Jewish cemetery. We may say that there are about six million such "fromm" Jews and three million "enlightened," while the remainder fill in the intermediate stages.

<sup>1</sup> *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, vol. i. p. 436.

<sup>2</sup> Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Jews and Anti-Semitism*.

The orthodox Jew still bases his life on Ezra's legislation ; his whole life is saturated with religion. The cleaning of a vessel (as Bruno Bauer has remarked) is not a household duty, it is the highest duty a man can have—a religious duty. Before he touches a morsel of food, he begins the day with religion, *i.e.* with attendance at a house of prayer and with praying ; the evening ends in the same way. For him there can be no festival and no joy outside his religion. The joyful events in family life, marriage, circumcision, etc., bear a pre-eminently religious character. The profane way in which Christians celebrate such events with singing and dancing is absolutely foreign to the pious Jew ; his one recreation is to go to the Beth Hamidrash (house of learning) on Sabbath afternoons, and there study the old Hebrew writings and discuss them with friends. It is characteristic that even social organisations such as the trades unions of Jewish workmen in Russia, are founded on the possession of a scroll of the Law, and a communal divine service in a common house of prayer.<sup>1</sup>

There is something "out-of-the-way," something extremely pathetic, even if it be not very lofty and exalted, in the religious feeling of an Eastern European Jew—a spirit which cannot be awakened in the "enlightened" Jew of Western Europe. To the orthodox Jew the existence of an ever-present, all-seeing God is the alpha and omega of his thought. He connects the events of every-day life, in business and family, directly with his observance of the ritual ; he sees everywhere the hand of God ever-present, punishing and rewarding. The neglect of a religious ordinance and a subsequent unpleasantness in business are to

<sup>1</sup> Sara Rabinowitsch, *The Organisation of the Jewish Proletariat in Russia*, p. 9.



him obviously matter of cause and effect. We should call much—perhaps most—of his religious thought superstition; but who can draw the line between faith and superstition? It is this very submission to the Law, and the ensuing feeling of constant communion with the God-head, that reconciles him to life, makes his miserable, dreary existence seem necessary and important. Death, and the reverence for departed spirits that goes hand in hand with it, is one of the mainsprings of all religion; thus, it is noteworthy that it is a sacred duty for the orphan son of an Eastern European Jew to recite the “Kaddish” in the synagogue every day for a whole year, after the death of his father, and again every year at the anniversary of the death, the Kaddish being a prayer in praise of God, the recital of which is thought to bring peace and repose to the soul of the departed. The burning of an oil lamp (*Jahrzeit*) accompanies the ceremony. The anniversaries of the deaths of great Rabbis are not only celebrated by their successors, but by the whole congregation, in prayer.<sup>1 2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The “Chassidim” celebrate the anniversaries of the deaths of their “Zaddikim” (holy ones) by a festive meal, as the deaths of such men are not sad but joyful events, signifying their union with God.

<sup>2</sup> In proof that this pious remembrance of the dead is a development of ancestor worship—worship of departed spirits—we may cite the fact that in Eastern Europe prayers are offered up not only *for* but *to* the dead. I visited the old Jewish cemetery of Cracow in the spring of 1903 on the very day of the “*Jahrzeit*” of the famous Rabbi Moses Isserles (buried here in 1572); Jews were flocking to the cemetery to pray and lament at the Rabbi’s grave. Most of them wrote down their particular prayer or wish in Hebrew on a piece of paper and either threw these papers on the grave or fastened them to the tombstone. Both grave and stone were ultimately quite hidden under the crowd of papers, which bore every variety of appeal to the Rabbi to come to their help.

An outstanding feature of the religious life is the sanctification of the Sabbath. The poorest Jew, after a week's toil as pedlar or artisan, throws off all his cares on the Sabbath, and abstains from all manner of work from the Friday to the Saturday evening. It is the strict observance of the Sabbath more than anything else that distinguishes and separates the Jew from his non-Jewish surroundings.

The sect of Chassidim occupies a singular position within the body of East European Judaism. Its adherents are found in the greatest numbers in Galicia and Bukovina, where they number one-half of all the Jews there; in Russia and Hungary their numbers are also very considerable. The Chassidim (*i.e.* the pious) are distinguished for a certain optimism of religious belief, and for the faith they have in their Zaddikim (holy ones), who are singled out by their transcendent piety and asceticism, and profess to be nearer God than other people, understanding and knowing Him better than they. Every Zaddik has his followers—many or few according to his fame and personality—and these are scattered far and wide in many places. These followers often meet together in special houses of prayer (Klaus), and their faith in the distant Zaddik binds them together as a separate community. The Zaddik is sought after for advice in every difficulty—be it the launching of a business, a legal dispute, a dangerous illness, an operation—the Rabbi is the final authority for his followers, and the lawyer and physician are set aside. The veneration in which these wonder-working Rabbis are held is extraordinary. A believer is happy if he can secure even a fish-bone out of the dish from which the holy man has eaten. He wears a coin which has received

the Zaddik's benediction as an amulet, and often sacrifices a whole year's earnings to make a journey to the Zaddik on a high festival and bring him a present. At the period of these festivals, Galician trains are crowded with these strange pilgrims. These wonder-working-Rabbis are generally members of famous families—their repute handed down from father to son—and they grow so rich on the presents brought them by the pilgrims that they often live in magnificent houses (in glaring contrast to the unspeakably miserable dwellings of the Galician Jews), and support a large staff of parasites, who live on the crumbs they leave. Their influence on their followers has the power of hypnotism. One must have witnessed the sight of the multitudes of Jews gathered together in a Synagogue, during high Festival at Belz Czortkow or Sadagora, when the famous wonder-Rabbi assists, in order to have an idea of this hypnotism. The thousand-headed, serried mass is swayed this side and that like ears of corn in a wheat-field; a low moan sometimes swelling into an agonised wail passes through it, as from a broken heart—this is no prayer in the ordinary sense of the word, it is delirium, transport, ecstasy. Undoubtedly Chassidism is a retrogression, an obstacle to any spiritual progress,<sup>1</sup> but there can be no hope of exterminating it, so long as the present wretched social condition of the Jews, on which Chassidism thrives, continues. The spiritual energy of the Jew created an imaginary world when the real world was lost to him. He found an outlet for his spirit in the

<sup>1</sup> A Jew whom I met in Belz (a stronghold of Chassidism), on hearing that I came from Prussia, remarked characteristically that 200 years ago famous men had lived there too. For him Prussia, since it ceased to produce famous Talmudists, had sunk to barbarism.

mysticism and superstition of Chassidism, an escape from the sorrows of existence in his faith in the power of the Rabbi; it was the one bright light of his life, the guarantee that sooner or later better times would come. With all peoples, at all times, whenever pressure from without crushes natural action, the spirit evolves these fantastic conceptions, and superstition and mysticism spring up. The esoteric doctrines of the Baale Emunoth in the eighth and ninth centuries, and the Cabbala-study of the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries have the same origins. *Some* hope of a brighter future was essential to the oppressed Jew; he could not live without it, he needed it to reconcile him to life.

Even with non-Chassidic orthodox Jews, religious feeling often degenerates into superstition and faith in miracles. How many look upon the fringes (Titzith), the phylacteries (Tephillin), the signs on the door-posts (Mezuzoth), otherwise than as amulets and precautions against evil spirits (comparable to the superstition of the horse-shoe).<sup>1</sup>

Religion even controls the wearing of the hair, and the costume of the orthodox Jew. A Jew may not cut off his hair at the temples, hence the well-known side-curls (in Russia he is not allowed to wear these); his wife, on her marriage, has to cut off all her hair, and is condemned to wear a head-shawl or wig all her life. The long gaberdine which the Eastern Jew wears was originally nothing else but the customary Polish dress of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, which the Jews adopted. But, strange as it may seem,

<sup>1</sup> See *The Children of the Ghetto*, by Israel Zangwill. When the old grandmother is told of the sudden illness of her grandson, her first words are, "I wonder if he was wearing his Titzith?"

religion has sanctified this very costume, the pious Jew refuses to discard it, and looks upon a Jew in modern clothes as little better than an apostate. A Jew, who for the first time exchanges the "kaftan" for modern dress, looks upon this act as of epoch-making importance; it signifies as much to him as conversion does to the Western Jew. There is actually a sort of connection between orthodoxy and the kaftan, inasmuch as the Jews are most "fromm" where there are fewest in modern dress. In the small towns of Eastern Galicia there is hardly a Jew who does not wear a kaftan. In Cracow about one-half of all the Jews wear them. Like the kaftan, other originally profane articles of clothing have become sanctified by religion. The Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam still wear knee-breeches and "dreimaster" on the Sabbath (once the fashion in Portugal). And the pious Polish Jew still wears the fur hat (streimel), centuries ago the fashion in Poland, and now an indispensable article of Sabbath clothing. In Russia the fur hat has been prohibited by the Government, and a velvet or silk cap has had to be substituted.

It is certain that if we except those who blindly follow what their neighbours do for fear of public opinion, many Jews only observe the Law so rigidly because they fear the consequences of non-observance; they believe that their obedience to, and neglect of, the Laws are entered in God's book as matters of credit and debit, and that the fate of their "life to come" depends on the balance. What makes this sort of "piety" often so repulsive is that it leads to keeping the letter of the Law without the spirit; the most rigid observance of all the minutiae may go hand in hand with a bad character, with avarice, with hard-

heartedness and perfidy. But this is not the rule, and one cannot but admire the Jew who, in an overcrowded train, will proceed to recite the morning prayer with phylacteries, praying shawl and all; who will spend his last penny to secure the Sabbath candles—many towns within the Jewish area in Eastern Europe are only lit up on the occasion of this Friday night illumination—or who in his old age cherishes the desire to be buried in Palestine, in the land of his fathers.

It will be seen from the above remarks that Jewish orthodoxy remains to-day very much the ceremonial religion of Ezra and Nehemiah. The spirit is overlaid by a thick stratum of ritual and ceremony. The Jewish religion in this form has not reached a very high stage in religious evolution. But, as long as these forms suffice for the Jew, the religion has a great power. The proselytising strength of a religion is in inverse ratio to its abstractness. The more abstract, philosophic and intangible it is, the fewer and less fervent are its adherents. The blind unquestioning faith of the Moslem and the orthodox Jew, setting at nought all the discoveries of modern science, this is a really important factor in the life of a people—not the sceptical Protestantism of our own day, or the anaemic religious feeling of the “enlightened” Jew. For the Mohammedan and the Jew, prayer is no aesthetic pleasure, as it has tended to become in Christian services, with song and organ; it is an earnest attempt to bring man into line with nature. Worship in a Christian Church in Eastern Europe is unspeakably more beautiful than in the neighbouring synagogue, but the greater fervour is undeniably in the latter. The Jewish religion, partly through the prohibition to represent God pictorially, is comparatively poor in

outward symbols ;<sup>1</sup> the Jew is therefore compelled to concentrate all his religious feeling on prayer. Prayer is the essence of his religion, and it is because of this that the Jew has still a strongly marked anthropomorphic conception of God. Only a humanly conceived God could understand the torrent of feeling that is poured out to Him in prayer. It is for this reason that the Catholic offers up his prayer and his sacrifice not to God Himself, but to his patron Saint.

### C. *Liberal Judaism.*

Leroy-Beaulieu<sup>2</sup> is surprised " that the Jew as soon as he comes in contact with outside influences, so often goes from one extreme to the other, from blind faith to scepticism, from Oriental tradition to the latest development of 'the Spirit of the Age.' " This, indeed, is the Achilles' heel of the Jewish religion. It may have been the same in former times with other religions, when religion was a potent factor in cultural life, but to-day it is confined to the outcome of the Ghetto. As soon as the Jew steps out of the Ghetto, and begins to take part in the social life of the country, adopting its language and culture, so soon does he make himself free of the bonds of the Jewish religion. This is seen most clearly with the English and American Jewish immigrants. " It is generally recognised that the foreign Jew observes his religion less strictly than he

<sup>1</sup> The British Museum contains a collection of the religious symbols of all nations and faiths. Those of the Jews (consisting only of scrolls of the Law, knives for circumcision, Tallith, Tephillin, and a few other articles) probably occupy less space than those of any other religion.

<sup>2</sup> *L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes*, vol. i. p. 168.

did ten years ago," says Russell,<sup>1</sup> who is of opinion that the next generation will break loose from orthodoxy altogether. As we have shown in previous chapters, this detachment from religion is accomplished most rapidly when the Jew receives a secular education in his childhood. An East European Jew who has received a gymnasium or university education is hopelessly estranged from the Jewish religion. Even the elementary school education is calculated to undermine orthodox Judaism, and it is a very natural instinct that impels the "fromm" Jew to prevent his children going to the secular schools, and induces him to prefer the inferior Cheder education under the Hebrew master (Melamed). We see here that the far-famed obstinate devotion of the Jews to their religion arises not so much from the great spiritual power of this religion, as from anxiety to shield it from anything which might destroy religious faith. The Jew must not be allowed to doubt, or even to harbour conflicting thoughts; as soon as he begins to doubt, his fate is sealed, his secession from orthodoxy is a necessary result. The sceptic will never more be a pious Jew.

A century of unfettered activity in commercial affairs, combined with secular education, has sufficed to estrange Jews from their religion in all economically developed countries; and whatever remains of that religion is hopelessly diluted and bloodless. This is not to be wondered at. The spirit which entered Europe with the coming of the Capitalistic era was rationalism, and materialism accompanied it. The Jew, who owes his emancipation to this spirit, is to-day its most active propagandist, and the Jewish religion

<sup>1</sup> Russell and Lewis, *The Jew in London*.



is no more to him than Protestantism is to the enlightened Protestant: a survival of a former age, not to be thrown overboard entirely, for old associations' sake, but impossible to practise. Not that the Jew thinks his religion a bad one—on the contrary, he considers the pure monotheism of the Jewish religion less senseless than the Trinity of Christianity; (he merely despises religion altogether. He still keeps up some kind of connection with it; in England, for instance, we have a class of Jew called "Yom-kippur" Jews, because the Day of Atonement (Yom-kippur) is the only day of the year they attend a synagogue. And in France and Germany it is much the same. The observance of the Sabbath and the Dietary Laws are altogether discarded by the greater number of these Jews. An enquiry instituted in Germany in 1904 showed that only 487 congregations out of 1,850 held the prescribed daily service in the synagogue, while 1,147 held them on the Sabbath alone, and only 216 on the High Festivals.<sup>1</sup> The congregations which still hold daily services are to be found mostly in the Prussian provinces of Posen, Hessen and Nassau, and in South Germany (Bavaria, Baden, Hesse, and Alsace-Lorraine). These are the districts where one may still meet with orthodox Judaism, or at any rate the remnants of it, in Germany. Its survival must be attributed to the social and cultural backwardness of the small towns in which the Jews live in these parts. The orthodox Jews to be found in the great cities (Frankfurt-a-M., Hamburg, Halberstadt, Berlin, Munich) belong partly to old families who inherit a great pride in their race and lineage, and partly to East European immigrants and their children.

<sup>1</sup> *Zeitschrift f. Dem. u. Stat. d. Juden*, 1905.

Altogether about 10-15 per cent. of the Jews in Germany may be called orthodox.

Jewish religious activity during the nineteenth century has confined itself to modernising the ritual. "Reform" has been instituted everywhere; consisting chiefly of beautifying the synagogue building, introducing a sermon in the language of the country, and an organ—that is to say, in adopting Christian forms of service.<sup>1</sup> It is undeniable that the introduction of the sermon and the organ has made the service more aesthetic than the regular orthodox service used to be—held as it was in small dark rooms with no pretence at decoration, and inharmonious enough to offend a sensitive ear. But these cold, bare rooms were lit up by the intense religious fervour of the Russian Jews, to whom their religion was life, and who felt in its observance all the glow of a vital religious experience. "Compared to these," says Fabius Schach,<sup>2</sup> "the devotion of the Western Jew is cold, modern-European; the national feeling is eliminated, the Jewish soul has dressed itself (*Toilette gemacht*) and no longer appears in its natural state. Here everything is ordered and timed and calculated. Exquisite music with organ and choir, an eloquent sermon—but the outpouring of the soul, the warmth, are missing.

<sup>1</sup> It must be said here that musical accompaniment in the synagogue is by no means un-Jewish: "Music and song were one of the features of the Temple service; a Synagogue in Prague has for centuries possessed an organ, which is played every Friday evening and on the Sabbath; one, two, and three-part singing is fairly old" (Zunz, *Die Gottesdienstl. Vorträge der Juden*). But for the most part musical accompaniment had quite disappeared—with the probable exception of this synagogue in Prague—the organ had no place in any Jewish service, up to the nineteenth century.

Something new and foreign has been added to Judaism without being able to mix organically with it. Out of the old house of prayer has been evolved something which is neither Synagogue nor church." The Jewish religion is dying gradually in Western Europe. A certain feeling of piety, and a lurking sense of shame at deserting one's colours still hold its adherents together. This piety is indeed seldom the deep and heart-felt religious need of the Russian Jew ; it is far more often a dull conformity to tradition. It is more pronounced where the religious status of the surrounding Christian population is strong (in Catholic South Germany, for instance), and it is weakest where rationalism has undermined the religious feeling of the Christian population (in Berlin, Paris, and, in general, all the great cities). The doctrine of the mission of the Jews, so largely preached from the pulpit, may still be held by a few Rabbis ; to the mass of Jews it has long ceased to carry either meaning or credence.

#### *D. Destructive forces.*

So much is clear : in so far as the Jewish religion is still a living force, it is as a ceremonial religion, the precepts of which have no rational explanation, but are founded on a belief in their divine origin. Many attempts have been made to show that many of these laws are based on social and hygienic laws, which hold good to this day. But what does it signify if, out of hundreds of precepts, there should happen to be one which is still hygienically valuable ? We have to deal with the principle : (are the laws of the ritual to stand for all eternity on the strength of their pretended divine origin ? or are they to succumb to the examination of their actual utility in the light of advancing

scientific knowledge? Should the laws and customs emerge triumphant from the examination, the enlightened Jew would, of course, have no objection; but the orthodox Jew would consider such a thing an unheard-of sacrilege, and indeed one must either accept the ceremonial in its entirety, or reject it in its entirety. Whosoever believes in divine revelation will accept it. Whosoever does *not* believe in it must reject it, and no Jew who has received a modern education can in the light of Higher Criticism believe any longer in the divine origin of Ezra's legislation. To this opposition of reason must be added very weighty social and economic objections. Many laws, which entailed no hardship in their observance under the conditions of primitive communication and social isolation, under which the Jews formerly lived, are now an almost insuperable burden—such as the observance of the Sabbath and the Dietary Laws. How can the Jewish shopman compete with the Christian if, in addition to the legal day of rest, he must observe his Sabbath and confine himself to five working days a week? How can the Jewish pupil of the public schools, how can the lawyer, engineer, and civil servant, keep the Sabbath? How can a Jew whose calling takes him to a place where there is no Jewish congregation carry out the usages of his religion?

These two forces—modern science with the resulting religious scepticism, and the change in social conditions—are fighting against orthodox Judaism, and will conquer it in those countries where it still has sway, as surely as they have done in the more economically advanced countries. What then remains of Judaism is a feeble liberalism, which is not strong enough to stem the tide of assimilation; “the reformers” who

hope for this do not understand that the complex of ideas accepted by a mass of people takes some time to dissolve, and that tradition offers a tough resistance to science.

But its fate is sealed ; the conditions which kept orthodoxy alive so long—the social isolation of the Jews, and their divorce from secular education—are disappearing with the advance of capitalism, and the structure of orthodox Judaism, deprived of their support, will fall to the ground.

## CHAPTER X.

### INTERMARRIAGE.

#### *A. The increase of intermarriage.*

Since the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, that is, from about 400 B.C., marriage between Jew and non-Jew has been strictly prohibited. The Kohanim (priests) were not even allowed to marry with those who had been converted to Judaism. The common people, however, were permitted to do this, and during the Hellenic period, and in the Diaspora, marriage with Jewish neophytes was very common; of this the Judaised Chazars are a good example. On the other hand, during the Diaspora, such marriages were denounced by Christians as well as by Jews, and were forbidden, under pain of heavy penalties, by the Councils of Orleans (A.D. 538), Toledo (A.D. 589) and Rome (A.D. 743). The fact that these laws were made is thought by many writers to be in itself proof that such intermarriages did indeed take place—the Archbishop von Gran (in Hungary) mentions its existence in a report to the Pope in 1229; but intermarriage, towards the end of the Middle Ages, as the social position of the Jews deteriorated, became very rare, and has been since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries till recently, a negligible quantity. The social and religious gulf between Christian and Jew had become

so wide, that that alone precluded the possibility of intermarriage, and rendered the legal prohibition quite unnecessary. Nevertheless, this prohibition stands to this day, and still holds good in Spain, Portugal, Russia and all countries belonging to the Greek Church. In Mohammedan countries intermarriage is forbidden by religious laws, which are the only laws concerned in matters of marriage.

In the following remarks, whenever we speak of intermarriage, we are leaving out of consideration those cases in which either of the parties is converted to the religion of the other *before* marriage. Intermarriage in the general sense of the term implies the union of two persons who belong severally to the Jewish and Christian religions.

To the anthropologist, indeed, change of religion is of no importance; for him, a marriage between Jew and Christian remains a mixed marriage with or without conversion—a marriage of two people belonging to different races. But in considering statistically the spread of intermarriage, we cannot deal with the anthropological side, and for a very good reason. In Europe, at any rate, the *race* to which the individual belongs is not taken into account by official statistics; probably because it is exceedingly difficult—perhaps impossible—to classify Europeans in fixed anthropological groups. If, therefore, we wish to establish the fact of the spread of intermarriage by statistics, we have to look only at the religion to which the parties belong.

The impetus to abolish the statutes forbidding marriage between Christian and Jew came from the French Revolution, and spread slowly from country to country, to Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Scandi-

navia, England and the United States, favoured by the circumstance that marriage in these countries had been converted from a clerical to a civil act. In Germany intermarriage has been allowed since the law of 1875, which in addition legalised all such marriages already contracted. In Hungary it has been legal only since 1895; some of the Balkan States (notably Roumania) permit it; but it is prohibited in Austria, Russia, Spain, Portugal, and the Mohammedan countries, as we have already shown. In considering the degree in which Jews and Christians avail themselves of these facilities for intermarriage, we must not forget that diversity of religious belief is everywhere a great stumbling-block in the way of marriage. The religious character of marriage in many countries makes a mixed marriage appear a sacrilege, and for this reason it is, without exception, discountenanced by the clergy, and can only be accomplished through the civil law. Then, again, difference of religion usually implies a certain social aloofness, in the sense that people usually associate with their co-religionists, and therefore usually marry in their circle.<sup>1</sup> Thus the 6,700 inhabitants of the island of Schokland in the Zuyder Zee, consisting half of Protestants, half of Catholics, were found to marry exclusively within their religious communities; the 200 Karaites in Galicia, separated from

<sup>1</sup> This is the attitude of orthodox Judaism towards intermarriage. Of all the questions which Napoleon put to the Jewish Sanhedrin summoned by him, none aroused such a heated debate as the third: "May a Jewess marry with a Christian, or a Jew with a Christian girl?" The French reforming Rabbis were in favour of an affirmative, the German (Alsacian) of a definitely negative answer. The Sanhedrin finally came to the conclusion that the only marriage which was absolutely forbidden was marriage with Canaanites; marriages with Christians ought probably not to be celebrated by Jewish priests, but otherwise there was no hindrance.



the main body of their co-religionists and living apart, among Jews and Christians, nevertheless never intermarry with them. Even the slight religious difference which exists between the Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews of Amsterdam was sufficient to prevent marriage between the two until the middle of the nineteenth century. In Palestine, marriage between Sephardim and Ashkenazim is still quite exceptional. Here, certainly, there is the additional hindrance of difference of language and culture. Marriages between Protestants and Catholics in West and South Germany were formerly very rare, and it is only during the last decades—since civil marriages have been introduced—that such unions have become numerous, and the importance of religion and the Church in the life of the individual has decreased. The following table shows the percentage of marriages out of the faith among Protestants and Catholics:

In	Year.	Protestant.	Roman Catholics.	Per cent. of Protestants in Total Population.	Per cent. of Catholics in Total Population.
Prussia, - - -	1907	7.10	13.61	62.59	35.80
Bavaria, - - -	1907	16.24	6.66	28.28	70.70
Hungary, - - -	1907	21.33	7.24	6.69	51.49
Berlin, - - -	1906	8.93	62.37	83.09	10.98
Frankfort-on-Main, -	1907	28.29	44.16	60.45	31.59
Vienna, - - -	1905	35.26	1.42	2.88	87.28

The percentage of mixed marriages is here higher where the Catholics or Protestants are few in number among the general population. In other words, adherents of a religious minority are more liable to contract mixed marriages when the choice is limited among their own co-religionists. In Berlin and Frankfort-on-M., where Catholics are only 10.98 per cent.

of the city population (against 31.59 per cent. of the population of the whole country), 62.37 per cent. intermarry; that is, intermarriage has almost become the rule.

Jews intermarry most frequently in countries where they have been settled for several generations, and have achieved prosperity, but where their numbers are so small that their appearance in high Christian circles is not resented, and gives rise to no Anti-Semitism. Such countries are Denmark, Italy and Australia.

Eighty-one per cent. of the Jews of Denmark live in Copenhagen: in this town 395 Jewish marriages and 272 mixed marriages were contracted between the years 1880 and 1905 among the Jews, *i.e.* 68.9 mixed marriages to every 100 Jewish marriages. Mixed marriages are on the increase, Jewish marriages on the decrease. Of mixed marriages there were contracted:

In 1880-1889 99 = 50.8 per cent. of 161 purely Jewish marriages.  
 „ 1890-1895 101 = 68.7 „ „ 147 „ „  
 „ 1900-1905 81 = 82.9 „ „ 87 „ „

By the census of 1906 it was shown that there were 326 Jewish couples and 159 mixed (Jewish and Christian) in Copenhagen.

The census of 1901 in Australia disclosed the following figures:

State.	Jewish Marriages.	MIXED MARRIAGES.		
		Jewish Husband.	Jewish Wife.	Together.
West Australia, -	157	39	23	62
New South Wales, -	781	252	108	360

so that mixed marriages in West Australia constitute 34.4 per cent., in New South Wales 46 per cent. of Jewish marriages.

We have no recent data for Italy, but it is generally acknowledged that intermarriage goes on there to a great extent; in 1881 there were already 34.1 per cent. mixed marriages. In Trieste, which belongs politically to Austria, but culturally to Italy, the following marriages were contracted:

Year.	Purely Jewish Marriages.	MARRIAGES BETWEEN JEWS AND FREETHINKERS.	
		In actual Numbers.	Per 100 Pure Jewish Marriages.
1877-1890, - - - -	138	46	33.3
1891-1895, - - - -	122	47	38.5
1896-1899, - - - -	137	57	41.6
1900-1903, - - - -	106	65	61.4

In England and France, intermarriage was common until 10 or 20 years ago. The Jews were then few in numbers, and were among the wealthiest of the inhabitants. Their numbers have lately increased very largely, owing to the immigration from Eastern Europe: among these immigrants intermarriage with Gentiles takes place very seldom; it is confined to the settled upper classes of Jews. We have unfortunately no actual figures.

In America, conditions are similar to those in England. Those Jews who have long been settled in the country and belong to the wealthier class, tend to intermarry with Christians, more especially in the rather sparsely populated districts of the Southern States and South America. The great mass of Jews,

however, who have immigrated since 1881, and concentrated themselves in the Northern States, do not so intermarry on a large scale. A census taken in 1904 for clerical purposes showed that there were 85 mixed marriages to 8,627 Jewish marriages in New York, or less than 1 per cent.

We have accurate figures of mixed marriages for Germany since 1901, for Prussia and Bavaria since 1875-76; and separate statistics for all the large towns. Here we see that mixed marriages are everywhere on the increase.

Country.	Between	Purely Jewish Marriages.	MIXED MARRIAGES.			Mixed Marriages per 100 Pure Jewish.	In every 100 Purely Jewish Marriages there married out of Faith.		
			Jew	Jew. Assoc.	Total.		Men.	Women	Average Total.
Germany, -	1901-1904	3909	362	313	675	17.3	8.48	7.41	7.95
	1905-1908	3968	477	406	883	22.2	10.69	9.24	9.97
Prussia, -	1875-1884	2406	116	126	242	10.1	4.60	4.98	4.79
	1885-1894	2426	155	147	302	12.4	6.01	5.71	5.86
	1895-1899	2555	231	202	433	16.9	8.29	7.33	7.81
	1900-1904	2568	263	232	495	19.3	9.29	8.29	8.80
	1905-1908	2674	358	316	674	25.2	11.81	10.57	11.19
Bavaria, -	1876-1884	359	7	6	13	3.6	1.91	1.63	1.78
	1885-1894	360	10	9	19	5.3	2.70	2.44	2.57
	1895-1899	379	20	12	32	8.4	5.01	3.07	4.05
	1900-1904	425	21	17	38	8.9	4.71	3.85	4.29
	1905-1908	405	20	19	39	9.6	4.71	4.48	4.59
Berlin, -	1901-1904	615	134	84	218	35.4	17.89	12.02	15.06
	1905-1906	626	158	116	274	43.8	20.15	15.63	17.96
Hamburg, -	1903-1905	105	26	26	52	49.5	19.85	19.85	19.85
Frankfort-on-Main, -	1905-1909	154	19	19	38	24.7	10.98	10.98	10.98
Breslau, -	1905-1906	138	12	11	23	16.7	8.00	7.38	7.69
Munich, -	1906-1908	44	7	9	16	36.4	13.73	16.98	15.38
Charlottenburg, -	1895-1905	59	9	5	14	23.7	13.24	7.81	10.61

The percentage of mixed marriages to Jewish ones was on the average 22.2 in Germany between

the years 1904 and 1908. Bavaria, which is the leading state of all Catholic South Germany, has only 9.6 per cent., thus coming below the general average; Prussia (*i.e.* Protestant Northern and Central Germany) has 25.2 per cent., something above it. Berlin and Hamburg have no less than 43.8 and 49.5 mixed marriages, respectively, to 100 Jewish marriages. For the whole of Germany 1904-1908, the average of Jews or Jewesses marrying out of the faith was 9.97 per cent.; in Berlin it was 17.96 per cent.; in Hamburg 19.95 per cent.

As a general rule intermarriage of Jewish men with Christian women is far more common than that of Christian men with Jewish women. This is specially the case in Berlin, Charlottenburg and Hamburg. During the period 1875-1884 this was not so, probably because at that time it was the fashion for poor Christians of noble families to marry rich Jewesses. With the advent of anti-Semitism (about 1880) marriage with a Jew or Jewess came to be looked upon as something of a *mésalliance*; especially so in the case of the Jewish wife, as, under present conditions in Germany, wives are easier to find than husbands. Thus, in cases of intermarriage, a Jewish man often seems to be marrying below his rank. The following table differentiates the sects to which the Christians who intermarry belong. It shows that by far the greater part are Protestant.

The percentage of Protestants in Germany in 1905 was 62.1 per cent. of the general population, so that their percentage of mixed marriages is out of proportion to their numbers. The contrary is seen with the Catholics, in spite of the fact that Jews are as numerous in the Catholic as in the Protestant districts. The reasons for this are firstly that the large cities, with their

disproportionate percentage of mixed marriages, are mostly situated in Protestant districts, and secondly that Catholicism has far more hold on the people, and hinders them from intermarrying.

Year.	Man and Wife Jewish.	HUSBAND, JEWISH. WIFE,				WIFE, JEWISH. HUSBAND,			
		Protes- tant.	Catho- lic.	Other Christ. Sects.	Other Relig- ions.	Protes- tant.	Catho- lic.	Other Christ. Sects.	Other Relig- ions.
1901	3,878	258	67	13	4	222	76	16	2
1902	3,925	244	75	8	4	217	63	11	4
1903	3,831	279	68	11	5	218	70	13	4
1904	4,001	316	74	16	6	256	74	5	1
1905	3,905	361	74	14	9	255	85	16	4
1906	4,080	330	87	18	5	297	91	22	5
1907	4,052	389	84	21	1	305	96	19	5
1908	3,907	382	92	35	7	310	88	19	6
Aver. 1901-8	3,947	320	78	17	5	260	80	15	4

In intermarriage with Jewish husband, 76.19 % of all cases are Protestant.

" " " wife, 72.42 % " " "

In total average of intermarriages, 74.45 % " " "

Statistics for Prussia, Saxony, Hamburg and Bremen give the actual numbers of mixed couples. Thus in Prussia there were the following number :

In the Year.	With Jewish Husband.	With Jewish Wife.	Total
1885	1,100	1,011	2,111
1890	1,505	1,258	2,763
1895	1,757	1,530	3,287
1900	2,242	1,810	4,052
1905	2,931	2,186	5,117

In Saxony (1905) to 2,174 Jewish there were 292 mixed marriages (213 with Jewish husbands, 79 with Jewish wife) = 13.4 per cent. mixed marriages. In Hamburg (1900) to 3,022 Jewish there were 158 mixed

marriages with Jewish wife and 273 with Jewish husband: thus altogether 14.3 per cent. of mixed marriages.

In Austria, as we have already mentioned, marriage between Christian and Jew is forbidden, but inter-marriage with persons of "no religious confession" is allowed. Thus, if a couple wish to marry, one of them Christian, the other Jewish, the only courses they can take are for one of them either to adopt the faith of the other, or to declare him or herself of no religious confession. If the first alternative is adopted the marriage is not counted as "mixed" statistically; and in the second case the marriage is registered as the marriage of a Jew or Christian (as the case may be) with a person of no confession. It is only the former cases (*i.e.* marriages between Jews and persons of no confession) which can be reckoned as mixed marriages of Jew and Christian with any certainty;<sup>1</sup> in cases where a Christian marries in this way, the non-confessional party is indeed very often, but by no means always, Jewish by birth. We must bear these facts in mind when we study the figures for mixed marriages in Austria, set out below.

In Austria there were contracted on an average yearly :

Year.	Purely Jewish Marriages.	MARRIAGES BETWEEN JEWS AND PERSONS OF NO RELIGIOUS CONFESSION.	
		In actual Figures.	Per 100 purely Jewish Marriages.
1881-1884	3,287	52	1.58
1885-1894	4,576	61	1.33
1895-1899	5,781	122	2.11
1900-1904	7,445	148	1.99
1905-1906	7,816	160	2.05

<sup>1</sup> Even these mixed marriages include many cases of marriage between Jews and baptised or non-confessing Jews, though these

The remarkable increase in Jewish marriages is due to the fact that until a short time ago marriages in Austria and in Galicia in particular were celebrated according to Jewish ritual only, and were not considered valid in the eye of the law. In recent times even the Galician Jews are tending more and more to be married civilly, and the result is seen in the increase of Jewish marriages in the statistics. The fact that while mixed marriages have trebled themselves in actual numbers, their percentage has risen only from 1.58 to 2.05 is attributable to the increase in the number of Jewish marriages registered, the cause of which we have just explained. The greatest number of mixed marriages in Austria take place in Vienna, where the yearly average was :

Year.	Jewish Marriages.	MARRIAGES BETWEEN JEWS AND PERSONS OF NO RELIGIOUS CONFESSION.	
		Actual Figures.	Per 100 purely Jewish Marriages.
1881-1884	390	42	10.8
1885-1894	538	48	8.9
1895-1899	839	76	9.1
1900-1903	864	92	10.7
1904-1907	963	107	11.1

Besides Vienna, Trieste and Bohemia (Prague) witness a great deal of intermarriage. On the other hand, it is almost unknown in Galicia and Bukovina : from 1900-1903 there were only six intermarriages in the whole of Galicia, and not a single one in Bukovina.

clearly cannot be called mixed marriages. On the other hand when *both* contracting parties are converted or non-confessing Jews before marriage these cases are not registered as mixed marriages.



In Hungary the following number are contracted on an average yearly :

Year.	Jewish Marriages.	MIXED MARRIAGES.			Per 100 purely Jewish Marriages.
		Jewish Husband.	Jewish Wife.	Total.	
1895-1899, -	6,694	184	188	372	5.56
1900-1904, -	6,754	224	218	442	6.53
1905-1906, -	6,889	268	237	505	7.33
1907-1908, -	7,239	311	345	656	9.06

We see that in the relatively short time since the law forbidding intermarriage was repealed (1895) intermarriage has been on the increase. The following percentage of Jews married out of the faith :

OF EVERY 100 MARRIED JEWISH				
year.		Men.	Women.	Average of Men and Women together.
1895-1899, -	-	2.68	2.73	2.70
1900-1904, -	-	3.21	3.13	3.16
1905-1906, -	-	3.74	3.32	3.54
1907-1908, -	-	4.12	4.55	4.33

Capital cities offer the widest field for intermarriage in every country : thus, in Hungary, Budapest gives the following figures :

Year.	Jewish Marriages.	MIXED MARRIAGES.			Per 100 purely Jewish Marriages.
		Jewish Husband.	Jewish Wife.	Total.	
1896-1900, -	-	86	93	179	15.0
1901-1904, -	-	104	107	211	16.5

Percentage of Jews marrying out of the faith :

Year.	OF EVERY 100 MARRIED JEWISH		
	Men.	Women.	Average of Men and Women together.
1896-1900, - -	6.71	7.22	6.97
1901-1904, - -	7.54	7.74	7.64

In Holland we have statistics for Amsterdam only, but, as more than half the Dutch Jews live in Amsterdam, we can get a general idea of conditions therefrom. For the years 1899-1908 the average yearly number of Jewish marriages contracted was 381, of mixed marriages, 43, *i.e.* 11.3 per cent. of Jewish marriages.

In Roumania intermarriage does not assume large proportions. For the years 1896-1899, there were on an average 17 mixed to 1,503 Jewish marriages, thus 1.1 per cent. of Jewish marriages. In Roumania also most of the intermarriage goes on in Bukarest :

Year.	Jewish Marriages.	MIXED MARRIAGES.			Per 100 purely Jewish Marriages.
		Jewish Husband.	Jewish Wife.	Total.	
1898-1899, -	303	unknown	unknown	14	4.6
1904-1905, -	242	2	7	9	3.7

In reviewing all these facts we find that we can divide countries into four distinct classes, according to the amount of intermarriage which goes on within them.

In the first class we include those countries where mixed marriages are less than 2 per cent. : Galicia,

Bukovina, Roumania and the Jewish immigrant areas of England, France and the United States.

In the second class (intermarriages from 2 to 10 per cent.) we place Catholic Germany, Hungary (excluding Budapest) and Bohemia.

To the third class belong Protestant Germany, Holland, Austria (Vienna and Budapest). Here intermarriage goes on to the extent of from 10 to 30 per cent. of Jewish marriages, and shows signs of rapid increase. It does not as yet threaten to disrupt the Jewish population, though it seriously reduces its numbers.

Finally, in the fourth class come Denmark, Australia and Italy. Here one-third of Jewish marriages are mixed marriages, and constitute a serious menace to the continued existence of the already scanty Jewish population in these countries, as the children of the mixed marriages are practically all brought up in the Christian faith. The same thing applies to the Jewish communities which have been long established in England, France and the United States of America. A few large German towns (Berlin, Hamburg) should be included also in this fourth class.

The likeness these four classes present to the four sections of Jewry, described in our first chapter, is obvious. Nor is this surprising, considering that the same cause is at the root of both—namely, the participation of Jews in modern culture and capitalistic economic life. The more Jews and Christians mix with one another in economic and social life, the more likely is it that they will intermarry with one another.

Intermarriage has been denounced by the enemies of Jews almost as much as by lovers of Judaism ;

especially by Dühring in his book *The Jewish Question as a question of Racial Degeneration* (*Die Judenfrage als Frage der Rassenschädlichkeit*). His chief argument is that Jewish blood destroys the pure "Aryan" race, and that the physiological antipathy is such that marriage between the two races is unnatural. But the strongest argument against this statement is the fact of the spread of intermarriage. The parties who contract the marriage are surely the best judges as to whether there exists any physical antipathy! Whatever antipathy to the Jewish type may exist is, like that of the orthodox Jew of East Europe to the Christian, more a *social* than a physiological and instinctive aversion. The one really important race distinction, skin-colour, a distinction which often calls up a deep-seated instinctive antipathy, does not enter into the question between Jews and Europeans.

On the other hand, intermarriage is welcomed by many Christians. Ed. v. Hartmann, for example, considers "the providential admixture of Jewish blood an unmixed blessing for the Teuton race," and looks forward eagerly to "a complete assimilation," the accomplishment of which in time he "does not doubt."<sup>1</sup> The increasing spread of intermarriage is indeed not likely to be hindered by any race theories, so long as the social differences between Christians and Jews are wiped out, and the path to intermarriage made smooth.

### B. *The children of mixed marriages.*

The number of children born of mixed marriages has risen of late years in the same degree as intermarriage has increased.

<sup>1</sup> *Das Judentum in Gegenwart und Zukunft* (Berlin, 1885).

## THE JEWS OF TO-DAY

AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF JEWISH BIRTHS  
IN PRUSSIA (INCLUDING STILL-BORN CHILDREN).

Year.	Of purely Jewish Marriages.	OF MIXED MARRIAGES.			To every 100 Births of Purely Jewish Marri- ages there were born of Mixed Marriages.
		With Jewish Husband.	With Jewish Wife.	Total.	
1875-1879, -	11,113	164	223	387	3.48
1880-1884, -	10,288	207	265	472	4.59
1885-1889, -	9,083	261	265	526	5.79
1890-1894, -	8,354	281	294	575	6.88
1895-1899, -	7,619	304	318	622	8.16
1900-1904, -	7,097	348	354	702	9.89
1905-1906, -	6,900	386	401	787	11.41
1907-1908, -	6,627	392	405	797	12.03

In Prussia, as we see from the table, the average of 387 in the years 1875-79 rose to an average of 797 in 1907-08, while simultaneously the number of children born of Jewish marriages fell from 11,113 to 6,627. The result is that the percentage of children of mixed marriages to that of the children of Jewish marriages rose from 3.48 per cent. in 1875-79 to 12.03 per cent. in 1907-08.

In Bavaria there were born on an average :

AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF JEWISH BIRTHS  
IN BAVARIA.

Year.	Of purely Jewish Marriages.	OF MIXED MARRIAGES.			To every 100 Births of Purely Jewish Marri- ages there were born of Mixed Marriages.
		Jewish Husband.	Jewish Wife.	Total.	
1876-1879, -	1,677	3	11	14	0.83
1880-1884, -	1,544	9	12	21	1.36
1885-1889, -	1,299	17	15	32	2.46
1890-1894, -	1,124	21	16	37	3.29
1895-1899, -	988	26	20	46	4.66
1900-1904, -	937	32	26	58	6.19
1905-1906, -	911	31	21	52	5.71
1907-1908, -	897	35	25	60	6.69

In Bavaria the increase is less than in Prussia. Nevertheless, the table shows that in Bavaria also children of mixed marriages were 6.69 per cent. of the children of Jewish marriages, while their percentage in 1876-79 was only 0.83 per cent.

In Hungary there were born on an average :

Year.	Of purely Jewish Marriages.	OF MIXED MARRIAGES.			Per 100 Births of Purely Jewish Marriages there were born of Mixed Marriages.
		Jewish Husband.	Jewish Wife.	Total.	
1897-1901, -	26,212	116	137	253	0.97
1903-1904, -	25,020	174	202	376	1.50
1906, -	24,067	212	239	451	1.87

Here again we have a considerable increase.

In Holland 2,395 children were born of Jewish marriages, 74 of mixed marriages with a Jewish father, and 41 of mixed marriages with a Jewish mother. The children of mixed marriages are therefore 4.8 per cent. of the children of Jewish marriages.

In Copenhagen by the census of 1906 there were only 783 children born of the 376 Jewish marriages, as against 370 born of the 159 mixed marriages, so that the issue of mixed marriages was almost half as large (to be exact 47.2 per cent.) as that of the Jewish marriages.

Other countries have unfortunately no similar data as to the religion of the parents. Still, the foregoing figures will suffice to show that the children of inter-marriage are an ever-growing factor of the Jewish population, and one which will grow larger as mixed marriages increase in number.

It has been urged against mixed marriages between

two persons of different race, that they are less fecund than other marriages. Statistics to substantiate this are, however, not available. It could only be proved with any certainty if one were to investigate the issue of pure and mixed marriages, and see how many children had been born of each within a certain time after marriage: and no such investigation has been made. Nevertheless, it is probable that childlessness is more common in intermarriage than in pure marriages. A census in Prussia in 1905 showed that no fewer than 1,940 out of 5,117 mixed marriages, *i.e.* 37.91 per cent., were sterile. In Breslau the following number in 1905 had no-issue :

Of mixed marriages between :

Protestant Husbands and Catholic Wives,	24.5 per cent.
Catholic " " Protestant " "	24.3 "
Jewish Protestant	47.7 "
Jewish Catholic	37.9 "
Protestant Jewish	47.9 "
Catholic Jewish	46.7 "

The percentage of childless marriages was thus higher in mixed marriages of Christian and Jew than Catholic and Protestant.

The cause of the more frequent sterility might easily be proved by natural science. Just as certain differing zoological species cannot be crossed, so it is possible that to an extent difference of race is responsible for sterility.

### *C. Losses to Judaism caused by intermarriage.*

The spread of intermarriage constitutes a two-fold danger to Judaism; in the first place, through the quantitative loss of the vastly preponderating number of children born of mixed marriages who are brought

up outside the community ; in the second place, the *qualitative* loss of race purity by admixture of non-Jewish blood.

Prussian statistics of the "Religion of children of mixed marriages, living with their parents" give us ample material for demonstrating the amount of quantitative loss. From the census of 1905 we find that the number of such children was :

Brought up as	CHILDREN OF MIXED MARRIAGES WITH			PERCENTAGE IN MIXED MARRIAGES WITH		
	Jewish Husband.	Jewish Wife.	Total.	Jewish Husband.	Jewish Wife.	Average Total.
Jewish, - -	972	619	1,591	24.61	20.18	22.67
Christian, - -	2,897	2,332	5,229	73.36	76.04	74.53
Freethinking, -	80	116	196	2.03	3.78	2.80
Total, - -	3,949	3,067	7,016	100.00	100.00	100.00

Here we see that of all the children of mixed marriages living in the houses of their parents only 22.67 per cent. remained Jewish, whereas theoretically one would expect one-half to belong to the Jewish religion.

A comparison with former census returns shows how the percentage of children of mixed marriages who remain Jewish has steadily decreased since 1890. It was :

24.78	per cent.	in 1885
25.48	"	" 1890
24.47	"	" 1895
24.21	"	" 1900
22.67	"	" 1905

The decrease between the years 1900 and 1905 is due to the fact that the percentage of children of mixed



marriages (Jewish father) remaining Jewish was 27.67 per cent. in 1900, 24.61 per cent. in 1905; in mixed marriages with a Jewish mother the percentage rose slightly from 20.08 per cent. in 1900 to 20.18 per cent. in 1905. Of the sons of mixed marriages 22.14 per cent. remained Jewish; of the daughters 23.21 per cent. We may perhaps assume from this that the tendency to bring up the children in the Christian religion is stronger in the case of boys than in that of girls.

If we distinguish the various religions of the non-Jewish side of mixed marriages, we find that

in marriages with a Protestant	Husband or Wife,	20.39	per cent.
„ „ Catholic	„ „	24.03	„
„ „ Freethinking			
or Dissenting	„ „	48.04	„

of the children remain Jewish.

Thus intermarriage with Protestants is the most derogatory to Judaism. Protestantism being the ruling religion, it naturally exerts the greatest power of attraction. In mixed marriages with Freethinkers or Dissenters the average of children who remain Jewish is 48.04 per cent., or almost one-half, and in mixed marriages between a Freethinking or Dissenting wife and Jewish husband, the percentage of children remaining Jewish is 59.60 per cent., or more than half. But here we must take into consideration the Prussian law of the 14th May, 1873, by which the child of a Christian or Jewish father was not allowed to be registered as a dissenter until after his fourteenth year, so that many who would otherwise have been dissenters, were still nominally attached to the Jewish community.

The above table does not convey an exact idea of

the losses Judaism suffers through intermarriage. The numbers have reference only to the children who are still living in their parents' households, *i.e.* chiefly juveniles. But there is not the slightest doubt that many children of such marriages who, by the will of their parents, have been brought up as Jews, will revert to Christianity as soon as they are grown up. The fact that they have a number of Christian relatives, and are only half-Jewish by blood, facilitates their change of religion. It is not too much to say that of the 22.67 per cent. of children of mixed marriages, who by their parents' wish have remained Jewish, at least one-half fall away from Judaism as they grow up; thus only about 10 per cent. remain definitely Jews and marry in the Jewish community.

In Saxony, by the census of 1905, the following number of children of mixed marriages remained Jewish :

In Mixed Marriages With	Total Number of Children.	Remaining Jewish.	Percentage.
Jewish husband, - -	117	18	15.4
Jewish wife, - - -	53	7	13.2

Of these, again, 10 per cent. at most remain Jews.

In Hungary those about to contract a mixed marriage can make an agreement as to the religion they wish their children to have. In the absence of such an agreement, the sons follow the religion of the father, the daughters that of the mother. In the 4,822 mixed marriages contracted between 1896 and 1906, agreements were made in 1,181 cases (24.49 per cent.), but were omitted in 3,641 cases (75.51 per cent.). Following the

agreements 465 children of mixed marriages with Jewish fathers (*i.e.* 83.33 per cent.) were brought up as Christians, 93 (*i.e.* 16.67 per cent.) as Jews; of the children of mixed marriages with Jewish mothers 549 (88.12 per cent.) became Christians, and only 74 (11.88 per cent.) remained Jews—an average of 14.04 per cent. remaining Jewish.

In Denmark, before a mixed marriage can be entered upon, the law demands a statement as to the religion to which the children will belong. In Copenhagen there were 21 such declarations from mixed marriages between Christians and Jews (in the years 1893 and 1903); in 13 cases (62 per cent.) the religion of the children was to be Christian, in 7 cases (33 per cent.) Jewish. In one case the boys were to be brought up as Jews, the girls as Christians.

The statistics drawn from the census of 1906 are still less favourable to Jews. By these there were 370 children born of 159 mixed marriages, and of these 16.5 per cent. were brought up as Jews, 77.8 per cent. as Christians, 5.7 per cent. as Dissenters.

In New South Wales it is surprising to find that in mixed marriages, where the wife is Jewish, conditions are more favourable to Judaism than where the husband is a Jew, 36.36 per cent. of the children remaining Jewish in the former case, and only 26.99 per cent. in the latter. It would seem from this that, contrary to the practice in Europe, the mother in Australia has more control than the father over the education and religion of the child.

Similar statistics are not forthcoming from other countries, but conditions are very much the same everywhere. In France—as De-la-Roi remarks <sup>1</sup>—the

<sup>1</sup> *Judentaufen im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1899).

number of children of mixed marriages brought to the font exceeds the number of actual converts.

We can no longer consider the losses entailed by intermarriage a negligible quantity in Judaism. In Hungary in 1907 the 462 children of mixed marriages constituted 1.93 per cent., in Prussia 776 children, 11.67 per cent., and in Berlin 225 children, 15.15 per cent., of the children of Jewish marriages. When we remember the declining birth-rate of the Jews, we realise that the losses through intermarriage are very serious.

The qualitative loss to the Jewish race is also of some importance. Thus in Prussia some 700 children of half-Jewish blood are added to the Christian, and some 100 to the Jewish population every year through mixed marriages. In addition to which we must add the number of illegitimate births, Christian as well as Jewish (the latter amounting to about 300 yearly), in which the father of the child of a Christian mother may have been a Jew, and the father of the child of a Jewish mother, a Christian. This infiltration of Jewish blood has as yet left hardly any visible traces on the racial characteristics of the Christian population; it is only in the large towns, with teeming populations in which mixed marriages and conversions are common, that a certain change can be noticed in the national type. It may perhaps not be too bold an assumption to submit that the vivacity and proverbial sharpness of the population of Berlin, and the prevalence of the dark-haired type, are both attributable to a dash of Jewish blood. The effect of intermarriage on the Jews is much stronger; although in point of numbers the additions through mixed marriages are far smaller than among the Christians; still the hundred or so children that mixed marriages bring yearly to

Judaism, are about 1.5 per cent. of the children of Jewish marriages; while the 700 that fall to the Christians are only 0.06 per cent. of the children of Christian marriages. Reckoning that about half the 300 illegitimate Jewish children have Christian fathers, the percentage of children who are received into the Jewish community of half-Jewish blood is 3.7 per cent. of the number of Jewish births. It is natural, that such a proportion must, in course of time, considerably modify the race-character of the Jews.

## CHAPTER XI.

### BAPTISM.

#### *A. Conversion in former times.*

Baptism in its results is akin to intermarriage. Intermarriage thins the ranks of Judaism by absorbing a large part of the offspring into Christianity; baptism achieves the same end by releasing members of the Jewish faith from the Jewish community by means of a lawful act performed for the purpose, with the result that in time they are completely swallowed up by Christian nationalities.

Conversion from Judaism to other religions is no new feature in Jewish history; it occurred frequently even in the days of the existence of a Jewish State, wherever Jews lived scattered among other nations; thus, for example, in the year 40 A.D. many conversions from Judaism to Paganism followed on the Jewish persecutions in Alexandria.<sup>1</sup> The son of the Arabarch Alexander himself—the leader of the Jewish community in Alexandria—was one of the apostates, and, as a reward for abandoning Jehovah for the Roman gods, had many honours conferred upon him by Rome. This is but a typical instance. An astounding number of Jewish converts to other creeds have achieved high social standing.

<sup>1</sup> Graetz, *History of the Jews*, vol. iii. p. 344.

Voluntary or enforced conversion from Judaism to Christianity went on throughout the Middle Ages. A proof of the extent to which this took place in some countries is the fact that in Spain, to this very day—four hundred years after the expulsion of the Jews from that country—the Jewish type is very prevalent, particularly among the upper classes.<sup>1</sup>

Compared with the number of Jewish converts to other religions, that of converts to Judaism is very small. In the first centuries before and after Christ, Judaism was indeed a great attractive force with the heathen, and there was a very considerable number of Jewish proselytes,<sup>2</sup> apart from the Idumaeans, who were converted to Judaism by force of arms. But this spread of the Jewish faith ceases almost entirely at the end of the first century A.D. Paul's propaganda, and the growing strength of Christianity took the wind out of its sails. Christianity conveyed to the heathen the main idea of Judaism—monotheism—without the burden of the ceremonial, and the national pride of the born Jew,<sup>3</sup> and from that time onwards the Jewish mission was rejected in favour of Christianity. The conversion to Judaism of some Arab tribes in Yemen (S. Arabia) at the beginning of the sixth century, under King Jussuf, exercised no lasting effect, as Jussuf's kingdom was broken up 530 A.D., and all that remained of Judaism there was afterwards engulfed in Islam. The only other wholesale conversion to Judaism took place in the eighth century A.D., when the King of the Chazars—a people living on the banks of the Lower

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Joseph Jacobs "On the Racial Characteristics of Modern Jews," in the *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. xv. p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Josephus, *The Wars of the Jews*, vol. ii. 18, 2; vii. 3, 3, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Harnack, *The Mission and Propagation of Christianity*.

Volga—followed by his Court, embraced Judaism. It is, however, doubtful whether the Jewish religion was so far adopted and practised by the Chazars as to have outlived the Chazar kingdom, which was destroyed at the beginning of the eleventh century.<sup>1</sup>

The admission of Jews to modern European culture at the beginning of the nineteenth century occasioned a great number of conversions to Christianity. Hardly a single famous Jew of the time in Germany avoided this step. Leopold Zunz himself, who devoted his life to the study of Jewish literature, describes his fidelity to Judaism as the "great cage of his soul." In the short period between 1819-1823 in Berlin, which contained at that time 3,610 Jewish inhabitants, there were no less than 1,236 converts to Christianity, and in the rest of Prussia 1,382. From 1850-1880 the conversionist movement in Germany abated considerably, because at this time Liberalism was in full sway, and the profession of Judaism entailed no social disrespect and exclusion, and there was thus no occasion for conversion. The rate of baptism reached its lowest point in 1876, when in Prussia only 50 Jews were baptised. Since then—that is, since the beginning of the anti-Semitic movement in Germany—the figures have risen again rapidly.

The following table at the conclusion of an essay of De-la-Roi's, summarises the total number of conversions from Judaism to Christianity in the nineteenth century. De-la-Roi remarks that wherever his figures rest on estimates he has been most careful to choose a lower in preference to a higher, and it is quite conceivable that his approximate calculation of 204,500 Jewish baptisms

<sup>1</sup> The theory that the Karäites in Crimea of to-day are descendants of the Chazars cannot be unconditionally accepted.



in the nineteenth century not only does not exceed the actual number, but may perhaps fall slightly short of it. It must be noticed that this figure includes neither Jewish converts to dissenting creeds nor baptised children of mixed marriages.

### DEFECTIONS FROM JUDAISM.

IN	To			Total.
	Protestant Church.	Roman Catholic Church.	Greek Church.	
Prussia, - - -	13,128	5,000		22,520
Bavaria, - - -	330			
Saxony, - - -	770			
Wurtemberg, - - -	115			
Rest of Germany, - - -	3,177			
Great Britain, - - -	28,830			28,830
Holland, - - -	1,800			1,800
Sweden and Norway, - - -	500			500
Denmark, - - -	100			100
Switzerland, - - -	100			100
France, - - -	600	1,800		2,400
Austria, - - -	6,300	28,200	200	44,756
Hungary, - - -	2,056	8,000		
Russia, - - -	3,136	12,000	69,400	84,536
Italy, - - -		300		300
Roumania, - - -			1,500	1,500
Turkey, - - -			3,300	3,300
Rest of Balkan Penin., - - -			100	100
Asia and Africa, - - -	100	500		600
Australia, - - -	200			200
North America, - - -	11,500	1,500		13,000
Total, - - -	72,742	57,300	74,500	204,542

#### B. *Baptism at the present day.*

The frequency of defection from Judaism during the last two decades will be seen from the following table. This shows that the number of converts yearly among 10,000 Jews rises from 1 (in Galicia) to 40 (in Vienna).

CONVERSIONS FROM JUDAISM			Conversion per 10,000 Jews yearly.
In	Years.	Annual Average.	
Galicia and Bukovina, -	1900-1903	ca. 90	1
Russia, - - - -	1881-1890	689	1.5
	1891-1897	1021	2
Hungary, - - - -	1896-1907	446	5
Germany, - - - -	1896-1900	480	8
	1904	497	8
Servia, - - - -	1894-1903	6	10
Budapest, - - - -	1903	226	13
Berlin, - - - -	1899-1903	153	15
Austria (excluding Galicia and Bukovina), - -	1900-1903	ca. 800	25
Dresden, - - - -	1886-1906	10	33
Vienna, - - - -	1901-1905	580	39
	1906	643	40

We will now separately consider each country of which we have accurate statistics with regard to conversions. In Russia the numbers of annual Jewish conversions to the Greek Church varied considerably in the nineteenth century. They rose at times of Jewish persecution and oppression, only to fall again when these ceased.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the annual number of baptisms from 1836-1840 was on an average 394, rising in the decade 1841-1850 to an average of 1,540, and reaching its climax in 1854 with 4,439, after which it decreased. From 1881-1890 the yearly average was 689, from 1891-1894 it rose again to 1,021.

Galicia and Bukovina, where baptism is very rare, must be distinguished from the rest of Austria: there

<sup>1</sup> In Russia, till quite recently, return to the Greek Church was impossible for an apostate from it. Anyone could become a member of the Church, but defection from it into another religion was forbidden by law and severely punished. This enactment was first suspended in 1909 by the law relating to freedom of religion.

conversion is practically confined to Cracow and Lemberg, and even in those places it reaches no higher figure than about one to every 10,000 Jewish inhabitants. In the rest of Austria, however, conversion is far more prevalent, particularly in Vienna—the metropolis of converts—for which we give accurate figures below. According to a calculation of Thon, the defections in all Austria amounted to about 900 converts annually in the years 1900-1903, *i.e.* one to every 1,480 Jews, in Austria. Excluding Galicia, Bukovina and Vienna, the figure is one convert to every 500 Jews.

In the kingdom of Hungary in the twelve years 1896-1907 a total of 5,148 Jews (2,603 male and 2,545 female) were converted to Christianity, and 1,065 Christians (471 male and 594 female) re-embraced Judaism (*i.e.* returned to the Jewish religion, after having deserted to Christianity), giving a total loss of 4,083 souls to Judaism. The Christian converts to Judaism (when they are not baptised Jews, who compose almost a third of all the converts) are practically without exception cases of conversion due to marriage with a Jew or Jewess, and it is doubtful whether these proselytes and their descendants will long remain faithful to Judaism. However this may be, these conversions prove that numbers of Jews cling so faithfully to Judaism that they not only refuse all the social advantages afforded by conversion to Christianity, but actually achieve the conversion of their Christian mates to Judaism in spite of all its social obstacles. From 1901-1905 conversion increased markedly in Hungary, for Jewish defections to Christianity which amounted in 1896-1900 to an average of 261, rose in 1901-1905 to 420, to fall again in the years 1906-1907 to 370. To these must be added the Jews who became Freethinkers, amounting

from 1896-1907 to 201 persons, *i.e.* about 17 annually. It is interesting to observe what numbers of Jews in Hungary have changed their names. Of 2,148 persons who adopted Hungarian names in the first six months of 1902, there are 95 of the name of Kahn and many Blaus, Brauns and Weisses, who are undoubtedly Jews. It is impossible to trace in how many cases the change of name has been accompanied by baptism.

In Servia from 1894-1903 there were baptised annually an average of six Jews, or one to every 1,000.

In Germany the only statistics to hand are those of the Protestant National Church, those of converts to Catholicism being unknown. In the years 1896-1900 the annual average of Jewish conversions to Protestantism was 480, increasing in 1904 to 497. Against this from 1896-1900 the annual average of Christian conversions to Judaism is 25, and in the year 1904, 52, which, when compared to the corresponding higher figures in Hungary, clearly goes to prove that in Germany the adoption of Judaism by the Gentile is a much rarer occurrence, and that the German Jew is a far less zealous upholder of Judaism. Compared with the previous decade, the number of Jewish baptisms has greatly increased, for the annual average in the nine old provinces of Prussia from 1881 to 1887 amounted to 160, as against 291 from 1891-1897—thus doubling itself, while the number of Jews was about stationary.

The desire of the German Jew for assimilation, shown by the rapid spread of baptism, is shown too by the Christian names of the children, which are almost invariably Teutonic. Jewish names, which till about fifty years ago were generally given to Jewish children, are now very uncommon. The attempts of many Jews

to change their Jewish surnames have failed up till now, chiefly because they have been refused the necessary official consent, so that Jewish surnames are still relatively numerous. Of the 20,133 members of the Jewish community in Berlin in the year 1904, 3 per cent. were called Cohn (under various forms of the name) and 1.71 per cent. Levy; besides these, there were numbers of other Biblical surnames.

In England, where there are no obstacles to the change of names, Jewish immigrants of the second generation try to anglicise their names—at any rate partially so that the English may be able to pronounce them—thus, instead of Cohen we have Cowen, instead of Heimann, Hymans, etc.

In this connection we would say that in Holland also Jewish first-names are rejected in favour of Dutch names, although most Jews there are orthodox. We have no statistics of baptism in Holland.

Baptism among the Jews thrives best in large towns, and for many reasons. Here modern capitalistic economic life is most highly developed, and all economic differences between Christians and Jews effaced. Education, controlled by the rationalism and anti-dogmatism of the day has laid a common moral foundation for both Jews and Christians. The control of the Jewish community over its members is relaxed because of the large numbers of members. And finally, the continual intermarriage of Jews and Christians, which is most frequent in large towns, is a repeated cause of defection to Christianity, as mixed marriage is very closely allied to conversion. They are both the results of the intimate relations maintained between Christians and Jews, living the same social life based on modern culture and economic conditions. Each reacts on the

other ; intermarriage entailing baptism, as we have shown, while the baptised Jew or Jewess on the other hand invariably chooses a Christian and not a Jewish spouse. Mixed marriage and baptism, however, differ in one respect, namely, in the influence exercised on them by social contempt. Intermarriage flourishes where there is no social or religious disrespect for Judaism, and where, therefore, intimate and easy intercourse between Jews and Christians favours marriage between the two. Baptism, on the other hand, is most prevalent where, in spite of legal equality, Jews are socially despised, a condition which they hope to overcome by baptism. For this reason in Australia and South America, where Jews are in every respect the social equals of Christians, much intermarriage but little baptism takes place. In Vienna, on the other hand, where violent anti-Semitism is well known to prevail, the numbers of baptisms exceed those of intermarriage.

In Berlin there have been records of baptisms for many years. While from 1881-1887 the average annual defection to Protestantism was only 66—making one convert to every 1,000 Jews<sup>1</sup>—from 1899-1903 the annual average rose to 153, *i.e.* one convert to every 800 Jews. If to these are added the converts to Catholicism and to dissenting creeds, the total number amounts to at least 200 annually, *i.e.* one convert to every 600 Jewish inhabitants. Although the reports of the Berlin Jewish community from 1899-1903 account for only 115, and from 1904-1906 for 157 persons—107 male and 50 female—as having declared their renunciation of Judaism before the Courts, the difference is explained by the fact that in the figures

<sup>1</sup> Referring to the Jewish population of Berlin *and its suburbs*.

given of the Berlin community, children of Jewish parents baptised in extreme youth are not counted, while the above figures of the actual baptisms (conversions to Protestantism) include a number of such children.<sup>1</sup>

In Dresden from 1886-1906, 200 Jews in all became Protestants and 15 Protestants were converted to Judaism.

In Vienna the number of Jews who became either Christians or Freethinkers in 1906 was 643, bringing the percentage up to one convert to about every 229 Jews. From 1901-1905 the average number of converts annually in Vienna was 580, which makes one to every 253 Jews yearly, while conversions fifteen years earlier, from 1886-1890, amounted to a yearly average of 33, *i.e.* one convert to every 359 Jews. Conversion, therefore, increased very considerably up to 1906. And the above figures do not include children under seven years of age, who—by Austrian law—change their religion with their parents. There is, of course, the consideration that in Austria intermarriage between Jews and Christians is forbidden. If a Jew or Jewess wishes to marry a Christian, one or other of the parties has either to become “of no confession,” or to embrace the faith of the other. This causes many defections from Judaism which would be unnecessary in countries where mixed marriage is acknowledged. The statistics of both Berlin and Vienna show that the upper educated classes—the so-called “Intellectuals”—are just those who provide a disproportionate number of apostates. Thus, in Berlin from 1873-1906, of the 1,388 converted

<sup>1</sup> In spite of much enquiry I have been unable to obtain accurate statistics of infant baptism. Cf. Blau, “Defections from Judaism in Berlin,” *Zeitschrift f. Dem. u. Stat. d. Juden*, 1907, p. 145.

Jews of definite professions, 489 = 35.9 per cent., were University students. In Vienna in 1906, when the total number of converted Jews was 643, no fewer than 105 of these were professional men (doctors, lawyers, men of letters) and 40 were students and scholars—so that the “Intellectuals” formed almost one-quarter of the converts.

As against the 643 defections from Judaism in Vienna in 1906, there were 84 converts to Judaism—quite a considerable number. From 1901 to 1905 the average annual number was 72. Whenever the converts are not Jewish renegades, they are almost without exception Christians desirous of marrying Jews or Jewesses.

In Budapest in the year 1903 (the Budapest community alone, not including Ofen and Alt-Ofen) there were 226 Jewish converts (146 male and 80 female), and of these 214 became Christians, 12 Freethinkers.<sup>1</sup> Hence (according to the figures given in the census of 1900) to every 748 Jews there was one convert. In the same year, however, 45 Jews (20 men and 25 women), who had embraced other creeds, returned again to Judaism.

Defection to dissenting creeds is often preferred to conversion to Christianity because it does not entail baptism. It is less severely condemned by the Jewish community, and it avoids the dishonour of having to make an open confession of a faith which, in almost every case, is adopted not out of conviction, but for purely material reasons, as an essential of modern culture, or else in order to facilitate marriage with a Christian. It is with this view that Jewish parents in Germany often have their children baptised as babies,

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted for these figures to the late Dr. J. v. Körösi, Director of the General Statistical Bureau of Budapest.



while they themselves remain Jewish. In the United States, too, Jews frequently adopt one of the many religious creeds in preference to being baptised.

### C. *Missionary societies.*

We can dismiss with a few words those missionary Societies which devote themselves to the conversion of Jews to Christianity. In the whole world there are 112 such Protestant Societies alone (according to a report for 1902) which maintain 228 mission stations with 816 missionaries and other employees.<sup>1</sup> Their income amounts to over £125,000 (2½ million marks), £100,000 of which is supplied by Great Britain alone, which country also furnishes by far the greatest numbers of missionaries. According to De-la-Roi, 380 Jews are brought into the Church every year by these societies, a greater number—said to be influenced by the missionaries—being baptised by vicars of churches. The largest of the Missionary Societies is that founded in London in 1809: "The Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews," which controls a yearly income of £40,000; in 1902-1903 it spent £38,061 for its own purposes, and it supports 214 missionaries and agents in 51 mission stations posted in different parts of the world. From 1809-1897 the Society baptised 1,871 Jews in London, and about 7,000 Jews in all its stations. Considering the tremendous sums expended on them, these results are utterly contemptible, especially when we reflect that the majority of the converts would in any case have become Christians without the intervention of the missionaries. If their activity consisted solely in actual missionising—the preaching

<sup>1</sup> *Geography and Atlas of Protestant Missions*, vol. ii. New York, 1906.

of the Gospel—it would not have achieved even this small result, for Jews are peculiarly irresponsive to such propaganda. But luckily for the missionaries, social conditions come to their aid and bring them a few proselytes. By far the greater number of the converts come from the upper classes, from the forty or fifty thousand Jews settled for generations in England, who have acquired wealth and position, and not from the 200,000 Jewish immigrants from Russia, Galicia and Roumania, who inhabit special quarters of London, Manchester and Liverpool. The Whitechapel Jew is unaffected by the missionaries of the above-mentioned large Society and the continual agitations of a number of smaller societies, although, living as he does often under the most wretched conditions, baptism would procure him considerable material advantage, careful attention for several months, and protection for the future. The spirit of the Ghettos of Russia and Galicia is still alive in him ; but whether this will be the case in the next and following generations it is impossible to say. It may be that the missions will then reap their richest harvest from what is now very barren soil.

#### *D. Prognostics for the future.*

To take a general survey of the position, we may say that a considerable increase is noticeable in the number of baptisms in the western countries of to-day. The Jewish community of Austria (not counting Galicia) loses every year more than 2, of Germany at least 1, of Hungary about  $\frac{3}{4}$  per 1,000 of its members to Christianity. On the other hand, the mass of the Jews in Russia and Galicia—the first of the four classes indicated in Chap. I.—withstand all Christian influence, and suffer only very trifling losses. Moreover, the

off shoots of these communities, in England and America—the second class—have till now resisted fairly successfully any tendencies towards baptism. It is in the third class, among the well-to-do bourgeoisie of West and Central Europe, that aversion to baptism first shows signs of diminution, and its possibility is freely discussed. In the fourth class—which includes the rich Jews of the capitals and Jews of University training—baptism, for the children at least, has almost become the rule. If numbers of men and women cannot decide to be baptised, it is not so much because of their love of Judaism as of their unwillingness to face the reproach of cowardice and treachery by deserting a minority which is in danger, and is being attacked on all sides. Others cannot convince themselves of the superiority of Christian dogmas, and are unwilling to perjure themselves by embracing the Christian faith; if, however, they adopt the expedient of becoming dissenters, the whole purpose of the change of religion, (*viz.*, the unconditional reception into and equality of status in society and culture in France, Germany or elsewhere) is often destroyed; it is actual adherence to Christianity which is demanded, the dissenter being frequently held in as much contempt as the Jew. Finally, the fact that even the baptised Jew is not at once placed on a level with the real Christian, but is for some time treated as something intermediary between a Jew and a Christian, acts as a deterrent. This disrespect from the Gentile is all the more galling for the baptised Jew, because it comes from his own newly adopted camp, and he is a defenceless victim; whereas the unbaptised Jew can proudly wrap himself in the robe of an ancient community and an ancestral religion. Thus anti-Semitism, although encouraging

baptism among weaker characters, yet holds together a number of heterogeneous elements in Judaism, which, without this outside pressure, might already have converted. But such resistance, founded purely on sentiment, cannot last for many generations. Baptism is only the last phase of assimilation, and with the constant striving after assimilation, it will necessarily persevere and spread. The only means of arresting it would be the disappearance of all social contempt for the Jew, but then what was lost as a result of baptism would be doubled and trebled as a result of mixed marriages. And it is this intermarriage which is the most serious menace to Judaism. Exclusion of intermarriage is what has preserved Judaism throughout the ages ; its intrusion will bring about her downfall.

It might be argued that baptism has no more effect upon the Jewish type than it has upon the negro, and that therefore from an ethnological and anthropological standpoint, it brings about no change. This in itself is correct, but two circumstances operate to counteract it : first, as has already been shown, the baptised Jew, or at any rate his children, marry Christians ; and secondly, as the Jews everywhere constitute a small minority of the whole population, all traces of Jewish blood sooner or later disappear. Thus the offspring of the baptised Jew is not only lost to Judaism, but also to the Jewish nation.

Will the losses suffered by Judaism through baptism continue in the future ? The answer to this question lies in what we have already said. It must decidedly be in the affirmative if the process of decomposition continues which has divided the Jews into different sections, *i.e.* with the continuation of the advance of the poor Jews with a smattering of secular education

(indicated in the first and second sections) into the ranks of the well-to-do classes with their modern education (the third and fourth sections); for these last two sections fall away in time through baptism and inter-marriage. The question is, therefore, whether the tendencies which have hitherto induced Jews of the first and second sections to aspire to join the third and fourth, will continue in the same direction in the future? The economic progress of the Jews and the growing culture of their surroundings make it clear that the answer must be that an increase of baptism is all that can be expected.

## CHAPTER XII.

### ANTI-SEMITISM AN INEFFECTIVE CHECK TO ASSIMILATION.

#### *A. Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria.*

We have already seen that resistance to assimilation is no longer to be expected from the Jews ; will it perhaps come from the Christians ? Signs are not wanting that to a certain section of Christians the assimilation of the Jews is highly undesirable. We are not speaking of Russia and the semi-civilised states of North Africa and Asia, where Jews are subject to special legislation <sup>1</sup> and are, to a certain extent, prevented from assimilating. Even in those countries where Jews have

<sup>1</sup> Russian legislation in regard to Jews is very complicated. It is founded principally on the May Laws of 1882, the so-called laws of Ignatieff, the principal clauses of which are :

(a) That all Jews (with the exception of those who have received a University education, master mechanics, and merchants of the first guild) shall reside only in Poland and the fifteen neighbouring governmental departments—the so-called Pale of Settlement—and shall not have the right of moving from towns to villages even within the Pale of Settlement.

(b) That, with few exceptions, any acquisition of land shall be denied them.

(c) That their active and passive powers of voting in Local Councils (for town magistrates, etc.) shall be restricted.

(d) That their admittance to secondary schools and Universities shall be strictly limited, and their way barred absolutely to certain callings, such as those of military officers, State officials, etc.

absolute legal equality a movement called anti-Semitism has been set on foot which aims at depriving the Jews of their political and social rights.

The anti-Semitic movement grew up on German soil ; it is almost as old as the enfranchisement of the Jews. Legal equality was granted to the Jews of Germany in 1869, and already during the middle of 1870—the so-called year of speculation—when Germany was passing through an economic crisis, the old hatred of the Jews flamed up again, and they were accused of being the cause of the crisis. A political party was formed with the express and openly-avowed purpose of attacking the Jews socially and politically. This party in the Reichstag represented 248,500 votes in 1907 (2.21 per cent. of the total suffrage) and 15 mandates. The greatest number of its supporters came from the kingdom of Saxony, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, and the provinces of Hessen-Nassau and Pomerania. At the present time the party is not making great progress ; in fact, since 1898, when it represented 284,250 votes = 3.7 per cent., it has retrogressed. To make up for this, however, the powerful Conservative party in its programme of 1892 (the so-called Tivoli programme) took up the fight against the “increasing and disintegrating influence of the Jews,” and demanded Christian government for a Christian people, and Christian teachers in Christian schools. The power of anti-Semitism to-day in Germany, and equally in Austria (where the great Christian Socialist party is pronouncedly anti-Semitic) lies not so much in the political party which seeks in Parliament to deprive the Jews of legal equality, as in the feeling which it has aroused against the Jews in all classes of the population outside the actual anti-Semitic party itself, and which has led

almost to the social ostracism of the Jews. The government, in spite of the nominal equality of the Jews, bows to this public opinion, and only in most exceptional instances confers an official or University appointment upon a Jew ; similarly in the army, a Jew can never rise to the rank of officer. Anti-Semitism has destroyed social intercourse between Jew and Christian to such an extent—more particularly in the upper classes and in University circles—that intercourse is either stopped altogether, or continued under the cloak of an assumed ignorance of the bar to really cordial relations. Even in commercial relations, the influence of anti-Semitism is felt. We see this in newspaper advertisements for partnership, etc., where we read “only Christians need apply,” and again in the popular refrain, “Do not buy of Jews.”

#### B. *Anti-Semitism in other countries.*

In Roumania anti-Semitism is stronger even than in Germany and Austria, and here the government assists in framing rules for the degradation of the Jews. By Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, legal equality for the Jews was stipulated for by the signatory powers. Nevertheless, the Roumanian government withholds this equality from the great mass of its Jews ; it evades the law by classing the Jews as “foreigners under Roumanian protection,” and applying against them the laws as to foreigners. In this way the Jews are not only deprived of their rights of citizenship, but suffer great economic injury, as the government reserves certain privileges exclusively for Roumanians. This is all the more unjust since the government does not regard the Jews as foreigners in all matters relating to their obligations to the State, as for instance military service,



which Jews are bound to perform equally with Roumanians. Very few Jews have so far succeeded in becoming naturalised, and so recognised as Roumanian. By the census of 1899, the following number of Jews were classed as

Roumanians, - - - - -	4,272 = 1.6 per cent.
Foreigners dependent on the State, -	5,859 = 2.2 „ „
Foreigners under Roumanian protection,	256,588 = 96.2 „ „

In France, the Dreyfus case showed how easily the feeling of the masses against the Jews can be aroused, and in the French colony of Algiers there is actually a strong anti-Semitic party. Even in England there exist anti-Semitic tendencies. In the United States of America, where twenty years ago anti-Semitism was absolutely unknown, the anti-Semitic movement has grown so strong that it has led almost to a social boycott of the Jews in upper circles, and to hostile anti-Jewish demonstrations among the working classes. Overnight, as it were, free America has become an anti-Semitic country. The only nations which can be said to be innocent of anti-Semitism are Italy, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden and the English colonies.

### C. *Causes of anti-Semitism.*

What is the cause of this smouldering antipathy to the Jews, which from 1850-1875 was to all appearances put out for ever? The *political* anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria arises from objections to the Jews economically, as the typical representatives of capital (the Stock Exchange) and landed interests, as landed proprietors, as promoters of capitalised enterprise (such as emporiums, etc.), as shopkeepers, artisans and

money-lenders. In England and America, anti-Semitism arose because of the great influx of immigrants who are used to a low standard of living, are content to work for a low wage, and so undercut the wages and lower the standard of living of the native workman. They thus incur the same hatred as is directed in an intensified form against the Chinese, and which resulted in the United States passing a law to restrict Chinese immigration into the United States.

In many countries the growing importance of the principle of nationality tends to emphasise the antithesis between Jew and Christian. Thus, anti-Semitism in Roumania—rightly or wrongly—is caused as much by fear that the young Roumanian nation will not be able to develop its own individuality if the Jews are allowed to gain too much influence, as by dread of Jewish economic competition. Similarly the Poles in Galicia and the Magyars in Hungary are afraid of the power of Jewish influence, which might be injurious to the development of their own nationalities. We say nothing of Houston Stewart Chamberlain and his school, who see in the Jews the natural and the only dangerous enemy of Germany and its civilisation.

*Social* anti-Semitism takes root in countries where numbers of Jews, in a very short space of time, amass great wealth either through business or speculation, and where they do not seek to make their culture and manners comport with their wealth. They thus naturally create a feeling of disgust in upper social circles to which their great wealth gives them access. It is in America particularly that these *nouveaux riches* abound, where the rich Jews serve as a type of the *parvenu*, and where he has to submit to the contempt of the

settled American aristocracy and the denial of any social intercourse. In Germany and Austria the introduction of Jews into official and upper circles is resented in the same way.

From the sociological point of view there is nothing uncommon in all this. It is an echo of the fight between the *connubium et commercium* of ancient Rome, and the battle of the guilds in the town republics of the Middle Ages. Wherever a hitherto despised class—conscious of its advance on the social ladder—seeks admittance to higher circles, it arouses an antagonism which is, however, generally overcome in the lapse of time. In a democratic State, where no privileges of birth or standing exist, class-distinctions merely represent degrees of wealth, but a certain amount of time has always to elapse before things are established in their true relations.

#### D. *The importance of anti-Semitism in the assimilationist movement.*

We now come back to our original question, whether anti-Semitism serves as a check to assimilation. Up to a certain point it certainly does. \* Wherever anti-Semitism puts a stop to, or at any rate hinders, social and commercial relations between Christians and Jews, we find the Jews associating only with their own people. There has been some talk of "The New Ghetto," which is the outcome of this state of things. It is certain that many mixed marriages have been avoided by the "cessation of intercourse," and perhaps many a Jew who would otherwise have become converted has remained staunch to Judaism, unwilling to turn traitor, and leave his people in their time of need. But on the whole, anti-Semitism can hardly be considered a real obstacle to

assimilation.<sup>1</sup> It is unthinkable that either in Europe or America anti-Semitism could ever bring about legal disabilities for Jews. Any such legislation would be a direct break with the political tradition of the nineteenth century, and no State could well take such a step. We must also remember that all anti-Jewish laws are directed against the Jews as a religious community; anti-Semitism is not directed against the Jewish religion—it is perfectly indifferent to it. It is hostile to the Jews as a race, and as promoters of certain kinds of industry and politics. Here legislation is powerless. Scientifically the Jewish race may be a perfectly well-defined thing, legally the term is useless, not only because Jews share their outward physical marks of race with other peoples (for instance with Armenians and Syrians), but also because a certain percentage of adherents of the Jewish religion are not Jews by race, and *vice versa*, many members of the Jewish race have become Christians through conversion. In Europe and the United States it is easy to deal with negroes, Indians or Chinese—any child can tell the difference between these races and whites. But special treatment for Jews founded on such a basis would present insurmountable difficulties in practice. Jews, as a race, are beyond the reach of legislation, and still less can they be assailed as followers of certain branches of trade, etc., since there is to-day no one such branch exclusively in Jewish hands.

The danger of anti-Jewish legislation which might counteract the assimilative movement, is, therefore, still

<sup>1</sup> It may be said that anti-Semitism, through lowering the status of the Jews, has prevented mixed marriages between Jews and non-Jews of equal social standing. But it has proved no hindrance to mixed marriages between Jews and those below them in social standing, and such marriages are of frequent occurrence.

far distant. Social anti-Semitism alone is not so enough to stem assimilation. The "New Ghetto" to which it gives rise is totally different to the Ghettos in which Judaism was sheltered from assimilation. In the old Ghettos the Jews were singled out commercially in their callings of money-lending, peddling, and culturally by their specifically Jewish education. Even if they had wanted, they could not have mixed socially with Christians, their points of view being entirely different. To-day, on the other hand, Jews are merchants, bankers, manufacturers, lawyers, and doctors equally with Christians, receive the same school education, read the same papers, and visit the same theatres, lectures and so on. The social isolation of the Jews is not, as in former times, a necessary result of their commercial and cultural isolation; it is due to commercial and national envy of Jewish competition, and will fall away when the cause for it is removed. The Jews of England and America will not undercut wages for ever. They have to begin with low wages to introduce new industries into America, and to provide some means of subsistence for the hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants, but the demand for higher wages grows with the growth of the industries. And the industrial reserve—to adopt Marx's phrase—grows less in spite of the continual stream of immigrants, because Jews are always bringing in new branches of trade, while the children of the immigrants do not remain in the particularly Jewish industries, but seek other branches of work and demand at least as high a wage as the American workmen.

Just as the Jew will not remain the type of the sweater in Germany, so in other countries he will outlive his reputation as spoliator and destroyer of the middle

classes. Jews have indeed played a great part in the development of industry, banks, wholesale trade (especially in the introduction of the emporium—so injurious to retail trade), but it is quite wrong to impute this development to Jewish activity alone. Not the Jews, but the whole body of enterprising capitalists of whom Jews are but a fraction, are responsible for this development. If we eliminated all the Jews, we should see that the small shopkeepers and artisans who complain so bitterly to-day of overpowering Jewish competition, and who constitute the kernel of the anti-Semitic party, would be no better off. The Jew goes, the capitalist remains. This much is certain: whole sections of the middle classes are now occupied in new commercial activities, and the time is not far distant when the economic revolution, caused by the victorious progress of wholesale trade, will settle down to conditions of greater equality founded on the principles of wholesale trade. The Jew will then, still less than to-day, be the typical representative of a particular form of trade. And the programme of the anti-Semitic party, which is directed far more against the capitalist than against the Jew, will then have no meaning. To sum up: the economic condition which gives rise to so much antipathy against the Jews is a passing phenomenon which will disappear altogether within a measurable period of time.

The same will happen with the Jewish *parvenu* and snob. A Jew who has suddenly acquired great wealth may be as ignorant as possible, but he is careful to give his children the very best of educations, and thus the objectionable qualities in the father are wiped out in the next generation. Wherever numbers of *nouveaux riches* Jews live, especially in large towns, the striking

difference between father and sons is evident ; the children of the commonest parents have perfect manners, and are usually of upright character and good education.

When the economic and social causes of anti-Semitism disappear, there yet remains the national opposition. But this also will not be of long duration. The Jews are in such small minorities in European countries (in Roumania 4.5 per cent., in Hungary 4.4 per cent., in Galicia 11.1 per cent.) that the fear of their assuming much prominence is unfounded. The Roumanians, Magyars, Ruthenes and Poles, besides, are themselves developing so fast that they need have less cause to be afraid of the Jews in the future.

Hitherto we have spoken of anti-Semitism as an insufficient *check* to assimilation ; but on the other hand we must realise that in many cases it actually accelerates Jewish apostacy. So long as it continues to be the case, as it is to day more especially in Germany and Austria, that conversion is the only road to social position, so long will there be Jews who will avail themselves of baptism and formally renounce the Judaism to which they were hitherto, outwardly at least, attached. Anti-Semitism has two opposite effects on Jews who are inwardly estranged from Judaism : those whose only idea is to get on, it encourages to renounce Judaism ; while those who, perhaps, without anti-Semitism would have become converts, remain Jews out of a feeling of shame at taking such a step just at a time when the Jews are being attacked on all sides. As at the present day the desire for honours and wealth is more common than idealism and devotion to one's faith, it will be seen that the destructive element in

anti-Semitism is more effective than the conservative element ; furthermore, the children rarely follow in the footsteps of the father, and thus the inevitable result is anyhow only retarded. The gain which anti-Semitism brings to Judaism is ephemeral—the loss is lasting.





PART II. JEWISH NATIONALISM.

*SECTION IV.*

THE FOUNDATIONS OF JEWISH NATIONALISM.



## CHAPTER XIII.

### RACE VALUE OF THE JEWS.

#### A. *The justification of the continued existence of the Jews as a separate nation.*

We have shown how the Jews are in the throes of assimilation—in some countries to the extent of complete denationalisation and imminent danger of absorption. Even in Eastern Europe, where the denationalisation movement is still in its infancy, the prospects for the future are not promising. The Jews of Eastern Europe are unquestionably on a higher cultural and social plane than were the Jews of Prussia at the end of the eighteenth century ; unless we are greatly mistaken, in fifty years' time they will have reached the same standard of development as the West European Jews achieved during the nineteenth century, and after that their fate will be analogous to that of Western Jewry.

The four sections of Jewry, to which we have so often referred, represent the same differences of outlook in regard to the continued existence of Jews, as they do to the Jewish religion. The most advanced section (the fourth) finds in the complete absorption of the Jews a most desirable solution. The third section is indifferent or has no decided opinions on the subject ; in any case it would be unwilling to deprive itself of the social and

cultural life of its native land, even if by so doing it might avert the threatening danger to Judaism. The second section is anxious for the preservation of the Jews as upholders of the Jewish religion, and in the furtherance of this ideal is willing to make a certain sacrifice of social intercourse. The first section has no other aim in life than the preservation of Judaism and Jewish life, for which it is willing to make any and every sacrifice.

Have the Jews a right to a separate existence? The very question is an insult to the Jewish people, since no other people is required to defend by argument its right to survive. Not only the German and the Frenchman, but the Servian, the Bulgarian, the Roumanian—less numerous and infinitely less gifted than the Jews, as they are—would never for a moment think of entering on such an argument. To them their right to a separate national existence is as unquestionable and as unanswerable as the right of the individual to live.

The Jews might justly claim that a history extending over 3,000 years is sufficient justification of their continued existence. What European nation can show anything comparable with that which the Jewish nation has given to humanity? What nation can point to such eagerness in well-doing, such unity between its members, such appreciation of study and learning, such fidelity and devotion to its faith and customs, as can the Jewish nation? Is this fidelity, for which our forefathers suffered martyrdom and centuries of persecution, to be despised by their successors, and replaced by conversion to Christianity? No Jew will lightly answer the question. Those very Jews who bow to necessity and outwardly renounce Judaism do so with

a certain inward shame, and preserve a feeling of pride in their ancestry, and a respect for the high spiritual qualities of their race.

But these, after all, are only sentimental arguments ; if we wish to get a true answer to the question whether assimilation is of use or of harm to the Jews, we must first answer the following question : “ Can the Jews do more for humanity by remaining a separate nationality than by becoming absorbed in other nations ? ” A people can be of use to humanity in two ways, firstly through its race-value, *i.e.* through the spiritual and mental powers incorporated in it, and secondly through its culture. Whoever defends the right of the Jews to a separate existence must do so either in view of their racial or of their cultural value.

### *B. The intellectual gifts of the Jews.*

Are the Jews a highly gifted race ? Is there such a thing as a Jewish race ? It is not our intention to discuss the Jewish race question at this stage, especially since the subject has been brilliantly and exhaustively treated in Zollschan's recent book, *The Race Question, with special reference to the Theoretical Foundations of the Jewish Race* (Vienna, 1909).<sup>1</sup> Of the three great race divisions, the white, the yellow and the black, the Jews belong to the white race, and of the two divisions within the white race—the Xanthochroi (fair-haired) and the Melanochroi (dark-haired)—they belong to the dark-haired. The dark-haired division can be again divided into three groups: 1. The inhabitants of

<sup>1</sup> The literature of the Jewish race-question is very plentiful, but much of it is uncritical and unscientific. Among valuable authorities may be mentioned, Andree, Luschau, Weissenberg, Judt, Elkind, Auerbach, Fishberg, Sofer.

Northern Africa and Arabia (typical representatives, the Arab Beduins). 2. The remaining West and South Asiatic peoples (typical representatives, Armenians and Persians). 3. The Southern Europeans (typical representatives, the Greeks).

The Jews at their first entry into history were a cross between the first group—to which the Assyrians and Babylonians belonged in ancient times, besides the Arabians—and the second group (Aramæans, Hittites). The Jews took their culture and language from the first group, and as long as the test of race was language-relationship, the Jews were reckoned as belonging to the Semitic group. In reality the Jews are more nearly related anthropologically to the second group, to the peoples of Asia Minor and Persia, and it is from these that they inherit their characteristic physical features. It was the merit of von Luschau to be the first to discover the physical resemblance between the Jews and the races of Asia Minor, especially the Armenians,<sup>1</sup> and thus to strike a blow at the Semitic theory which has since been repudiated by all serious scholars.

The group of peoples to which the Jews are thus most nearly akin are to this very day remarkable for their intellectual energy, which makes them dangerous opponents in all matters of trade and commerce. The Armenians are known to be the most practised and capable merchants of the Orient, and the Persians are famous for their general commercial talent and high mental and spiritual gifts. This commercial talent is not a narrow one-sided gift of chaffering, it is the sign

<sup>1</sup> The resemblance to the Armenians is quite remarkable. The most experienced anthropologist might try in vain to distinguish between Jews and Armenians in the mass.

of exceptional intellectual capacity. Josef Kohler<sup>1</sup> declares the Jews "one of the most gifted races mankind has produced, less prolific in great geniuses, but overflowing with men of great talent."<sup>2</sup> The reason that the gifts of the Jews are best manifested in commercial matters is simply due to the fact that in every nation there are more merchants than scholars, and intellect in trade brings therefore much more prominence than it does in science. There is no specific commercial gift; the same qualities which go to make a successful business man—the power of swift comprehension, of logical thinking, of good judgment, of organisation, of quick action—are the same which in different circumstances go to make the distinguished scholar, politician, engineer and officer. The same Jews who were able to create new forms of exchange, such as the emporium, and to apply the technical discoveries of modern times to economic life, would have achieved through their acuteness, their powers of organisation and their untiring energy, equal success in other walks of life. Further, the Jews have long ago ceased to be merely business men. In Western Europe during the last hundred years they have been numbered amongst the best jurists, politicians, parliamentarians,

<sup>1</sup> *German Monthly Magazine*, December 11th, 1910.

<sup>2</sup> The assertion that the Jews produce many men of talent, but few, if any, geniuses is a charge constantly brought up in literary references to Jews. It seems to us that something more than repetition is required to prove this thesis. There is no fixed line of demarcation between talent and genius. But if we accept the difference, and admit that of the great artists, scientists and politicians of the nineteenth century, the greatest geniuses—let us say Napoleon, Beethoven, Goethe, Darwin—were not Jews, does this show that the Jews, who constitute 2 per cent. of the Christians in Europe, have less genius than the Christians?



doctors, engineers, actors and chess-players.<sup>1</sup> The greatest English statesman of the nineteenth century was the Jew Disraeli. Italy owes not a little of its present commercial prosperity to the Jewish ex-Prime Minister Luzzatti; the first president of the German Reichstag and Reichsgericht was the Jew Simson; at the cradle of the most important scientific discoveries of the New Age, the telephone, electricity, the flying machine, stand the Jews Edison, Heinrich Hertz, and Lilienthal; the greatest social movement of the nineteenth century was the product of the Jews Lassalle and Marx.

In earlier literature relating to the Jewish race, we generally find an exaggerated estimate of the purity and unity of the Jewish race. Latterly a reaction has set in, and many authors deny altogether any unity of race in the Jews. In reality, the Jews, in the course of their 3,000 years' history, have assimilated to a small extent certain foreign ethnical elements, though *in the mass*, as contrasted with the Central European nations, they represent a well-characterised race. In Southern Europe it is more difficult to distinguish them from non-Jews, while in Asia Minor and Syria it is practically impossible. But this very likeness to the Asiatic peoples, from whom they have been separated for 2,000 years, shows that the Jews have remained unchanged, and that in the Jews of to-day we may say we have the same people who fought victoriously under King David, who repented their misdeeds under Ezra and Nehemiah, died fighting for freedom under Bar-Kochba, were the great carriers of trade between Europe and the Orient

<sup>1</sup> The supremacy of the Jews as chess-players refutes the assertion so often heard that the Jews have only a practical bent, chess being in the sphere of pure abstraction.

in the early Middle Ages, and finally were excluded from culture in the isolation and misery of the Ghettos from the end of the Middle Ages onward for 500 years. Thus the Jews have not only preserved their great natural racial gifts, but through a long process of selection these gifts have become strengthened. The terrible conditions under which the Jews lived during the last 500 years necessitated a bitter struggle for life in which only the cleverest and strongest survived, while the thirst for knowledge, and more especially the keen exercise of the mind engendered by the study of the Talmud, served also to eliminate all but the most gifted. The rich Jews of the Ghetto vied with one another for the most learned Talmudic scholars as husbands for their daughters, and thus insured the mental progress of the race.<sup>1</sup> The result is that in the Jew of to-day, we have what is in some respects a particularly valuable human type. Other nations may have other points of superiority, but in respect of intellectual gifts the Jews can scarcely be surpassed by any nation. For this fact alone the Jews may well claim their right to a separate existence and resist any attempt to absorb them. That type of Cosmopolitanism, which aims at the greatest possible similarity between nations, at a smoothing away of all their differences of character, is to-day generally discredited. Just as it would be absurd to destroy specific kinds of fruit in order to produce one general kind, so it is equally absurd to wish to wipe out national differences. Mankind to-day aims not at uniformity, but at making use

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps owing to this severe process of selection that the Ashkenazim are to-day superior in activity, intelligence and scientific capacity to the Sephardim and Arabian Jews, in spite of their common ancestry.

of the individuality of every nation for the common good.

It might be well to consider here the vexed question whether or not a race can change its character. In the first place, there is no doubt that the will to breed which produces varieties in plant and animal life, often transforming them altogether, produces like effects in the races of men. We have made frequent mention of the preference of Jews for Talmudic scholars as husbands with a view to rearing a higher race ; in the same way it is likely that the prevalence of fair hair among the German Jews, for example, is due to preference for fair hair in the choice of a husband or wife (a result of the effort after assimilation). In these cases changes in race-character arise from the cultivation of certain varieties within the race itself. It is a different question whether a race can be transformed by the influence of external conditions. The answer depends upon the point of view. The politician who reckons with short spaces of time will certainly answer in the negative, while the biologist, who is interested not so much in actual changes of type as in the possibility of change, will probably reply in the affirmative. Absurd as it would be to expect a European standard of culture from the negroes in one or two generations of altered social and economic conditions, it would be equally presumptuous to declare against their being able to produce a high state of culture hundreds or thousands of years hence. The way in which the spiritual germ gradually brings about a change in the race is still not quite clear (the best known explanation is Semon's Mneme-Theory), but that such transformations can and do take place over long periods of time is more than likely. It is highly probable too that an ancient

culture affects and moulds the character of a race. Thus, for instance, the markedly rational trend of thought and action which is most pronounced in the oldest nation of civilisation—the Chinese—but is noticeable also in the descendants of the ancient Mediterranean peoples, the Armenians, Jews, Greeks and Persians, may be explained by this consideration. The rationalism of the Jew thus becomes a result of his ancient culture, and the peoples of Northern Europe will at some future time arrive at the stage at which the Jew stands to-day.

*C. The artistic proclivities of the Jews.*

The cultural value of a nation is determined not only by its intellectual, but by its artistic and ethical qualities. Should the Jews, in comparison with other nations, fall short in these provinces, their intellectual gifts might indeed be disparaged and their value to humanity considered, at best, a negative one. It is, indeed, often asserted that the Jews are not deeply artistic, that they have produced no artistic genius. But when we remember that a few hundred thousand Jews in Germany alone in the nineteenth century produced musicians like Mendelssohn, Meyerbeer, Offenbach, Goldmark, Joseph Joachim; poets like Heine; painters like Max Liebermann, we see the falsity of such an assertion. We must always remember that German Jews are only 1 per cent. of the Christians in number, so that, in proportion, German Christians should have produced 100 to every one of these Jewish artists. We doubt if they could show this result. It is easy enough, especially in anti-Semitic countries, to disparage Jewish artists and their work. But whoever takes an unprejudiced view, and remembers besides, the Jewish

non-German artists, (Josef Israels, Antokolski, Pissaro, Rubinstein) must come to the conclusion that the Jews of Western Europe have, in proportion to their numbers, produced a great number of gifted artists. They are likewise well represented in poetry and sculpture, and it is only in architecture that so far they do not seem to have excelled. The artistic achievements of the Jews are the more remarkable, as Zollschan has rightly pointed out in his book, considering that the callings open to Jews hitherto have not been such as to further any artistic genius; they were concentrated in trade and commerce, and had a hard struggle for existence. The qualities needed for success were sharpness and dexterity, clearness of mind, and a quick grasp of things, in addition to a habitual and shallow superficiality; most of which qualities do not lead to profundity of realisation of the inner meaning of things. It is the best proof of the spiritual gifts of the Jews that in spite of these unfavourable outward conditions they still produce men of leading in Art and Literature.

#### D. *The Jews and Ethics.*

It has been said that Jews are inferior in ethical qualities, in morals and character. Is this true? We can scarcely tell from the individual case; it is only by taking the people in the mass that we can reach any objective judgment. Such a survey can be made by studying criminal statistics. (The criminality of the Jews has been the subject of much investigation <sup>1</sup> of

<sup>1</sup> Compare my treatise, *Criminality of Christians and Jews in Germany*, 1899-1902; also Blau, *The Criminality of Jews in Germany during the years 1903-1906*; v. Liszt, *The Problem of Jewish Criminality*; Wassermann, *Profession, Religion and Crime*, Munich, 1907; Thon, *Criminality of the Christians and Jews of Austria*.

late years, and the general conclusion is this, that the criminality of the Jews is different from, but in no way greater than that of Christians. Speaking generally we may say that Christians have a preponderance in crimes of violence and brutality, Jews in crimes of fraudulence and deceit.) The table on pp. 222 and 223 shows the comparative criminality of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Netherlands. The figures for Germany are those of the years 1903-1906, for Austria of 1898-1902, for Hungary of 1904, for the Netherlands of 1902.

(An analysis of the figures shows that the differences of criminality between Jews and non-Jews is due solely to difference in social conditions, to the greater prosperity and higher education of the Jews, their restricted participation in agriculture, their concentration in trade and industry, and in the large towns; and that there is here no question of racial differences: unless, indeed, we attribute the prevalence of alcoholism among Christians (which is responsible for so many crimes of violence) and of greater cunning among the Jews (which facilitates fraud) to dispositions of race. The more one studies the question, and investigates the causes of crime, the more clear does it become that those who would account for the differences between Jewish and Christian criminality by inborn qualities of race are deceiving themselves. If one goes to the root of things, one finds that social conditions are everywhere responsible for differences in criminality.) This is quite apart from the question raised by Lombroso and his school as to whether some men are born criminals or not. The "*delinquente nato*" of Lombroso is not a man who resorts to breaches of the peace, stealing, forgery, or inflicting bodily harm, *i.e.* to the crimes which claim

## COMPARATIVE CRIMINALITY OF JEWS AND CHRISTIANS.

JEWS PARTICIPATE TO A GREATER EXTENT			CHRISTIANS PARTICIPATE TO A GREATER EXTENT		
In the following criminal acts.	In	Number of times.	In the following criminal acts.	In	Number of times.
1. Usury - - - -	Germany - Austria, - Hungary -	29.05 75.45 4.88	Resistance to authority of the State - - - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary - Netherlands -	3.63 1.60 2.56 2.18
2. Bankruptcy - - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary -	12.62 8.79 28.20	Robbery and robbery by extortion (in Austria by bodily threats) - - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary - Netherlands -	5.55 8.73 7.43 15.83
3. Fraud - - - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary - Netherlands -	2.04 3.27 4.02 2.02	Theft and larceny - - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary - Netherlands -	2.84 1.66 1.87 1.90
4. Spreading immoral literature. Offences against morality	Germany - Netherlands -	2.04 5.01	Breach of the peace - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary - Netherlands -	2.00 3.30 2.91 1.59
5. Evasion of military service - - - -	Germany - Austria -	2.16 1.59	Damage to property - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary - Netherlands -	4.55 7.43 1.97 2.52

JEWS PARTICIPATE TO A GREATER EXTENT			CHRISTIANS PARTICIPATE TO A GREATER EXTENT		
In the following criminal acts.	In	Number of times.	In the following criminal acts.	In	Number of times.
6. Extortion - - -	Germany - Hungary -	1.61 1.45	Homicide through negligence - - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary -	4.33 2.22 3.01
7. Defeating civil executions (in Hungary, falsification, removal of legal boundaries)	Germany - Austria - Hungary -	2.01 2.22 2.07	Arson - - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary -	2.67 1.45 4.07
8. Counterfeiting, falsification of records, documents	Germany - Hungary -	2.33 1.68	Inflicting bodily injury -	Germany - Austria - Hungary - Netherlands -	2.55 3.29 3.24 1.95
9. Libel and slander - -	Germany - Hungary -	1.31 1.61	Abortion - - -	Germany - Austria - Hungary -	1.19 1.25 4.42
10. Duelling - - -	Germany - Hungary -	3.66 11.49			



the greatest number of criminals in the present day ; he is rather a man who is devoid of any feeling of restraint, who gives full rein to his passions, and does not shrink either from sexual immorality, robbery or murder. Such men may exist, but they are as rare among criminals as are the insane among the sane. Their numbers are so small that they do not count in a comparison of criminality. It would be too absurd to attribute those delinquencies in which Jews are more strongly represented than Christians (these are in Germany, usury, bankruptcy, failures in business, falsification of documents, evasion of military service, fraud and libel) to inborn criminal disposition. They are the results of recent changes in social life, and it would be as unreasonable to impute a propensity to usury and bankruptcy to the Jewish babe, as it would be to impute to the Christian child a natural inclination to damage property and commit breaches of the peace.

If we examine the offences (usury, misappropriation, bankruptcy, infringement of the law of Sunday closing, offences against the law of copyright) for which Jews were convicted seven times as often as Christians, we find that the offences are directly traceable to the business or profession of the offender. When we compare, as we have tried to do in the accompanying table, the proportion of Jews in certain professions with their corresponding proportion of offenders, we find that the greater criminality of Jews in these callings is explained by their greater participation therein.

The powerful influence of economic conditions is most strikingly seen in Amsterdam, where the Jews, unlike the Jews of other countries, are guilty of *less fraud and more infliction of bodily injury* than the

Offence.	Profession of Offender.	PROPORTION OF JEWS	
		In Profession.	Of Offenders.
Usury - - - - -	Independent - - -	33.12	22.73
Misappropriation - -	Financiers, bankers, etc. - - - - -	33.12	17.17
Bankruptcy - - - - -	Independent tradesmen and business men - - - - -	9.50	13.10
Fraudulent bankruptcy			3.57
General bankruptcy -			4.71
Infringement of the law of Sunday closing, etc.)			11.33
Offences against intellectual property - -	Authors, journalists, private scholars -	7.48	9.44

Christians. Why is this ? Because the great majority of the Jews of Amsterdam are not occupied in trade but in the handicraft of diamond-cutting. They thus have few possibilities and temptations to defraud, such as trade so frequently offers. On the other hand, the workmen are less educated and probably more addicted to liquor than Jews in other lands, and therefore lose the restraint which hinders most Jews from committing acts of violence.

So much is clear : criminal statistics cannot prove the relation between crime and race, since the majority of offences have only become criminal in recent legal systems. As to the capital crimes (murder, robbery, incendiarism, offences against morality) which have been punishable in all ages, if one would impute inborn criminality to their perpetrators, the Jews would be found to have very few such born criminals, since they have always been far more immune from these particular crimes than the Christians. Similarly, they have in proportion to their numbers fewer culprits altogether

than have the Christians. Thus any inborn, *i.e.* racial moral inferiority is completely disproved by criminal statistics.

In social and public life the Jews are often charged with being presumptuous and wanting in tact. This is very often the case in fact, but the reason is not to be found in their racial qualities but in the unparalleled rapidity of their social and economic advance, which naturally gives rise to this *parvenu* spirit. It is not so easy to get accustomed to new standards of life. But this is only a transition stage. The second and third generations feel at home in their new surroundings, and know how to conduct themselves with perfect ease and tact. We must remember too that much that gives offence in the behaviour of the Jews does so only because it is measured by the standard of the Christian environment. Thus, in England and North Germany the Jews give offence by their temperamental manner of speaking and gesticulating, because it is the habit in these countries to be reserved; whereas the English demeanour is by no means to the taste of some other nations, such as those of South Europe. It is the fate of the Jews that they are the only Mediterranean people who live among Northern nations, and that being in a small minority they cannot create a standard for themselves, but must accept and be judged by that of the majority.

#### E. *The value of the Jewish race.*

We think we have proved sufficiently what we set out to prove, namely, that the Jews as a race are inferior neither in artistic achievement nor in moral fibre. We can thus accept the high intellectuality of the Jews without reserve, and are justified in desiring to preserve

this high human type, the equal of any race of mankind, as a separate entity, unmixed, because this is the only possible way to preserve and develop the race-character. Any highly cultivated race deteriorates rapidly when its members mate with a less cultivated race, and the Jew naturally finds his equal and match most easily within the Jewish people. We cannot absolutely assert that the mixture of Jews with other races invariably produces a degenerate posterity. The mixing of diametrically opposed races does indeed almost always produce bad results, the difference of blood between father and mother giving rise to an unbalanced offspring, devoid of character and energy. The racial difference between Jews and Europeans is not great enough to warrant an unfavourable prognostic as to the fruits of a mixed marriage. The few investigations which have been made into the physical and mental qualities of the children of mixed marriages have not led to any definite conclusion in this matter, though the assertion that mixed marriages between Jews and Christians are less prolific than others seems likely to be confirmed by statistics. This might be a sign that mixed marriages are not conducive to the begetting of offspring, though it would not necessarily follow that the children themselves would be physically and mentally weaker.

It is certain, however, that by intermarriage the race-character is lost, and that descendants of a mixed marriage are not likely to have any remarkable gifts. A very gifted Jewish couple may confidently look forward to finding their talents reproduced and intensified in their children. But the same result cannot be anticipated from a mixed marriage where racial discrepancies exist between the father and mother. The child

naturally inherits the qualities both of the father and mother, but these qualities, instead of being intensified, will be weaker in the child. As a general rule, the child is not distinctively of either race, and its gifts will not be above the average.

Intermarriage being clearly detrimental to the preservation of the high qualities of the race, it follows that it is necessary to try and prevent it and to preserve Jewish separatism. The only possible way is to put a stop not to intermarriage alone, but to the whole process of assimilation, which begins in denationalisation and ends in intermarriage. To oppose intermarriage alone would be acting like the quack who tries to cure the excrescences without getting to the root of the disease. Once the process of assimilation has commenced and has progressed as far as denationalisation, *i.e.* extinction of all Jewish individuality, the complete assimilation and absorption of the Jews becomes inevitable. The "de-Judaised" Jew finds no support in Judaism, he hovers in the air, as it were, and eventually takes refuge in Christianity, which, as the ruling religion, naturally exerts the greatest attraction. Jewish individuality and culture, and finally the custodian of that culture, the Jew himself, all become destroyed by assimilation, and the Jewish race disappears like a drop in the ocean of Christian blood. The preservation of the Jew as a high type of human culture depends upon the cessation of the process of denationalisation, and means in practice a constant struggle against assimilation.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### CULTURAL VALUE OF THE JEWS.

#### A. *Race and culture.*

We have already seen that a nation's racial and cultural value are its justification for a separate existence. We have further seen that the condition as to race value is fulfilled by the Jews. Can they also show a similar cultural value? It would be reasonable to suppose that high culture would be a natural adjunct of a high race, since race is the soil from which culture springs. High racial endowment is indeed a necessary condition for culture, but it is not the only condition; it must go hand in hand with the external advantages of economic and political prosperity. It is differences in these external circumstances which explain the different grades of culture attained by the same race at different periods and in different countries. The same Arabs who developed such a high type of civilisation outside Arabia in the ninth and tenth centuries were, some few centuries before, as they are to-day in the deserts of Arabia, nomad tribes of low standing. The native American races of Mexico and Peru showed an advanced state of civilisation in agricultural matters at the time of the discovery of America, while in other districts they were completely uncivilised, and relied on the chase as their chief means of subsistence. Nations such as the Persians and Greeks, under the stress of

political oppression and economic distress, fell from the cultural eminence they had previously attained. These few examples will suffice to show the influence of external conditions on culture.

What is culture, and how can its value be estimated ?

Culture is not merely science and art, a high degree of technical development, a refined mode of life, or lofty conceptions of morality, but the sum total of all those spiritual possessions which fit men for life in association with their compatriots and endow them with poise and intellectual perspective. Greek culture, although as regards science and technical development far below that of modern Europe, was yet its equal in another sense, because it gave to the Greeks a social perception, a national spirit, and a uniform comprehension of history.

The union of rich racial endowment with favourable external conditions produces the highest culture, but like an organic structure, it requires a certain time for growth and development. If it is to develop to the full many generations must contribute to it the results of their experiences. The gradual evolution of ethical and social ideas within a nation is a process which requires hundreds of years for its accomplishment.

It will be understood from this that a high culture has an independent value of its own, even with a highly endowed race—just as the value of an individual does not depend solely on his natural gifts (which give him the means of acquiring knowledge), but on his actual acquirement and assimilation of that knowledge. To take another example : acquired culture is to the race what money is to the merchant—he has acquired it through the exercise of his business capacity, and thereafter it becomes his capital.

*B. The value of modern Jewish culture.*

Jewish culture to-day is confined to the East European Jews. The Jews of Western Europe have given up their Jewish culture and have become Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen and so forth. They accomplish great things in the various intellectual and artistic spheres of these countries, and do much to further their development, but they are lost to Jewish culture. This is the greater pity, since they would probably achieve still greater things in the realms of Jewry, where all their racial gifts would be called into play without let or hindrance ; whereas in the countries of their adoption they are bound to adapt themselves to the life and thought of the racial majority, which is in many cases quite foreign to them.

The present Jewish culture, *i.e.* the culture of the East European Jews, is the same as that possessed by the Jews of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which they took with them to the isolation of the Ghettos. At that time it was similar in character to that of the other European nations, and scholasticism was its dominating spirit. But whereas Christian civilisation was enormously enriched during the following centuries of the Renaissance by geographical discoveries and by the development of natural sciences, and progressed by leaps and bounds, the Jews in their Ghettos lived through five hundred years without any impulse from outside, and had to subsist on what they had when they entered the Ghettos. This spiritual inbreeding impoverished their civilisation, especially in comparison with the gigantic contemporary progress of the Christians. The study of the Talmud, which was and still is with the "fromm" (pious) Jew of East



Europe the beginning and end of knowledge, does indeed sharpen the intellect, but the education it gives is not to be compared with modern European education. The plastic arts are absent. Powers of self-cultivation, and the desire for the refinements of life, are not even awakened. The love of nature, which Christianity has been slowly acquiring ever since the Renaissance, is almost unknown. The literature of the European nations is ignored, and science is at a very primitive stage. In short, the Jews' culture lacks all that the European nations—each striving to outdo the other, and favoured by happy discoveries and inventions—have added to their culture during the last five hundred years.

Hence an inevitable discrepancy between conception and realisation. In wealth of ideas the Jewish can bear comparison with any European civilisation. Its conception of life is grand in its comprehensiveness; and the outlook of the East European Jew, who sees the controlling hand of a righteous God in all things, is much finer in its harmony and its strong ethical sense than the world-philosophy of many an "enlightened" Jew, who looks down compassionately on East European Judaism. The perfect Talmud scholar, notwithstanding his ignorance of modern science and learning, can hold his own with the most cultured as a type of the highly educated man.

In the sphere of ethics Jewish civilisation can also bear comparison with that of any European people. The well-known moderation of the East European Jews, their aversion to violence and lust, their sympathy for all human sorrow, their earnestness, and eagerness to work, their respect for the law, the close tie between parents and children, the absence of class distinctions, are its principal features, and are of the greatest value

n communal life. Their religious fervour, which is the outstanding characteristic of Eastern Jewish culture, shows their capacity for ignoring worldly interests ; and under other circumstances this idealism takes the form of enthusiasm for other great causes, as is clearly shown by the participation of the Jewish youth in the movement for Russian freedom.

But in comprehensiveness, *i.e.* in content of secular knowledge, Jewish culture compared with that of Europe, is undeniably backward. It shares the fate of all isolated cultures : that of China, for example, which though in itself among the most highly developed, by cutting itself off from any other contemporary learning and science, has been left behind by that of Europe. The era of isolated centres of light, such as existed in olden times, is over ; such centres cannot compete with European civilisation, which consists of the combined civilisations of all the European peoples working together, and the interplay of one with the other. One single people cannot possibly attain as comprehensive an excellence in all provinces of thought and action as can all the nations of Europe combined. If, for instance, one were to isolate one of the European nations, France or Germany, cutting them off from connection with other national cultures, we should see a repetition of the same process as has happened to the Jews ; they would fall behind the other nations in knowledge and experiences. They might still reach a high standard, but it would be as " empirically backward " as that of Jewish culture to-day.

The backwardness of Jewish culture is easily overcome. The rapidity with which the Jews of Western and Central Europe acquired the European outlook and produced notable men like Spinoza, Disraeli, Marx,

Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Heine, Israels, Heinrich Hertz, in all spheres of learning and art, is proof that they do not remain backward for long. The West European Jews indeed have completely identified themselves with European standards, but at the expense of their own. That there is no need for this we see from the Japanese, whose culture, though of a high type, was until fifty years ago in an isolated and backward condition : yet they were able to adapt the most advanced European thought to their own needs, and while remaining thoroughly Japanese, and respecting their ancient culture, they are to-day able to compete with the European nations in the highest spheres of learning, art and science.

Like the Japanese, the Jews must adapt modern culture to their own, so that they may combat that of Europe on its own ground as equal antagonists. But they must go carefully to work, lest in the effort to merge the two together, they destroy the worth of the old. The result of the combination should be a Jewish civilisation with a real value of its own, whereas up till now the wholesale participation of Jews in modern thought has indeed been a cure for the backwardness of their culture, but one, in the process of which, that culture has tended to disappear altogether.

As long as the new Jewish culture takes that of the old Ghetto for its foundation and becomes its organic continuation it will have a firm basis. But if, as has been occasionally attempted, a Jewish culture is built up without this foundation, the corner-stones of the new edifice being taken from the whole variety of possible sources, the result will be nothing but worthless talk. A civilisation cannot be put together like a mosaic ; it can only grow out of a living national life,

*i.e.* in this case, out of the culture of the East European Jews. This means, at the same time, that the pioneers of the new culture can only be those who have acquired the old, *i.e.* the East European Jews. The West European Jews, with individual exceptions, are already too denationalised and too saturated with modernity to do anything of the sort. The new Jewish culture in its early stages would doubtless fall short of their worldly standards, and would therefore fail to attract them.

*C. The new Jewish culture a combination of Jewish tradition with modern education.*

To prove whether or not it is possible for the East European Jews to be receptive of modern secular education and still maintain the positive worth of their present Jewish standards, we must first show why the adoption of modern education has hitherto worked such havoc with Jewish tradition. Three reasons present themselves :

1. Modern secular education is at bottom anti-religious, and is thus in indirect opposition to the culture of the East European Jews, the kernel of which is religion and belief in God. There is no bridge between the firm belief of the Russian Jew in an Almighty God, in His active intervention in the history of the world, in the power of prayer, and the modern conception of life founded on natural science and evolutionary theories.

2. Modern education is imparted to the East European Jew not in his own (Yiddish) but in a foreign language. At every step, therefore, the fact that his education is the product of a foreign people is brought home to him. His soul is divided between Jewish tradition, imparted to him either in Yiddish or Hebrew,

and secular knowledge, which comes to him in either the German, Russian or Polish language in the guise of German, Russian or Polish culture. Of the two, secular education, with its obvious superiorities of learning and science, and the advantages it offers in economic life, nearly always proves the stronger influence. The Jew applies himself to it, and contempt for the Jewish language and tradition is the natural consequence.

3. The East European Jew receives this secular education in Christian schools in which naturally no attention is paid to the traditions of the Jewish home, the Jewish pupil being plunged into an absolutely foreign *milieu*. The child is, as it were, uprooted from Jewish tradition, and leaves the school totally estranged from Judaism.

Of these causes, the first—the schism between Jewish religion and the teachings of natural science—cannot be evaded. The body of the Jewish beliefs will no doubt suffer many blows from the spread of scientific knowledge. But the Jews will here fare no differently from all the nations who have been touched by the breath of science. In France, England, Italy, Germany, no less than in the United States and Japan, religion has had to resign its sovereign power, and be content with what science has left it. The Jewish religion will fare no worse than the Christian—it will fare better, because it has fewer dogmas, and because its fundamental dogma, belief in one God, is not irreconcilable with the Monism of natural science. Perhaps this may one day develop into a synthesis which will unite all the world. In any event, by using a little discretion it is quite possible for Jewish children to retain, side by side with modern education, a feeling of respect for their religion, as the greatest and most pregnant expression

of the Jewish genius. It is quite reasonable that they should at the same time preserve many of the ceremonials as symbols of their faith.

This brings us to the second cause of the destruction of Jewish culture, namely, the disturbing influence of foreign languages and non-Jewish schools. This difficulty might be removed by giving Jewish children a modern education, not as now in a strange language and in Christian schools, but in *Jewish schools*, in direct connection with Jewish tradition and in their own language. This demand for their own schools and their own language is an essential condition for a satisfactory combination of Jewish tradition with modern culture.

A peculiar language and separate schools are only possible where Jews live in the closest connection with one another. For this the primary condition of every constitutional nation must be fulfilled : a fixed territory and a self-contained national existence. Previously the Jews of East Europe had at least the semblance of these conditions ; the boundaries of the Ghettos confined them to one spot, and their special privileges as money-lenders and—in Poland—also as artisans, made them to a certain extent independent of the Christians ; they relied as little on the Christians as did the latter on the Jews. With the loss of these privileges things have changed for the Jews ; they now take their share in the open market, where, surrounded by Christian competitors, they have to rely on and to cater for non-Jewish customers. This smooths the way to assimilation. The only possible preventive is for the Jews, who to-day are mainly middlemen between the non-Jewish producer and the non-Jewish consumer, and thus dependent upon both, to create an economic life of their own, and to apply themselves to all callings, and

more particularly to agriculture. Here the Jews would not only be the sellers of wares, but would be both producer and consumer. Without some such change of occupation, and without local segregation, Jewish schools where the Hebrew language prevails will not be possible, because economic life necessitates a different education. As long as the Jews are a small minority in the midst of a great non-Jewish majority, and remain economically dependent on non-Jews, so long will they be forced by circumstances to acquire the language and customs of their environment; and even if Jewish schools should be able to maintain themselves, any ideas they may have implanted will be destroyed in later life. We have an example before us in the young men of East Europe who, educated in Jewish schools, and good Jews enough when they arrive in England or America, invariably fall a prey to assimilation as soon as they leave the Jewish quarters of the cities and earn their living outside. Having shown that four conditions are essential for the furtherance of Jewish culture, namely :

1. Jewish schools,
2. An self-contained economical life,
3. A common language,
4. Local segregation.

the question presents itself as to how and where these conditions can be fulfilled. The problem of the schools is the easiest to solve. When the three other conditions are fulfilled, the schools will come of themselves, because they will be the only possible kind. Everything depends, therefore, on the possibility of fulfilling the three last conditions. We propose to discuss this possibility in the three following chapters.

*SECTION V.*

THE AIMS OF JEWISH NATIONALISM.





## CHAPTER XV.

### CREATION OF A SELF-CONTAINED JEWISH ECONOMIC LIFE BY A RETURN TO AGRICULTURE.

#### A. *The importance of agricultural occupation for a community of Jews.*

If the Jews are to live together in large numbers they must be represented in every calling, and more particularly in agriculture. So long as the Jews remain in the spheres of labour in which we find them to-day, and the culture of the soil, the most important branch of domestic economy, remains in non-Jewish hands, so long will Jews who live in the open country continue to be at best shopkeepers and carpenters, and be forced to throng to the towns where trade and industry offer them a means of livelihood. An isolated Jewish town population, the environment of which is exclusively non-Jewish, would be the worst possible foundation for a Jewish co-operative community. A town population, which relies on trade and commerce, constantly fluctuates, is ever ready to change its residence when another locality offers better economic prospects ; moreover, as we have already shown, it offers exceptional opportunities for assimilation, living as it does on custom (and particularly on the custom of the non-Jewish country neighbourhood), and therefore being forced to suit the wishes of its customers. The farmer who lives on the produce

of his field is the only thoroughly settled man, his modest needs and his independence enabling him to withstand assimilation and survive crises which work havoc with those engaged in business. A true love of home, a feeling of being part of the soil, only takes root in a people which has by its own toil drawn its sustenance out of the earth. A settled Jewish community can only exist where there are Jewish farmers. There only the springs of nature, which were sealed up in the Jews of the Ghetto, will begin to flow anew.

*B. Small participation of Jews in agriculture.*

It is a vexed question whether the Jews, who during the existence of the Jewish kingdom were undoubtedly an agricultural people, remained so during the first centuries of the dispersion; but it is certain that ever since the Middle Ages they have ceased to be farmers. In the whole of Western Europe, in England, France, Italy and Holland, we might search in vain for Jewish farmers. In Germany—by the census of 1907—among 292,862 professing Jews, 3,746 were engaged in agricultural occupations (horticulture, forestry, cattle raising, fishing); thus, of Jews, 1.3 per cent. engaged in agriculture as against 35.5 per cent. of Christians. And even these few Jews with very few exceptions live, not on the produce of their agricultural labour, but as landowners and lessors, or as participators in industrial enterprises in connection with agriculture.

In Austria the statistics of 1900 give the relatively high number of 139,810 Jews, *i.e.* 11.4 per cent. engaged in agriculture and forestry, as against 54.4 per cent. of the Christians. But these figures should not deceive us into thinking that there is really a Jewish peasant class in Austria. There is no such thing. In Galicia

and Bukovina it is indeed not uncommon for a Jew to possess a cow or occasionally a large stock of cattle ; but in my long journeys in Galicia I never met a genuine Jewish peasant. On the other hand, Jewish landlords, particularly large landowners, are comparatively numerous in Galicia. Of the entire "landtäflig" ground of Galicia (*i.e.* property which was originally manor land, and still enjoys certain legally assured privileges), which in 1902 amounted to 7,204,076 acres or 37.2 per cent. of the total area of Galicia, 744,998 acres = 10.34 per cent., were in the hands of the Jews, which gives about the same proportion as the Jewish population is to the Galician (11.09 per cent.). The Jews who possess "landtäflig" estates, and are thus among the large landowners, manage the land in most cases themselves. The small Jewish landowners, on the contrary, seek only to let it out and devote themselves to trade. At the same time, many Jews are to be found among Galician agricultural labourers.

The conditions in Hungary and Roumania are similar. In the latter country the Jews manage numerous large estates as lessees (they are prevented by law from becoming landowners). In Roumania in 1908 of the 3,332 lessees who owned estates of over 120 acres, 472 = 14.2 per cent., were Jews, and 5,765,338 acres = 18.87 per cent. of the entire leasehold land, was in their hands. These Jews are not farmers, but agricultural employers ; they do not till the soil with their own hands, but have it worked by others—sub-tenants, hired labourers, etc.

### *C. Results of Jewish agricultural colonisation hitherto.*

If we wish to find Jewish farmers in Europe we must go to Russia. The existence of these farmers is due,

however, not to the voluntary return of the Jews to the land, but to a colonising enterprise of the Russian Government. In 1806 Alexander I. issued a decree by which Jews with not less than £40 capital who were willing to be farmers were promised their own piece of ground. Applications flowed in, so that soon after the issue of the decree nine colonies were founded in the government province of Cherson. The colonies did not prosper, however, and would probably have disappeared altogether if Nicholas I. had not come to the rescue. In 1836 this Czar took up the project of his predecessor, and, by promises of special privileges, induced many new colonists to settle in Cherson, with the result that the number of colonising families rose rapidly from 957 to over 2,000. The privileges they now enjoyed ameliorated their condition, and in 1842 four more colonies were founded in Cherson. In 1846 four new colonies were established in the government of Ekaterinoslav, and to-day we find colonies in almost every governmental department of the Pale of Settlement.<sup>1</sup> In 1898 and 1899 the Jewish Colonisation Association instituted and published a report of these Jewish agricultural colonies. We extract the following table, from which we see that in thirteen governments there were 301 Jewish settlements, consisting of 10,721 families, and a total population of 68,959 souls, occupying an area of 100,107 desjatins (about 275,000 acres). This population includes artisans and small traders who possess no land, the number of those who possess land being about 58,881 souls.

The land in the colonies is mostly the property of the State, and is held by the colonists as an inheritance from

<sup>1</sup> An historical account of the Colonisation is given in a book by Julius Elk, *The Jewish Colonies in Russia* (Frankfort-a.-M., 1886).

## JEWISH AGRICULTURAL COLONIES IN RUSSIA.

Governmental Department.	Number of Settlers.	Number of Families.	Number of Persons.	Number of desjatins occupied.
Vilna, - - -	32	372	2,414	4,392
Witebsk, - - -	28	192	1,235	1,914
Grodno, - - -	14	261	1,811	3,585
Kowno, - - -	15	216	1,604	2,649
Minsk, - - -	26	885	5,762	6,601
Mohilew, - - -	76	824	5,828	5,343
Wolhynien, - - -	18	991	5,003	5,551
Kiev, - - -	23	447	3,221	2,812
Podolien, - - -	15	652	3,279	2,191
Tschernigow, - - -	4	107	652	1,280
Bessarabia, - - -	11	1,024	5,466	3,300
Cherson, - - -	22	3,304	24,295	42,839
Ekaterinoslav, - - -	17	1,416	8,389	17,650
Total, -	301	10,721	68,959	100,107

father to son : a small portion of it is the property of the colonists themselves or of other private individuals. An enquiry into the divisions of land held by the Jewish Colonisation Association in 1897 discovered that of 4,022 families possessing land (29,634 souls)

1,341 or 33.3 % had less than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  desjatins.

996 or 24.8 % had  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 5 desjatins.

922 or 22.9 % had 5 to 10 desjatins.

527 or 13.1 % had 10 to 20 desjatins.

236 or 5.9 % had more than 20 desjatins.

(1 desjatin = about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  acres). The governments of Cherson and Ekaterinoslav are not included in these figures.

The colonists do not all work their own fields ; a considerable number lease them out, so that of the 4,022 families possessing land of their own, only 2,568

are actually engaged in agriculture. The number of Jewish families in all the colonies together who are really engaged in agriculture should not be estimated at more than 5,000, or 30,000 souls.

Opinions differ greatly as to the economic condition of the colonies ; the truth seems to be that, though not yet brilliantly prosperous, they are making slow progress,<sup>1</sup> particularly since they started tree plantations in addition to farming. Outside the Jewish colonies there are scattered here and there in Russia, Jews who, though not properly speaking farmers, are interested in branches of agriculture. According to the report of the J.C.A. in 1899 there were 11,894 Jews engaged in horticulture, 1,746 in tobacco plantation, 665 in vine plantation, 177 in bee-farming, 7,185 in dairy work.

Besides the Jewish agricultural colonies in Russia, which are already over a hundred years old, there are Jewish agricultural settlements in the United States, in the Argentine and in Palestine, all of which have been founded within the last three decades. In the *United States* there are a number of Jewish colonies which sprang up after the year 1881 by the private initiative of immigrant Russian Jews, but which have since either failed, or been compelled to appeal for help to Jewish philanthropists or charitable institutions. The most important of the existing colonies are Woodbine, Carmel, Rosenhayn, Alliance, Hunderton, all in the State of New Jersey. The colonies—Woodbine in particular—have a strong industrial character ; one section of the inhabitants is exclusively, another only partially engaged in manufactures and workrooms ; only about one-half or two-thirds of the inhabitants

<sup>1</sup> This was the view of the Jewish agronomer Oettinger in 1909.

maintain themselves solely on agriculture, which takes the form of wine, fruit, vegetable and dairy produce. Outside New Jersey there are some small Jewish colonies and a considerable number of individual Jewish farmers in the States of New York and Connecticut, and in the more westerly States, notably North Dakota. These farmers are not much engaged in farming proper ; like the Russian Jews outside the colonies who are interested in agriculture, they are for the most part vegetable growers, gardeners, dairy farmers ; and their products being perishable food-stuffs, they remain in close connection with their market, *i.e.* the towns. In 1910 the Jewish Agricultural and Industrial Aid Society in New York estimated the number of agricultural businesses in Jewish hands at 2,984. Of these 656 were in the State of New Jersey, 517 in the State of Connecticut, 840 in the State of New York, 240 in North Dakota, 169 in Massachusetts, the remainder in other States. The total number of Jews in the United States engaged one way and another in agriculture is about 20,000 souls (including their families). In Canada there are also four Jewish Agricultural Colonies, Hirsch with 40, Qu'Appelle with about 180, Oxbow with about 15, and Bender with about 70 families.

*The Argentine colonies* owe their foundation to Baron de Hirsch, who thought to solve the Jewish question by settling Jews as farmers and workmen in countries outside Europe, a plan for the realisation of which he founded the Jewish Colonisation Association (J.C.A.) with a capital of about £10,000,000. The first Jewish colonies in the Argentine were founded by this Association in the early nineties. The condition of the colonies at the end of the year 1908 is shown in the following table, compiled from the *Rapport de l'Administration*



*Centrale de la Jewish Colonisation Association pour l'année 1908 (Paris, 1909).*

Name of Colony.	NO. OF COLONISTS.		NOT COLONISTS.		TOTAL POPULATION.		Surface cultivated in hectares (1 hectare = 2.4 acres).
	Families	Souls.	Families	Souls.	Families	Souls.	
Moisesville,	511	2,770	129	1,040	640	3,810	10,840
Mauricio, -	317	1,614	170	700	487	2,314	19,750
Clara, -	631	3,477	198	1,061	829	4,538	19,690
San Antonio,	151	861	14	82	165	943	4,541
Lucienville,	316	1,767	203	1,232	519	2,999	16,550
Baron de Hirsch,	143	728	43	164	186	892	13,136
Santa Isabel,	49	275	—	—	49	275	—
Total, -	2,118	11,492	757	4,279	2,875	15,771	84,507

The colonies are composed of an agricultural population of 2,118 families (11,492 souls) to which we must add labourers, tradesmen, teachers and so forth, to the number of about 4,000. The area of each colony is about 210,000 acres, of which about one-half is sown with wheat, and the other with flax, oats, maize and lucerne. There were about 109,376 head of cattle, 37,975 horses and mules, 31,342 sheep. In almost all the colonies cattle-rearing and dairy-work play a great part in addition to the actual farming. Economically the colonies are said by the J.C.A. to be in satisfactory condition: it appears, however, that many colonists, instead of working their own land, farm it out to the natives to cultivate, the land having greatly increased in value since the opening of the new railway. The J.C.A. will certainly enlarge its work of colonisation in the Argentine. It has already made large purchases of land for this purpose; the total amount

of land owned by it in the Argentine in 1908 was 1,277,325 acres.<sup>1</sup>

*The Jewish colonies in Palestine* have been founded within the last three decades to a small extent by Palestine enthusiasts from Russia, but chiefly by systematic colonisation aided by the munificence of Baron Edmond de Rothschild and with the funds entrusted by him to the J.C.A. These colonies have often been in a critical position, and great efforts were needed to keep them above water ; but during the last five years their condition has been improving, and many colonies, especially those which cultivate oranges in the neighbourhood of Jaffa, have reached a state of prosperity. Besides orange-growing, vine culture is a large industry in the Southern Palestine colonies, and large wine cellars have been built for the purpose in Rischon-le-Zion and Zichron Jacob. Of late the culture of olives, almonds and cereals is becoming increasingly popular, the chief colonies for these products being those in North Palestine (Galilee). There is little cattle-raising, and vegetable produce is scarce. There are now in Palestine altogether about thirty Jewish colonies with an area of about 75,000 acres, and an agricultural population of about 1,000 families (6,000 souls). Besides these, about 2,000 persons live in the colonies, not engaged in agriculture, such as labourers, teachers, small traders, landlords and their dependents,

To sum up : about 5,000 Jewish peasant-families have been established by the Russian Government during the last hundred years, and a further 6,000-7,000

<sup>1</sup> With the Argentine colonies we should mention the Brazilian colony Philippson, also under the direction of the J.C.A. At the end of 1908 it numbered 42 colonist families—299 souls, and occupied an area of 13,338 acres, of which about 10,000 acres were cultivated.

families have been settled during the last thirty years by Jewish colonisation societies and private persons who took to agriculture on their own initiative. This brings up the total of Jewish agriculturist families in the world to-day to 11,000-12,000. Having regard to the time spent and the enormous means at the disposal of the colonisation societies, this result can hardly be called brilliant, but it is not to be despised, in view of all the difficulties encountered. These were particularly great at the start. Jewish farmers had to be made out of men who for generations had been townspeople and petty traders; they lacked the necessary qualities, physical strength, rural traditions, technical knowledge. To these difficulties we must add the fact that the colonists were recruited chiefly from the poorest of the proletariat, who expected by colonisation to improve their economic condition. Colonisation offered no attraction to Jews of means who were happy in trade and industry, and the philanthropic character, which the colonisation assumed in the last three decades, resulted in the poorest Jews being chosen, by preference, for colonisation. These poor Jews becoming suddenly possessed of land, house and effects, were in most cases devoid of any capacity to make use of their possessions, and they lacked also the love and solicitude which the genuine peasant feels for the home he has won inch by inch by the sweat of his brow. The result of this physical incapacity was that only a fraction of the colonists remained on the land; the greater number fell away, either because they were unable or unwilling to do the hard physical work, or because village life was uncongenial to them; or perhaps because they were so utterly lacking in agricultural and economic knowledge that they saw no prospect of making a living.

The colonisation societies tried to make good this deficiency in knowledge by appointing an administrator whose office was to put the colonists in the right way ; but this was sending Beelzebub to drive out Satan. The colonists were indeed protected from great mistakes, but they thereby lost the feeling of independence and responsibility, and fell into the habit of asking help and money of the administrator whenever they were in trouble. Instead of becoming self-supporting farmers, they became cadging beggars. The administration system has since been given up, but its pernicious influence is still felt, especially in the Rothschild colonies in Palestine. In the place of administration, the colonisation societies, especially the J.C.A., have adopted the system of settling only such persons who have had some experience in agriculture, either as agricultural labourers or as sons of colonists, and who are accustomed to rural life. This system works better, and the percentage of unsuccessful colonists has perceptibly decreased. Thus the large sums of money, expended seemingly without result by the colonisation societies, have borne fruit at any rate in the second generation. It was probably necessary that money should be lavished. If the means and good-will had not been forthcoming to colonise a hundred Jews in order to win ten for agriculture, we should not to-day have had these ten colonists who are most valuable for the furtherance of colonisation. The beginning was difficult and expensive, but it has greatly facilitated all later effort. In one respect the work of colonisation has come to a dead stop ; it is possible to find people with some agricultural knowledge who are willing to colonise, but impossible to find any with capital. Apart from a few enthusiastic Zionists, the only applicants

for colonisation are people of no means whatsoever, whom the societies have to provide with everything, down to the smallest article necessary for their settlement. The effect of this is bad in two senses : in the first place, as we have already mentioned, the colonist lacks the necessary care and solicitude for his property ; and in the second place he has no credit basis on which to fall back in bad times. He depends entirely upon the pleasure of the colonisation society ; in times of adversity, such as a bad harvest, they must come to his help or he may be ruined. Such a state of affairs is not likely to develop either a feeling of independence and self-reliance, or any intimate connection with the soil. The colonist knows that one single bad harvest, or a cattle epidemic, would be sufficient to ruin him altogether ; but he knows, at the same time, that he has nothing to lose, and readily leaves hearth and home in cases when, were his own property at stake, he would undoubtedly struggle against adversity, and by exerting all his energy, at least make an effort to ward off the danger.

There is still another disadvantage in the colonisation of persons without means : it requires enormous sums of money, the cost of settlement for every colonist being £750 or more. It is obvious that at such a cost only a relatively small number of persons can be settled.

#### *D. Economic possibility of a return to agriculture.*

If, instead of some dozens, we wish to see some hundreds or even thousands of Jews reverting to agriculture every year, this can only happen if private persons of their own accord devote themselves to agriculture, and are willing to set up as independent farmers,

defraying, themselves, all the costs of installation. But is this to be expected? Certainly not, if cereal-growing is the only prospect; for the private man of means it entails too much hard physical labour and intimate agricultural knowledge. The Jew of East Europe who possesses the capital of £750-£1,000 necessary for installation as a farmer can be assured of a good living as an industrial employer, and naturally hesitates to devote himself to a difficult and unknown calling. It would be different if a return to agriculture presented the prospect of easy work and an assured existence. This would be the case if, instead of farming, he took up fruit-growing. For this the soil of Palestine is peculiarly adapted, and it demands neither hard work nor particular agricultural knowledge when once the trees are yielding fruit.<sup>1</sup> If only some plantation society could be organised which would encourage small middle-class Jewish capitalists to invest in a fruitful plantation, their reversion to agriculture would not mean a step back in their material welfare or a leap in the dark: on the contrary, the thought of dwelling "each man under his own vine and fig-tree" would no longer appear economically an unpractical dream.

The Jew who thus acquires a fruitful plantation does not of course become a farmer; he is only the owner of a plantation, but he lives in an agricultural *milieu* and his children may grow up in this *milieu* as real husbandmen. They will be able to add corn to fruit-growing, and to engage in all branches of farming, especially if

<sup>1</sup> It would seem that the Jew is far better adapted to arboriculture than to agriculture. This is no doubt the reason why the Jews of Russia and the United States who voluntarily undertook colonisation work should have chosen mainly dairy work, horticulture, tobacco-planting and vine-growing. In Palestine the Jewish plantation colonies are technically superior to the German colonies.

care is taken that they receive elementary agricultural education, either in the village schools or from special teachers, so that the love of and understanding for agriculture is awakened in them.<sup>1</sup>

The Jewish colonies of South Palestine, which are primarily fruit-growing colonies, furnish a proof for our statement, that the children of fruit-growers are at home in all agricultural callings, including actual tilling of the soil. For the sake of the sons it is necessary to win the fathers. The agricultural schools erected at great expense by the colonisation societies in Jaffa (Palestine), Djedeida (Tunis), Or-Jehuda (Asia Minor), Woodbine (United States), Slobodka-Lesna (Galicia), Steinhorst (Hanover), and elsewhere, only accomplish to a very small extent and with doubtful success that which is accomplished in the cheapest and most natural way in the father's household in the rural atmosphere and in the village schools, namely, the education of the children in practical farming. It would be wrong to hold up the dull farmer of North and East Europe, who still tills his field as his ancestors did before him, as a model to the active-minded Jew. Modern husbandry has outgrown this type of peasantry; its best representative is the intelligent American farmer who works with all the instruments modern science has invented. He must be the model for the Jewish farmer.

If Jewish capital in East Europe could be turned to

<sup>1</sup> This is specially necessary for the daughters, who suffer very much from the present neglect of agricultural education in the Jewish colonies. Many a colonist cannot make a living because his wife has no knowledge of those pursuits, which in a well-ordered farming establishment should be her special province. It is chiefly owing to the incapacity of the women that dairy-produce and vegetable produce have not been developed in Palestine.

the uses of colonisation and arboriculture, there would be the additional advantage of a new field of labour for Jews without means, who would thus become inured to agriculture.<sup>1</sup> As yet there are few such labourers, and Jewish colonisation is thereby deprived of a possible source of much assistance. A great influx of Jewish labourers would only be possible if these men could look forward to the prospect of becoming something more than hired servants—of becoming eventually more or less independent. This might be done by admitting them after a few years of work as hired labourers to co-operative settlements—as Franz Oppenheimer recommends—in which they would receive, in addition to their regular wage, a portion of the gross profits. This would spur them on to work, and give them the chance of saving enough to buy a small piece of land or a house of their own.<sup>2</sup> Their wages as labourers would still be their principal source of income, but, in addition, they would be able to keep up a small holding for dairy and vegetable produce, or poultry farming, by which they could support their families, and by gradual purchase of land raise themselves to independence.

#### E. Colonisation—*philanthropic and national.*

Having shown that it is economically possible to induce Jews both with and without means to revert to

<sup>1</sup> In Palestine, for example, the Jewish immigrant labourer from Eastern Europe cannot generally compete with the Arab who lives on practically nothing, and is indispensable for preparing new ground for Jewish settlers; but in proportion as more ground is acquired by Jews for plantations, more Jewish labourers will be in demand.

<sup>2</sup> Here the Colonisation Societies could be of great use by granting loans, repayable over a long space of time.



agriculture, we must now see whether the Jews will consent to do so. Economic life in Europe tends more and more to develop industry and commerce at the expense of agriculture. It is rare to find anyone who has been previously engaged in industry and commerce reverting to agriculture. If this is true of the general public, it is still more so of the Jews. Their great mental activity makes them turn naturally to trade and industry as offering the best field for the exercise of their talents ; they are, besides, so strikingly successful in these callings that it would be small profit to them to exchange them for one for which they are not so well adapted. So long as intelligence has a commercial value—as it has in the countries where the Jews principally reside—it will at best be only the less intelligent Jews who will engage in agriculture and persist in it. Paradoxical as it may sound, it is better that the Jewish agricultural schools should train unintelligent pupils ; this is the only way to prevent the majority from subsequently giving up agriculture.

To sum up : it seems to us that a voluntary return of Jews to agriculture on a large scale will only come about from other than economic causes. For instance, a great movement might be started which, recognising that the present condition of the Jews threatens their annihilation, postulates a return to agriculture as the only means of preserving the Jewish community. If such a movement is to succeed, and the conditions which it creates are to last, the economic aspect—the indispensable factor in social life everywhere—must be favourable. Enthusiasm may create a change, but the change will not last if economic conditions do not come to its aid, *i.e.* in our case, if agriculture does not hold its own against trade and industry. If we show that it

can, as we have tried to do, the return of the Jews to agriculture might be realised on a large scale.

This return to agriculture from national motives, which we shall hereafter call *national colonisation*, is greatly superior to the philanthropic colonisation previously discussed. Philanthropic colonisation is concerned only with people without means ; national colonisation affects all sections of Jewry. It can dispense with the great sums needed by philanthropic colonisation, since it relies on small Jewish capitalists giving their own substance for the purpose of colonisation. Its aim, to lay the foundation of a secure social and economic life for the Jews, is one to inspire enthusiasm, and thereby to conquer the difficulties which wrecked philanthropic colonisation.

The lessons which we have learnt by the results of previous colonisation are :

1. For cereal growing only those Jews are suited who have been engaged in agriculture from their youth.

2. Middle-aged people who lack agricultural knowledge, will find that fruit-growing offers the only possibility of a return to husbandry. Their children will find this a stepping-stone to a thorough knowledge of all matters connected with agriculture.

3. Philanthropic colonisation, which provides colonists without means with land, house and stock, entails enormous expenditure and has relatively little effect, a great number of the colonists proving incapable and unfit.

4. The most important question in colonisation is how to preserve the stimulus to work and to persevere even in the face of adverse circumstances. The colonist without means is apt either to desert his home or to beg

for assistance. The independent colonist alone can be relied upon to stay and struggle on unaided.

5. The philanthropic colonisation societies would achieve much better results if they would confine themselves to advancing loans on credit to the settlers as cottagers, cereal farmers or fruit-growers—according to the means and capacities of the individual—after the manner of the European agrarian banks.

6. A return of the Jews to agriculture on a large scale will not be brought about by any amount of philanthropic colonisation ; it is only possible through a colonisation movement, inspired by a national motive which will attract Jews with means.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### REVIVAL OF THE HEBREW LANGUAGE.

#### *A. Yiddish and Hebrew.*

The language of the East European Jew is Jargon (Yiddish). But it covers only one side of Jewish life. It is the "everyday" language. The language of Jewish literature and religion is Hebrew. The Jew thinks and prays in Hebrew whenever his thoughts soar above everyday life ; it is in Hebrew that the East European Jew has set down everything he has thought and experienced in the sphere of religion and study down to the present day. This division between the literary and the colloquial language is not uncommon ; the same thing is found, for instance, in the difference between spoken Arabic and the Arabic of literature.

In speaking of the language of the Jews, the question arises whether Yiddish or Hebrew is meant. Both languages exert about the same influence on the thought and feeling of the East European Jew, and secular knowledge can be equally well conveyed in either. To which language should the preference be given ? Yiddish has in its favour that it is already the language of the masses, and its relationship to German renders German literature easily accessible. On the other hand, the absence of a classical literature induces a feeling of instability, the language is always changing, and the

influence of English in England and America has already brought about many alterations. A language which has such a shifting foundation and which has no pretence to grammar is not very suitable for educational and literary purposes. In addition, Yiddish is not calculated to command the respect of other nations, in particular of its nearest relation, German. It is true, no doubt, that many of the phrases which sound peculiar to German ears are good old German forms borrowed from *Mittelhochdeutsch*. But the *Tertium comparationis* will always be the German of to-day, and against that Yiddish—like *Plattdeutsch*—will be hard put to it to maintain its dignity.

With Hebrew it is another matter. Its literature of 3,000 years, and its well-defined grammar make it a splendid educational language. Its literary treasures and its past would ensure for it, as a living language, the esteem not only of the Jews, but of all enlightened nations. A knowledge of Hebrew is still cultivated by Christians, and is taught at all European Universities. Should it be again revived by the Jews, it would awaken the greatest interest among Christian scholars, and works written in Hebrew would be accessible to Christian readers. It would create sympathies similar to those which the new Greek language—by derivation from classical Greek—evoked from the European nations. A knowledge of Yiddish, on the other hand, would be closely confined to the Jews, and would have no more importance than that of other petty national dialects, such as Servian and Bulgarian.

#### *B. Hebrew as the national language in Palestine.*

These remarks will suffice to show that Hebrew is the most desirable tongue and the best qualified to be

the national language of the Jews. Has it a claim *ipso facto* to become the national language?

Efforts to revive Hebrew as the mother-tongue of the Jews have been on foot during the last few decades, and have of late years been renewed with added vigour; societies for the furtherance of the Hebrew language work in every country for the revival of the ancient national language. In Russia and Galicia interest in Hebrew as a spoken language is growing, the number of those who habitually speak Hebrew has increased, and a so-called neo-Hebrew literature has arisen, which has a distinct modern tendency; but we must not shut our eyes to the fact that this movement, so far, only affects a very small section of the Jewish population, and that the masses remain untouched by it. The Jewish newspapers of East Europe, which have an immense circulation, are still, with very few exceptions, written in Yiddish, not in Hebrew. It is unthinkable that Hebrew can ever become the colloquial language of the Jewish masses in East Europe. It is difficult enough to preserve the language of a small nation in the midst of another prevailing language; it is far more difficult to *create* a new national language in place of one which already prevails. Hebrew is completely isolated among the European languages; economically there is absolutely no incentive in East Europe for adopting Hebrew as the general language. It is the "Holy Language," the language of prayer and of ancient Jewish literature, and as such suffers considerable discredit under the present fashion of depreciating all matters religious.

Conditions are more favourable to Hebrew in another country, Palestine. Here thirty years of effort for the revival of the Hebrew language have been crowned with

success: most of the Jewish schools have adopted Hebrew as the language of instruction, while it is gradually becoming the mother-tongue of the Jewish youth. Palestine offers special advantages for the revival of Hebrew, the majority of Jewish settlers there being filled with the national spirit, and thus especially sympathetic to the ancient national language. Besides this, Hebrew is the only language in which all Jews can make themselves understood, coming as they do to Palestine from every country of the world; whatever their mother-tongue, be it Arabic, Russian, Spaniolisch or Yiddish, they can all understand at least a little Hebrew. Thus Hebrew is a bond of union between these Jews; and we get an idea of the diversity of language among them by the following figures from three Jerusalem Kindergartens in 1907. Of the 305 children attending them:

39.3 %	spoke Spaniolisch as their mother-tongue.		
38.0 %	„ Yiddish	„	„
7.1 %	„ Arabic	„	„
5.2 %	„ Bucharic	„	„
5.2 %	„ Persian	„	„
3.2 %	„ Grusinic	„	„
1.0 %	„ Morocco dialects	„	„
1.0 %	„ Bulgarian	„	„

These reasons alone, however, would not have sufficed to secure the supremacy of Hebrew, had not economic and social conditions been favourable to the revival. In no other country has the Jewish agricultural population such a strong influence over the general Jewish population. Although the number of Jews in the colonies is only 10 per cent. of the Jewish population of Palestine, it is economically much stronger than the

town population, which exists for the most part on Chalukah. It is the colonies which have established Hebrew as the living language. In order to transplant Hebrew from the colonies to the towns, it will be necessary for the Jews of the towns to deal with Jews (*i.e.* with the colonists and the Chalukists) in preference to the surrounding Arabs, and so get accustomed to using Hebrew in their daily and business life.

The efforts to bring cohesion into the Jewish schools of Palestine are likely to lead to the universal adoption of Hebrew as the language of instruction, other languages being taught as foreign languages.<sup>1</sup> Ten years ago one could almost count the Jews in Palestine who spoke Hebrew; to-day in all the Jewish quarters of the towns and in the colonies Hebrew is heard more often than any other language, especially from the children. The demand that every Jew shall speak Hebrew is becoming widespread. The acknowledgment of Jewish nationality is practically identified in Palestine with the acknowledgment of Hebrew as the national language. (The same thing occurs with other nations who lack political independence, Poles, Ruthenians, etc.) We can see how Hebrew has taken root in Palestine by the fact that all Jewish newspapers and periodicals there are written in Hebrew, not a single publication being issued in either Yiddish or

<sup>1</sup> Arabic (the native language), Turkish (the official language), and one European language are taught as foreign languages. French (the language of instruction in the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and the ruling language in the Levant) and German (the language of instruction in the schools of the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden, and becoming daily of more importance with the growth of German influence in the Orient) struggle for the mastery with Hebrew. English also has its supporters, and is taught in some schools.



Spaniolisch. The common language has its effect on the population, and makes for a *rapprochement* between the Sephardim and Ashkenazim. The coolness which still exists in the East between Sephardim and Ashkenazim has tended to disappear in Palestine, and this is greatly due to the common language.

It may at any rate be claimed that in Palestine the reawakening of the Hebrew language is no longer a dream but a reality. Hebrew in that country, from being a dead language, has really become a living one, and much is being done to strengthen its hold and to modify it to suit the uses of daily life. The development of the plant, which to-day is still young and tender, depends principally on the development of national agricultural colonisation in Palestine. If that suffers a set-back, Hebrew will suffer too. *Without* numerous agricultural colonies, the Hebrew language will be an artificial and lifeless product; *with* such colonies in Palestine, it will be a natural and vital growth.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### LOCAL SEGREGATION OF THE JEWS.

#### A. *Local segregation and its relation to culture.*

We have already shown that it is necessary for Jews to live together in compact communities if they wish to be protected against assimilation, to which in their present condition of small scattered minorities they have fallen victims. Just as an army in hostile territory is much more easily destroyed when it is divided into small groups than when it is concentrated in a mass, so Jews could best withstand assimilation by concentration in great numbers in one area. The defensive value of local segregation is not its only recommendation ; it has the added positive value of creating a centre for the production of an individual civilisation. It is almost a truism to say that even the greatest minds are influenced by their surroundings, and that their work bears not only the impress of their genius, but the impress of the conditions of its production. If the environment is non-Jewish, the creative work of the Jews will be either un-Jewish, or Jewish only to a slight extent. For this reason there may be Jewish artists, but no Jewish art. Jewish art presupposes a Jewish *milieu*, i.e. first and foremost, masses of Jews living together. Such a *milieu* is the only one which can make the creative artist free of foreign influences, and by its

kinship of race and sentiment thoroughly appreciate him and spur him on to his best work.

How can the Jews create this centre? They need a country in which all our previously mentioned conditions for the creation of a new Jewish culture can be fulfilled; where they must be engaged in every occupation including agriculture, where they can use their own language and have their own schools. The land chosen must be one which, if it does not particularly favour, must not preclude Jews from taking up non-commercial callings, notably agriculture—a land which would make for the national unity of Israel.

Hitherto there have been three different answers to the question in which land the Jews can best live in compact masses, and therein build up a firm Jewish economic life. They are so many different manifestations of the *Will to live*, the desire of preserving the Jews as a separate entity among the nations, and each of them deserves serious discussion. The first answer is that the Jews should concentrate in Eastern Europe and organise themselves on a national basis; the second—Israel Zangwill's solution—recommends some territory in Africa or America, as yet untouched by Europeans; the third solution—that of the Zionists—makes Palestine the one and only possible centre for a new Jewish life.

#### *B. Prospects of concentration in Eastern Europe.*

The first solution is nearest to hand. In some districts of Eastern Europe the Jews constitute already about one-fifth of the population. A further influx of Jews to these districts from other parts would present no great difficulties, distances being small and social and climatic conditions very much the same as those to

which they had always been accustomed. In Yiddish a common language would be already provided. But there are some very serious objections. In the first place, Russian law to-day forbids Jews to settle in villages, and this practically precludes all possibility of agriculture; and it is certain that the government, with its policy of crushing out all minor nationalities within the state, would fiercely oppose any local segregation of Jews. But this might pass; laws and policies change with the lapse of time; and these difficulties could be surmounted in Austria, where the equality of the Jews and the rights of all minor nationalities are at any rate legally recognised. But two obstacles still remain. A return to agriculture would not be successful in Eastern Europe, and the cultivation of a new Jewish life would be exposed to constant interruption and disturbance. Eastern Europe is on the way to industrialism: industrial society offers countless opportunities to the Jews, and even if the attempts at agriculture were a success, there would always be the danger that at the slightest hint of failure the Jews would leave their new activities and revert again to commerce and industry. After 2,000 years of town-dwelling it is not to be expected that the Jews should suddenly feel themselves at home in agriculture. Very much the same thing applies to the creation of a new Jewish culture. East Europe is too near the vast fields of European culture. To develop a culture of their own, the Jews would have to live apart from other culture for some little time. They would not be able to persist in an individual nationality and culture against the tide of assimilation with which they would be assailed as long as they remain in the midst of nations of a superior state of culture. They would be

constantly exposed to the temptation of imitating what they see done around them, and thus their civilisation, instead of being Jewish, would be an inferior edition of Polish, German or Russian cultures.

In fact, the idea of a Jewish centre in East Europe has found few supporters. There is much talk of a "National Autonomy" of the Jews, that is, a legally assured position as a nationality in the legislature, and greater powers of autonomy in proportion to their numbers (without local segregation). In Galicia and Bukovina national autonomy is one of the principal claims of those Jews who have national aspirations. But a national autonomy such as this is not calculated either to prove a lasting protection against assimilation or to create a national Jewish culture, so long as the Jews remain as scattered and as little at home in agriculture as they are now in Austria and Galicia. The process of assimilation might, however, possibly be *retarded* by a legally assured national position, and it is no doubt for this reason that in Galicia and Bukovina the Zionists (whose ideal is Palestine) work for local national autonomy.

*C. Prospects of segregation in the colonies (Territorialism).*

A Jewish centre in Eastern Europe bristles with difficulties. Do the undeveloped colonies offer a better field for Jewish settlement? In this direction the only concrete proposition came from the English Government, whose offer of Uganda for a Jewish settlement was refused by the Zionists. Israel Zangwill, who pleaded in vain for the acceptance of the Uganda offer, has since put himself at the head of a "Territorialist" movement. Territorialism lays down that, Palestine

being impracticable, the Jews must concentrate on some other territory; it endeavours to find some suitable land either in the undeveloped districts of North Africa or in Central America or Australia; but it has nothing definite to report. It is undeniable that the Jews who should leave their native countries for one of these lands would be protected from assimilation, and on the way to developing their own culture. But the question is whether it is possible to settle the Jewish masses in such a country. This is open to the very gravest doubts. In the first place, it is highly improbable that a tract of land suitable for colonisation by European Jews will be so easy to find; Uganda was certainly not adapted to a large settlement. But given such a country, the colonisation of an unpopulated and undeveloped country presents such gigantic difficulties that even powerful states are frequently unable to surmount them. When we remember that the so-called Territorialists only entertain the idea of such a land because they think it would present fewer difficulties than Palestine, it must be admitted that they underestimate the obstacles. Palestine may indeed present political obstacles which do not exist in a colonial country. But against that the social and economic difficulties are slight in comparison. Under the most favourable circumstances, it would take many scores of years to settle as many Jews in a foreign territory as are already established to-day in Palestine. And probably by that time the work will prove to have been useless, and the political difficulties which now stand in the way of Jewish immigration to Palestine on a large scale will exist no longer. It would be slightly different if it were a question of settling Jews in Mesopotamia or Asia Minor, instead of in undeveloped

colonies. The economic difficulties here would be hardly greater than in Palestine, though, of course, the enthusiasm which Jews feel for their ancient home, and which is of such extraordinary value for a settlement in Palestine, would here be lacking also. But there is no sign that the Turkish government would be more sympathetically disposed to a settlement of Jews in Mesopotamia or Asia Minor than to one in Palestine ; so the matter need not be discussed.

*D. Prospects of segregation in Palestine (Zionism).*

The only excuse for Territorialism is the terrible distress among East European Jews, which is such that any scheme for its amelioration—be it never so nebulous—finds ready support. Is Zionism anything more than another such adventurous scheme ? Will that which seems impracticable in Eastern Europe and colonial countries be possible in Palestine ? It is impossible to answer unhesitatingly in the affirmative. But we may say at once that many of the difficulties before enumerated disappear or become less formidable as soon as Palestine is proposed as the land for segregation. The climate is healthy and permits of the settlement of European Jews. Palestine is sufficiently civilised and in close enough communication with modern life to obviate difficulties of colonisation such as would be encountered in a new undeveloped country ; at the same time it is not so highly civilised that the Jews might be tempted to coalesce with the non-Jewish population. With regard to culture it offers exactly the *milieu* needed by the Jews : not too backward to deter them, not advanced enough to divert them. Palestine belongs to Turkey—a state made up of small nationalities—and at the same time the only state in

which Jews have always been treated as a *nation* on equal footing with other nations. Palestine is an agricultural country and will remain so for many decades. It, therefore, does not offer any temptations to the agricultural settler to give up agriculture in favour of some business profession. There are some 100,000 Jews in Palestine to-day, and colonisation work has been going on there for the last thirty years. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of these facts. And the feelings and sentiment of the Jewish masses are bound up with Palestine, the ancient home of the Jews, more closely than with any other country.

If, besides all this, we bear in our mind our previous remarks as to the special advantages of Palestine for a reversion to agricultural life and for the revival of the Hebrew language, we must come to the conclusion that, for the settlement of the Jewish masses and the development of their own culture, Palestine is to be preferred before all other countries. It may be that the first Jews who proposed a Jewish settlement in Palestine did so less from the practical motives than from the force of sentiment which a sense of the religious and historical importance of Palestine awakens in so many Jews. Their sentiment has been justified, and furnishes one more example in history of instinct preceding reason, in which it afterwards finds its justification.

If a portion of the Jews of Europe were to return to Palestine, we should witness a repetition of that return to Zion which was accomplished 2,500 years ago, when a fraction of the Jews came back to Palestine after the Babylonian exile. Babylon then—like Europe to-day—was the centre of culture and the hot-bed of assimilation. As with the European Jews to-day only



a small number could make up their mind to exchange the comfort of Babylon for the barrenness of Palestine. Yet that small handful of Jews grew again into a nation with a well-defined civilisation of its own. The thought of this should inspire the Jews of the present day, and it is only right that Zionism—the movement which aims at providing a continued national existence for the Jews in Palestine—should be the subject of our last chapter.

*SECTION VI.*

ZIONISM



## CHAPTER XVIII.

### ZIONISM.

#### *A. Origin and growth of Zionism.*

The desire to return to Jerusalem has never ceased burning in the hearts of the Jews, and two thousand years of exile have not sufficed to wipe out the remembrance of their former state. In the course of the centuries the expression of this desire has taken many different forms. During the first thousand years of the Christian era it bore a political character. In a famous letter from the Jewish statesman Chasdai Ibn Schaprut (Spain, 915-970) to Joseph, King of the Chazars, whose ancestor Bulan had embraced Judaism two hundred years before, we feel the burning pain of lost independence, of shame at the mockery of other nations, that Israel, alone of the nations, should be without a land of his own. The love of Zion, the yearning for its lost glory, inspire all the poems of the greatest of the Jewish poets of Spain, Jehudah Halevi, who in his old age went on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

From the twelfth century onward this ardent desire for Palestine began to lose its intensity. Conditions were so favourable to the Jews in Spain that they preferred assimilation to a return to Palestine; as their lot deteriorated, as it rapidly did in Europe during the fourteenth century, the remembrance of Zion became

more vivid, but under the stress of persecution the Jews lost faith in their own strength, and the aspiration took on a religious and quiescent form. At each feast of Passover the Jew still prayed "next year in Jerusalem," but he now invested the words with a spiritual significance; he no longer hoped to see the Jews turning their steps to Palestine in his own day, they must await the coming of the Messiah to lead them thither. This quiescent attitude, which discourages and deprecates any active effort to rehabilitate the Jews in Palestine, is the spirit which permeates the Jewish masses of Eastern Europe to-day, and has dominated Jewry since the fourteenth century.

Not until recent times has feeling on this subject been aroused from its lethargy. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, numbers of religious Jews of advanced years used to wander to Palestine with the pious wish of ending their days there and being buried in holy soil. The Jewish communities of Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias owe their present population chiefly to these immigrations of aged persons, many of whom brought with them their children and grandchildren. Though this population received monetary support from its native countries—this support being soon converted into a regular system of almsgiving (*Chalukah*)—it speedily fell into the greatest distress, and had to appeal for help to European co-religionists. Thus the Jews of Central and Western Europe came to be interested in Palestine, and it became evident that the word "Palestine" still exercised its old power over the spirit of the Jews. Two Rabbis, Rabbi Zevi Hirsch Kalischer of Thorn, and Rabbi Elias Gutmacher of Grätz, started an agitation, towards the middle of the nineteenth century, for the foundation of Jewish agri-

cultural colonies in Palestine, with a view to improving the condition of the Palestinian Jews, and of uniting Jews all the world over, in a common cause—the revival of Jewish agriculture in Palestine. In the year 1870 an agricultural school at Jaffa was actually founded by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and some years later the first colony was established. In Europe a society was formed for the support of the Jewish colonies in Palestine, the “Union of Lovers of Zion” (Chovevi Zion), which held its first congress in Kattowitz in the year 1884, when delegates were present from Russia, Germany, England and France. The movement received a great impetus from Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris, who took up the cause of Jewish agricultural colonisation in Palestine with enthusiasm during the eighties, and endowed it with immense sums of money.

This work of colonisation may have been started from philanthropic motives, but these gradually gave place to the national motive, *i.e.* the idea of uniting the Jews and protecting them from the dangers of the Goluth (dispersion). As early as 1862 Moses Hess, in his book, *Rome and Jerusalem*, had proclaimed the national idea underlying Judaism, and in 1876, in her novel, *Daniel Deronda*, the famous English authoress, George Eliot, created a hero whose ideal in life is to create a political existence for the Jewish people, to give them a centre for their national life. The Russian Jew, Leo Pinsker, writing under the influence of the Jewish persecutions of 1881, propounds the same doctrine, and declares it, in his brochure, *Auto-Emancipation*, published in 1882, the only solution of the Jewish question in Eastern Europe. Neither Hess, nor George Eliot, nor Pinsker, however, designated *Palestine* as

the necessary centre, and the idea of nationality remained in consequence a mere theory lacking flesh and blood. It became a living thing only when the national idea and Palestine were identified. It was the *Zionist Movement* which bound the two together. At its first congress, summoned by Theodor Herzl at Basel, 1897, it drew up as its programme—"Zionism seeks to secure a legally assured home for the Jewish people in Palestine." Since that day hundreds of thousands of Jews in all countries have subscribed to that programme, pay the annual shekel, and have become members of a great organisation.

The enthusiasm which Zionism has aroused varies very much in different countries. It finds most ardent support in Russia and among the Russian emigrants in England, America and South Africa ; a considerable amount also in Roumania, Galicia and Bukovina ; on the other hand, it makes slow headway in other parts of Austria (Bohemia, Moravia, etc.), in Hungary and Italy, and wins still fewer adherents in Germany and Holland and France. This double attitude to the Zionist movement reveals the antithesis between East and West. Wherever the Jewish masses constitute, as they do in Russia and Galicia, a self-contained nation with a culture of their own, living in bad material circumstances and under political oppression, enthusiasm for the Zionist ideal—to create a new and better home for the Jewish people—is a matter of course. The Eastern Jew may think the aim unattainable ; but he desires it none the less. It is otherwise with the Western Jew. Living in comfortable material circumstances, often in prosperity and luxury, under the protection of a well-ordered state, he identifies himself with the culture of his native land. If he should

become a Zionist—for himself and not only for others—he stands to lose much. Modern education makes the Western Jew feel strange and superior to the Eastern Jew, and undesirous of coming into close contact with him. Only a few can rise above this feeling and recognise a brother and an equal in the Eastern Jew; they are to be found mostly among members of orthodox communities and families, brought up in the old Jewish tradition, who feel the tie of *religious* brotherhood more binding than any other. To these Western adherents of Zionism we must add individual idealists with strong racial feeling, and the still greater number of those who have been special victims of anti-Semitism. With these latter, the stronger their feeling of honour the more insupportable become the open or disguised insults and humiliations to which they are submitted, and the more ardently do they desire to remodel their condition. They turn to Zionism seeing in it a promise of a radical change. It would be untrue to say that Zionism grew out of anti-Semitism alone, but anti-Semitism is a powerful incentive, and its cessation would be followed by a decline of Zionism. It is for this reason that University men furnish so large a contingent of Zionists in Austria and Germany, and form, indeed, the very heart of the movement. It is a result of the fact that anti-Semitism is particularly directed against Jews at the Universities and in professions, and these in turn are particularly sensitive to slights and insults.

#### *B. Revival of Judaism by Zionism.*

What Zionism has hitherto accomplished for the revival of Judaism cannot be rated lightly. By its congresses—attended by several hundred delegates from all parts of the world—it has not only established



an *international alliance* among the Jews (this had already been done by the Alliance Israélite Universelle), but it has created an international Jewish sympathy. It has succeeded in raising about £400,000 for a national fund, most of it subscribed by its poorest supporters, and in itself a witness to their self-sacrificing devotion. But the greatest achievement of Zionism is, that by its very existence it has once more created an *ideal* for those Jews who had forsaken the Jewish religion, lost their faith, and with it, all noble ideals. Baptised or unbaptised, they were compelled to assist, repressed and unbidden, in the cultural activities of the people among whom they lived, or, entirely renouncing ideals, to devote themselves to the piling up of wealth and to material enjoyment. Zionism has created an ideal for these Jews, given a new meaning to life and endeavour. Before the advent of Zionism the position of gifted and serious-minded Jews was indeed pitiable. They were torn in two by the discrepancy between on the one hand their desire to identify themselves with, and benefit, the culture of their native land and a justifiable pride in their own capacity to do so, and on the other the opposition they encountered, the humiliating and embittering sense of social inferiority.<sup>1</sup> Zionism came as a solution, especially to young Jewish University men in Germany and Austria. To get an idea of what Zionism means to these students, we have only to compare the quiet confidence and optimism of the Zionist student at German and Austrian Universities with the students in pre-Zionistic times, vacillating between Judaism and baptism, timid, devoid of ideals. Finding

<sup>1</sup> A vivid picture of this state of things (slightly overdrawn in places) is given in Nordau's drama, *Doctor Kohn*; also in the novel, *Werther der Jude*, by Ludwig Jakobowski, Dresden, 1903.

the way made smooth for them by Zionism, there have come forward many authors and poets, writing either in Hebrew or Yiddish, who would hardly have dared to write before. Again, the warmth with which many Jews in recent years have devoted themselves to all aspects of Jewish life is directly attributable to the fire kindled by Zionism.

It is Zionism, again, which has re-established the bond of unity between the Western and the Eastern Jew. Before its advent the Western Jew remembered his brother in Eastern Europe only when his sympathy was aroused by bloody persecutions in Russia. Apart from these catastrophes there was no connection between East and West. The relation between the Western and Eastern Jew was not greatly different to that between the Sephardim and Ashkenazim in the eighteenth century, when the Sephardim in London forbade marriage with the Ashkenazim, and actually induced the town of Bordeaux to expel Ashkenazim Jews. The Western Jew did not know the Eastern, and did not wish to know him. He was ashamed of him as of a poor uneducated relative, whom one pities and supports in private but denies in public. The great Jewish societies assumed the character of benefactors to the East European Jew; they looked upon him not as a colleague, but as the object of their benevolent activities. The Western Jew had no idea of the wealth of idealism, of the undiscovered spiritual treasures of the Russian Jews.

Zionism has changed all that. The gulf between East and West is not yet filled in, but it has been bridged, and vast possibilities have been opened up. Even the Sephardim of the East (in Palestine and elsewhere) have been touched by the breath of Zionism.

They used to be contented enough with the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, where their children acquired useful knowledge, the French language in particular, but were quite separated from the Aschenazim. They were almost totally lacking in that which, to the poorest Jew of Eastern Europe, is the breath of his nostrils—love of Jewish literature and lively sympathy with and interest in the fate of the Jews all the world over.<sup>1</sup>

Zionist effort has to a certain extent succeeded in making a breach in this apathy and in arousing the interest of the Sephardim in the general condition of Jewry and the importance of Palestine. Much has still to be done before the Sephardim are won over to Zionism; but among Sephardim youth it is gradually finding acceptance, and little by little their minds are becoming saturated with the Zionist idea. This is important, because the attitude of the Turkish Government to Zionism is likely to depend very much upon the attitude of its Jewish subjects.

### *C. Economic activity of the Zionists in Palestine.*

Zionism has only recently started work in its own field, Palestine. The present Jewish population of Palestine is made up of three different sections of immigrants: first, the Spaniolisch-speaking Jews, who directly or indirectly came to Palestine after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain; second, the Ashkenazi Jews, who, from religious motives, emigrated from Eastern Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and settled in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias; third, the Ashkenazi Jews who, during the

<sup>1</sup> The Jews of Salonica are an exception to this rule, and have preserved a specifically Jewish life.

last thirty years, have gone out as labourers and small traders under the influence of the Jewish Agricultural Colonisation Societies and of Zionism. Besides these three principal groups there is a comparatively small number of Asiatic and African Jews who have come to Palestine during the last two centuries from Buchara, Persia, Southern Arabia, Northern Syria (Aleppo, Urfa), the Caucasus and Morocco.

The lack of reliable statistics makes it impossible to give any accurate figures for the Jewish population; taking a general estimate, we may say that their numbers have increased from about 35,000 in 1880 (7 per cent. of the total population of 500,000 souls) to 86,000 in the year 1910 (14.3 per cent. of the total population of 600,000). The following table gives the extraction, the increase and the local distribution of the Jews in each decade, but for the reason given above, it can make no claim to accuracy, and can only be a general estimate. We see that the three great-immigrant sections are about equal in numbers, and that, of the 86,000 Jews in Palestine, 50,000 live in Jerusalem alone, 28,000 in five other towns, and only 8,000 in the colonies. The economic condition of the populations in the towns is bad. The old Ashkenazim—more than a third of the population—is dependent upon charitable support, which it derives from the "Chalukah"—a fund of several million francs contributed by pious Jews all over the world for the upkeep of their Palestinian brethren; the rest of the Jews are small traders, artisans and hired labourers; a very small number make good livings in business or in some other independent calling. The economic condition of the colonies leaves much to be desired, but it is incomparably superior to that of the towns.

# EXTRACTION, INCREASE AND LOCAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION IN PALESTINE.

	Sephardim.	Old Aschenas, Immigrant Section.	Young Aschenas, Immigrant Section.	Immigrants from Asia and Africa.	Total.
No. in year 1880, - - -	20,000	15,000	—	—	35,000
Decade } Natural Increase, -	2,000	1,000	—	—	3,000
1881-1890 } By Immigration, -	—	5,000	3,000	1,500	9,500
Decade } Natural Increase, -	2,000	1,000	1,000	200	4,200
1891-1900 } By Immigration, -	—	4,000	7,000	2,000	13,000
Decade } Natural Increase, -	2,000	1,000	2,000	300	5,300
1901-1901 } By Immigration, -	—	4,000	10,000	2,000	16,000
Nos. in the year 1910, - -	26,000	31,000	23,000	6,000	86,000
Of these there lived					
in Jerusalem, - - -	15,000	20,000	10,000	5,000	50,000
„ Jaffa, - - -	3,000	—	4,500	500	8,000
„ Safed, - - -	3,000	7,000	—	—	10,000
„ Tiberias, - - -	2,500	3,500	—	—	6,000
„ Haifa, - - -	2,000	—	1,000	—	3,000
„ Hebron, - - -	500	500	—	—	1,000
„ Colonies, - - -	—	—	7,500	500	8,000
Total, - - -	26,000	31,000	23,000	6,000	86,000

The economic work of the Zionists in Palestine is connected with the colonisation activities of Baron de Rothschild and has led to the foundation of some new colonies. The philanthropic idea here falls into the background; the aim is to attract a Jewish agricultural population on to Palestinian soil. Zionism does not go in for philanthropic colonisation, and could not, even if it would, seeing the enormous sums entailed by such colonisation. It therefore confines itself at present to assisting and facilitating the development of suitable general conditions; by establishing information bureaux and societies for the foundation or

furtherance of plantations and land partition; by forming corporate societies and by lending credit from its own bank. It has likewise taken in hand the afforestation of land, the introduction of wholesale trade in connection with agriculture; it has attempted to introduce new methods of agriculture and to encourage home industries, arts and crafts, etc. The success that attends their efforts is already noticeable, but the future alone will show the full result. The economic weakness of the Jews in Palestine cannot be removed in a single day; it arises from the fact that, Palestine being an agricultural country, the economic strength belongs naturally to those who own the soil.

The area of Palestine is 30,000 qkm., and only 500 qkm., *i.e.* less than 2 per cent., is in Jewish hands, or counting only the arable land (*i.e.* excluding mountains, lakes and marshes), perhaps 3 per cent. to 4 per cent. With a Jewish population of about 14.3 per cent. of the total population, it will be seen that the Jews possess far less land than their numbers would demand. The only way they can become economically stronger is for them to acquire more land, and participate more largely in agricultural pursuits.

#### *D. Zionism and the Turkish Government.*

Zionism has undergone a certain transformation since its first congress. At the beginning the all-important question had been how to obtain from the Turkish Government a binding agreement, by means of an irrevocable act of state—a charter—for the settlement of the Jewish masses in colonisation in Palestine. The question of the possibility of such a settlement, even with the acquiescence of the Turkish Government,

was set aside. It was not until the diplomatic negotiations with the Turkish Government fell through that it began to be questioned whether the charter was really essential to Zionism—a question which was finally answered in the negative. As a matter of fact, the acquisition of a charter would be both fruitless and useless. Fruitless, because no civilised government can grant persons belonging to other states and living in other countries special rights and privileges in a country which is inhabited by its own subjects. Useless, because the moment the Turkish Government wished to alter its policy towards the new Jewish settlement, the charter would become a worthless piece of paper (compare paragraph 44 of the Berlin Treaty and the behaviour of the Roumanian Government); useless, moreover, because the legal security which the charter was to obtain for Jewish work in Palestine will be gained step by step by the work of colonisation, and does not need to precede it.

In spite of all this, however, it was right that Zionism should have started out with the idea of the charter. Without it, it would not have succeeded so easily in gaining the support of the Jewish masses. The charter idea gave to the movement the breadth which had been wanting in the previous efforts of the Chovevi Zion. But the charter idea has already fulfilled its mission and will have to submit to the fate of the idea of "the association of means of production" in the Socialist movement. "To us, the end is nothing, the movement everything"—these words of Edward Bernstein, spoken of the changed conditions of social democracy, may be equally well applied to Zionism.

In addition to the value of the charter idea for Zionist propaganda, it must be agreed that the recognition of

the necessity of an understanding with Turkey—though too much insisted upon, to the exclusion of other things—was absolutely justifiable. Colonisation on a large scale within the Turkish Empire can only prosper when it enjoys the goodwill of the Turkish Government. It will not suffice to rely upon existing Turkish law and on the validity of local transactions ; the administrative support of the central government and its local appurtenances must be added to ensure success for the work of colonisation. Zionism will, therefore, always be concerned to convince the Turkish Government of the usefulness of its work and of its peaceful intentions. In so far, Zionism must always bear a quasi-political character, but its efforts will be directed not towards obtaining a shadowy charter, but towards obtaining conditions necessary to the practical work of colonisation.

The question is whether it will be possible to gain the confidence and goodwill of the Turkish Government towards the Jewish colonisation of Palestine, which would naturally be attended by a large Jewish immigration. The Turkish Government, which has difficulties enough in dealing with the national aspirations of the various nationalities composing its empire, would at first sight hardly welcome a national increase of strength in the Jews, hitherto the weakest and most submissive nationality of the empire, from whom they might in future have to expect claims for the recognition of their national individuality, similar to those of other nationalities. Perhaps, also, deceived by the charter idea, and by many other misleading statements of the Zionists, they may fear that the Jews demand political independence, or that they might make themselves politically a nuisance.



It appears that from one or all of these causes the government looks askance at Zionism ; but it is probable that sooner or later they will change their attitude, since their fears can all be proved to be groundless. It is certain that those Jews who go to Palestine under the influence of Zionism wish to form a nationality and to develop their own individuality, and especially their own language. But this does no harm to a state which already includes so many nationalities <sup>1</sup> and which, in spite of some efforts at uniformity, must ever remain a conglomerate empire. The fear of a Jewish occupation of Palestine and of their wresting it away from the Turks is absurd, having regard to the relative strengths of Turkey and the Jews. Why should some hundred thousand, or even some million Jews—and the millions do not come in a hurry—present a greater danger as a nationality, than the Arabs, who are far more numerous and far more powerful in view of their long connection with the soil and their ingrained national language, but against whom the Turks raise no objections.

The Zionist congresses have repeatedly declared that the integrity of Turkey would in no way be impaired by Zionist endeavour, and, indeed, it is in the interest of the Jews in Palestine to belong to a state which could protect them from sanguinary fights and skirmishes with the stronger neighbouring nationalities, and with which a young independent nation would be certain to be assailed.

While Jewish immigration to Turkey would entail

<sup>1</sup> The Jews of Turkey are already officially a recognised nation, " millet." The Turkish word " millet " means religious community, as well as nationality. The question whether the Jews are a nationality or not cannot arise in Turkey, a religious community being there, *ipso facto*, a nationality.

no political danger, it would, on the other hand, most undoubtedly represent an economic and cultural asset. The Jews would not come to Palestine empty-handed ; their coming would bring an influx of capable men and capital. They would transplant their commercial and scientific knowledge, their enthusiasm for art and literature, to Palestine. The Jews are already pioneers in Palestine ; it is they who are responsible for the first signs of expanding trade and industrial enterprise, for the introduction of new branches of manufacture, for the foundation of co-operative societies ; it is they who have brought arboriculture—notably the cultivation of vineyards and oranges—to their present importance of being the typical produce of Palestine ; they have introduced the eucalyptus tree into Palestine, and thereby rendered originally marshy districts habitable ; their colonies, schools, doctors, apothecaries, hospitals and in some towns their suburbs, are on a much higher level than those of the native population. It is through the Jews that the customs receipts show such a large increase ; they have European needs and have popularised the means to satisfy them.

The Jews might in a relatively short time turn Palestine into the model country for all Asiatic Turkey ; they could hasten on the economic and cultural development of the country. It is difficult to believe that without some very good reason, the Turks would cut off this possibility, and refuse all this wealth of capacity and capital, the increase in their customs returns, and the advancement of culture which is here offered them. Constitutional Turkey undoubtedly desires economic advancement. But at every step this is hindered by the lack of scientific and technically skilled men and capital. She is bound to do as they do in Russia and the Balkan

States—call to her aid men and capital from more highly cultured lands ; and this is always attended by the unpleasant consequence of giving the European state the opportunity of enlarging its sphere of influence in Turkey. Turkey can only escape from this dilemma by calling to her aid Jewish engineers and Jewish capital. Any other European settlers will always remain alien to Turkey, and enjoy special privileges which are irksome to the Turkish Government ; immigrant Jews, on the contrary, would be ready to exchange their European citizenship which begets for them persecution and oppression, for the privilege of becoming a Turkish subject and of becoming naturalised in Turkey.

Only a small portion of Jewish immigrants to Palestine have hitherto become Ottoman subjects, but this is because most of the immigrants have been elderly people. The young immigrants, especially the inhabitants of the colonies, have most of them become so, as soon as they are certain of a career in Palestine, *i.e.* certain that the government will grant them the same social and national rights as they grant other nationalities of the empire.

#### *E. Relations with the non-Jewish population of Palestine.*

Assuming that the Turkish Government recognises the advantages of Jewish immigration, and favours it, there remains to be overcome the difficulty of the present non-Jewish population of Palestine, numbering over 500,000 souls. It is clear that these will not leave the country to make room for the Jews. This even the Zionists would not desire. Zionism does not wish to have Palestine exclusively for the Jews ; it only seeks to create, by a steady immigration, a large, coherent,

united population of Jews which will be protected from the dangers of assimilation. And the backward state of culture of the native population nullifies the danger at the outset. The question is, in what spirit the native non-Jewish population will view an increased Jewish immigration. Will it lead to serious conflict? Hitherto the Arabs have not shown themselves unsympathetic to Jewish immigration, as this immigration has brought them very material economic advantages, opportunities of work at a higher wage, custom for their agricultural products, rise in land values, etc. But the time may come when the Jews, by introducing into Palestine large industries and modern agricultural methods, may become, not merely buyers and consumers, but very dangerous rivals. It may well be that they will buy up the land at prices higher than the primitive Arab fellah can afford, and thus deprive the Arab farmer of the chance of extending his property. At present the danger of this is not imminent, as hardly one-half of the land is cultivated—the half which lends itself to corn-growing—while the other half, much of which is suitable for arboriculture, is almost wholly uncultivated, the Arab fellaheen being deficient in the capital and knowledge needed for plantation growing. In the vicinity of the towns, however, a few rich Arabs have started fruit-growing. So long as Jewish colonisation is confined to this, the Arabs are not likely to oppose their acquisition of the land, having themselves no use for it. But when it comes to corn-growing, the increasing immigration of the Jews is likely to cause friction. This might be mitigated somewhat if the Arabs are clever enough to imitate the superior agricultural methods of the Jews. They would then have nothing to fear from the competition of Jewish

producers, while the change from *extensive* to *intensive* agriculture would necessitate their using only a fraction of their present agricultural area. In this way the needs of the Jewish cereal grower could be satisfied, and need not necessarily cause the Arab to be expatriated.

If this economic difficulty could be satisfactorily overcome, there is not much to fear from the national jealousy of the Arabs. There is a certain affinity between the Arab and the Jew as there is between the Arabic and the Hebrew languages. It is highly probable that the two would live happily and amicably together even if the Jews were to come in great numbers. One must, however, always be prepared for surprises, and the Christian Arabs in particular, some 100,000 persons, in contrast to the Mohammedan Arabs, bitterly oppose the Jewish immigration. This arises from the fact that the Christian Arabs reside mostly in the towns, where they are more nearly affected by the competition of the new Jewish immigration in trade and handicraft. Furthermore, being in possession of large *latifundia*, they view with alarm the increasing economic strength of the fellaheen (peasants), acquired by working at a higher wage in the Jewish colonies, and by their adoption of improved agricultural methods. The Christian Arabs are, therefore, also forced to pay higher wages, and are consequently prevented from adding to their funds. Besides this, there is the religious opposition, rendered doubly bitter by the presence of so many clerics and missionaries in Palestine. It may be, too, that they fear that a large Jewish population might desecrate their holy places, and impede the stream of visitors, on whom the Christian Arabs chiefly live. It need hardly be said that

these holy places would remain unimpaired whether the majority of the population in Palestine were Mohammedan or Jewish. They have long been, if not *de jure*, at least *de facto*, extra-territorial, and will remain so in the future.

F. *Economic possibilities for Jewish immigrants in Palestine.*

The great obstacle which stands in the way of the segregation of the Jews in Palestine is economic—the lack of economic attraction to Palestine. The Jews of Eastern Europe live in miserable poverty and seek to emigrate ; but their destination is not Palestine, but America. In America, a great industrial country, the Jew, either with or without means, can earn a living in whatever calling he had in his old home. In Palestine, an agricultural country, he can earn a living only by *changing* his occupation and turning to agriculture. This is not so easy. Leroy-Beaulieu even says that it is impossible for a townsman ever to become a farmer. We need not go so far as that, but it is undeniable that the metamorphosis makes great demands on a man, and very often fails. As we have said before, the only possible chance of success for a Jew *with means* is to take part in a thriving fruit-growing concern, and thus pave the way to agriculture for his children. To be attracted to agriculture the young Jew *without means* must see in it prospects of a share in profits, of co-operative societies, of easy credit, so that the position of a hired labourer may lead eventually to independence.

It would be a far easier task to settle Oriental Jews (Jews from Yemen, Morocco, Aleppo and the Caucasus) in agricultural colonies. These are already drifting

towards Palestine. But the spiritual and intellectual status of these Jews is so low that an immigration *en masse* would lower the general cultural standard of the Jews in Palestine and would be bad from several points of view. In small numbers, however, they might be extremely useful, with their knowledge of Oriental conditions, their small needs, and, in particular, their capacity of competing in wages with the Arab agricultural labourer. The East European Jew cannot possibly live on such wages. He can earn a living in Palestine only by work which makes demands on his intelligence and reliability. For purely manual labour preference is naturally given to the Arab, who is the cheaper workman. This breach in the Jewish economic system can be bridged by the Oriental Jew, who can do the rough work at the same price as the Arab.

Compared with agriculture, the industries, trade and commerce of Palestine are of little importance. The land has neither iron nor coal, neither good harbours nor navigable rivers, and it is far from the centres of communication. Great industries are not possible; even the far more favourably situated Balkan provinces, with all their mineral wealth and with state aid, can hardly keep up with the competition of the great manufacturing countries. The only industries with any prospects of success are those connected with the products of local agriculture (cereals, fruit, vegetables, oil, wool), or with the production of such articles as do not lend themselves to transportation from foreign countries to Palestine. Home industries, especially arts and crafts, are growing in importance; wages are low, and Oriental wares (carpets, laces, metal and woodwork) always find a ready market in Europe and

America.<sup>1</sup> One whole town (Bethlehem) subsists on the manufacture of mother-of-pearl articles, sold as relics in America ; and in Damascus, tens of thousands find employment in metal and woodwork. With the growth of these industries, it may be that Palestine will extend its trade. So far it is limited to the importation of European manufactured articles and food-stuffs, and the export of agricultural products which, with the exception of oranges, barley and olive oil, are neither considerable nor profitable.

Though industry and trade play at present so insignificant a part, it is possible that they may increase in importance in the near future. The position of Palestine, in its relation to the trade of the world, will be greatly improved when Jaffa and Haifa have built their projected harbours, and when the railway in Asia Minor (now in the process of construction) is continued, as planned, through Palestine to Port Said, thus bringing Palestine into direct connection with the European and African railway systems. The Meccan railway will be of the greatest importance to Palestine ; it will open up to communication the fertile and hitherto thinly populated land east of the Jordan. The mineral wealth of the Dead Sea, the irrigation value of the rivers, the fertility of the Jordan valley, with its sub-tropical climate, the many medicinal springs, the wonderful winter climate which could make Palestine a rival of Egypt—all these await development and exploitation. They cannot be developed in a day or a

<sup>1</sup> Home industries, in the form of arts and crafts, designed for export trade, have a great advantage over all other industries. They allow the workman a certain independence, and encourage individual talent. They do not in any way lead to assimilation, business between the workman and the non-Jewish buyer being effected through a middleman.



night, but they will follow gradually on the general development of trade and communication in Palestine and Syria.

It is often urged that Palestine is much too small to hold all the Jews. Palestine covers an area of about 29,000 sqkm. and has a population of 600,000, *i.e.* about 35 to the square mile. With *intensive* cultivation—to which the land is peculiarly adapted, and which must have prevailed 2,000 years ago—there is not the slightest doubt that it could maintain a population of 100 and more to the square mile. In other words, that it could hold over two million Jews. The number of Jews in the world, however, is not two, but twelve millions. A gathering together of all these Jews in Palestine is not to be contemplated for a moment. But it is absolutely wrong to suppose that Zionism seeks to solve the Jewish question in the sense of bringing about at one stroke a revolution in the abnormal condition of the Jews all over the world. Zionism is a cure for the moral distress of Judaism rather than for the economic misery of the Jews; at present it can only create in Palestine the kernel of a nation, a refuge for those Jews who wish to escape from assimilation. It was only a small remnant of Jews who were able to withstand assimilation at the time of the Babylonian exile. It will only be a small remnant to-day. The great majority of Jews will not go out to Palestine, and with the present scanty prospects of earning a livelihood there, it is undesirable that they should. Nevertheless, Zionism is of importance for them also. The Zionist movement has already stirred the Jewish consciousness of many a Western Jew. How much more would this be the case if Zionism should succeed in creating a new Jewish life in Palestine? When

conversion and intermarriage are constantly on the increase, when the number of Jews decreases from one census to the next, when the son hurries to the font and despises the Judaism of his father, it must become clear even to the most short-sighted that religion alone is not strong enough to save the Jews in the Diaspora from extinction. If then there come from Palestine reports of a new Jewish life growing up there ; of Jewish farmers living on the produce of their fields ; of the land, forgotten for eighteen centuries, being again made beautiful by the labour of Jewish hands ; of a young generation growing up in Jewish schools, proud of their Judaism ; of the Hebrew language once more a living tongue ; of Jewish colleges where Jewish professors teach modern science and scholarship in all branches ; of scientific discoveries ; of a re-birth of poetry and music—the ancient heritage of Israel—then, indeed, Zionism, by being able to point to concrete facts, must command the sympathy and support of those Jews who would never have been won over by theoretical propaganda.<sup>1</sup>

The term “ Cultural Zionism ” must not lead us into

<sup>1</sup> The same thing applies to the relation of Zionism to the Jewish organisations in Western Europe and America. So long as these work in the direction of securing complete equality for the Jews in the countries in which they are settled, in the fond hope that they will still be able to continue their separate existence, they will see in Zionism a disturbing element. Their attitude to Zionism will change only when they see for themselves whither their policy of elimination of all national differences and their efforts at social equality are leading the Jews—when the ever-increasing number of mixed marriages and conversions convince them that they are making for the downfall instead of the uplifting of Judaism. They will then recognise in the Jewish settlement in Palestine a certain guarantee for the future in the event of their own efforts proving futile.

the error of thinking that Zionism in Palestine means the *immediate and exclusive* creation of a cultural centre. Such a conception would be utterly false, because a living Jewish culture in Palestine can only grow on the foundations of a large Jewish population and a healthy social system. One might possibly maintain a few scholars and educational and artistic institutions for a certain time on monetary support received from abroad, but a real national culture must be the natural outcome of a healthy national life. Whosoever desires to create a Jewish culture in Palestine must first bring thither Jews who are already provided with the means of existence.

Contrary to the general impression, that Palestine is too small for the segregation of the Jews, it might be affirmed with more truth that for the present purposes of Zionism it offers too large a field for colonisation. Not reckoning the Jews supported by Chalukah, who have gone out to Palestine from religious motives, the Jewish population has increased only by 30,000 souls during the last thirty years, though Baron de Rothschild's colonising activity fell within that period. The increase was thus at the rate of about 1,000 a year. It is possible that now that the first difficulties have been overcome, immigration may increase or be carried on on a larger scale, but we must not be too sanguine. Every immigrant must be assured of a livelihood beforehand, and the creation of so many livelihoods in an essentially agricultural land is a slow process. If, instead of an annual increase of 1,000 we calculate on 3,000, 5,000, or even 10,000 annually during the next thirty years, we have probably taken the maximum estimate. In any case there can be no question of any overcrowding in Palestine resulting from immigration.

And in fact the local segregation of the Jews can only be accomplished within certain restricted areas of Palestine. The towns, all of which have large Jewish populations, have been hitherto the natural centres. By the foundation of numerous Jewish agricultural colonies in the neighbourhood of these towns, we should obtain the basis of a comprehensive social life in which Jews would participate not only in the production of the raw material, but in its manufacture, and finally in the exchange of commodities. The economic area would comprise a group of villages centred round a town which would serve as the market, the small centres would be brought into communication one with the other, and would co-operate whenever possible, and each be a reflection of one and the same culture.

There remains the question of the Jews themselves. Flocking to Palestine as they would from the most diverse countries, speaking different languages, lacking the local character which belongs to all other nations by right of connection with the soil, how will they be able to live together in Palestine in peace and harmony? Is it not likely that the quarrels and religious contentions with which the Jews in Palestine were torn 2,000 years ago will break out afresh when the Jews are once more assembled together from all ends of the earth? There are some grounds for this fear. If the Jews were left to themselves bad results might be expected, especially in the first generation before the feeling of strangeness between the different sections had been overcome. But under the Turkish Government the dissensions, even if they break out, will not lead to any open show of hostility. It may be hoped, too, that by the usage of a common language, Hebrew, by sharing in the same work and following the same destiny, they will draw



nearer to one another, and that discord, if it cannot be averted altogether, may make itself heard less persistently. As far as we can judge by the present condition of the new immigrant Jewish population of Palestine, there is no lack of friction and of schisms, but the national feeling is strong enough to bridge over all dissensions. Even the religious antagonism between the "Frommen" (orthodox) and the "Unfrommen" (unorthodox), which is so pronounced in Europe, has lost its bitterness in Palestine, and is giving place to a broad tolerance. Each sees that the other is also working for Judaism and wishes to remain Jewish, and this does away with the bitter feeling caused by non-observance in Europe, where it is simply the first step to a renunciation of Judaism.

#### G. *The prospects of Zionism.*

The difficulties in the way of a local segregation of Jews in Palestine are great or small according to different points of view: they are not insuperable. The Jews who consider the Zionist aim impracticable or Utopian are more short-sighted than those Zionists who think the aim already accomplished when a new colony is founded somewhere in Palestine. The truth is that *the aim of Zionism—the formation of a coherent Jewish population in Palestine with agriculture as its economic basis and Hebrew as the national language—is difficult indeed, but possible.* The difficulties must not deter us. The re-building of a nation requires the utmost effort, and the bringing into play of all the latent strength of the Jewish people. But the end is worthy of the effort. For *Zionism is not a mere national or chauvinistic caprice, but the last desperate stand of the Jews against annihilation.* Should the denationalising



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